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This dissertation bundles three empirical studies in the area of corporate finance and
banking. These studies investigate corporates’ financing activity with a special focus on the
interaction between the banking industry and corporate borrowers. Chapter 2 asks the
question whether and how government interventions in the U.S. banking sector have
benefited the U.S. corporate borrowers during the financial crisis of 2007-2009. This chapter
focuses on firms’ stock performance and find that government capital infusions in banks
have a significantly positive impact on borrowing firms’ stock returns. Findings from this
chapter suggest that in an economic recession, policy makers could restart the economic
engine by carefully implementing a policy with the specific goal of reactivating the bank
lending channel. Chapter 3 looks into firm’s bond maturity dispersion activity and the
impact on firms’ funding liquidity. The results suggest that spreading out bond maturities is
an effective corporate policy used by certain types of firms to manage funding liquidity
risk. Chapter 4 investigates whether labor market frictions in the target market influence
the mode in which out-of-state banks enter the new market following the U.S. interstate
banking deregulation. The result shows that banks enter new markets by establishing new
branches after the relaxation of non-compete enforcement in the target market, while they
enter by acquiring incumbent banks’ branches after the enforcement becomes restrictive in
the target market. Interestingly, only bank entries via new branches significantly increase
bank competition, improve the availability of credit to small businesses, and facilitate
economic growth. 
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Chapter 1 
Introduction  
  
In the seminal work by Modigliani and Miller (1958), authors propose a theory arguing the 
irrelevance of corporate financing decision in a frictionless financial market. Paradoxically, this 
paper has led to extensive theoretical and empirical analysis that reveals the importance of 
corporate financing decision in a dynamic economic environment. In reality, firms are not only 
facing bankruptcy costs, but also subject to information asymmetry and agency costs. Those 
market frictions have significant impact on firms’ financing decision, and consequently influence 
firms’ performance. In an imperfect financial market with frictions, the existence of banks as 
delegated monitor and financial intermediary helps to mitigate the information asymmetry 
between borrowing firms and lenders on the market, matches credit supply with credit demand, 
and generate extra liquidity to the market (Diamond 1984, Diamond and Rajan 2001). Bank 
credit remains as an important source for corporate financing – by the end of 2014, the amount of 
commercial and industrial loan provided by all commercial banks has reached a historical level 
of 1.8 trillion U.S. dollars which is equivalent to 11% of the U.S. GDP. It is therefore important 
to understand the interaction between banks and corporate borrowers and how changes in the 
banking industry affect firms’ financing decision and performance.  
This dissertation studies three research questions in the area of corporate finance and 
banking. The first chapter investigates the impact of government interventions in banks on 
corporate borrowers. Based on detailed information on the firms’ borrowing history, we identify 
credit relationships with banks as channels that transmit government capital injection program as 
positive shocks in the banking industry and investigate the impact on corporate borrowers. To 
identify the impact, we define a firm-specific time-varying Intervention Score that is based on 
the firms’ pre-crisis structure of bank relationships and their banks’ participation in government 
14_Erim Wang Stand.job
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capital support programs. Using short-term event study methodology and panel data analysis, we 
investigate whether and how corporate borrowers’ stock returns during the financial crisis of 
2007-2009 relate to the variation in their intervention scores, controlling for the general stock 
market performance. While related studies document the negative spillover effects from the 
banking to the corporate sector in the first stage of the financial crisis, we show that bank-firm 
relationships serve as a transmission channel for positive spillover effects on the corporate sector 
in situations when shocks to banks are mitigated through government interventions. Our 
principal results indicate that firms significantly benefit from the government capital support in 
their banks. Firms display positive abnormal stock returns around intervention events in their 
banks and also higher average daily stock returns the higher their intervention scores. Moreover, 
the impact of government intervention varies with pre-crisis firm and bank characteristics. We 
further find some indication that financial constraints of firms have been reduced during the year 
after their banks received capital infusions, which is consistent with our main results based on 
firms’ stock price performance. Our evidence is consistent with the broader view that bank-firm 
relationships serve as an important transmission channel for positive shocks to banks. 
Chapter 3 looks into firm’s debt maturity management activity and the impact on firms’ 
funding liquidity. Funding liquidity risk is an important type of risk faced by firms in a financial 
market with friction. When a firm faces severe funding liquidity risk, it may be forced to search 
for expensive alternative financing sources, undertake a costly debt restructuring process, or even 
liquidate its assets, possibly at fire-sale prices (e.g., Brunnermeier and Yogo, 2009). It arises 
when a firm cannot meet its financing needs – either being unable to rollover its debt at maturity 
or being unable to finance new investment opportunities (e.g., Diamond, 1991). Survey evidence 
suggests that, when deciding on debt issues, one of the primary concerns for CFOs is to avoid the 
clustering of debt maturity dates (e.g., Graham and Harvey, 2001; Servaes and Tufano, 2006). 
Many recent studies show that firms having a large proportion of debt maturing during the crisis 
had severe funding liquidity problem, suffered from credit downgrading, and were forced to 
reduce investment (Almeida et al. 2012, Gopalan et al. 2012). This chapter looks into firms’ debt 
maturity diversification practice and investigates first, what types of firms that maintain 
dispersed maturity overtime. And second, whether spreading out debt maturity could mitigate 
firms’ funding liquidity problem. We find that larger, more leveraged, less profitable, growth-
oriented, and non-bank dependent firms exhibit the largest maturity dispersion of outstanding 
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bonds. Such dispersion is maintained by frequently issuing sets of bonds with different 
maturities. We further find that more bond maturity dispersion results in higher funding 
availability and lower funding costs. The effects are stronger for firms that face more funding 
liquidity risk. The evidence suggests that spreading out bond maturities is an effective corporate 
policy to manage funding liquidity risk. 
Chapter 4 investigates the role of labor market in the process of bank expansion in the United 
States. In the field of financial economics, one of the most fundamental questions is why we 
need the financial industry. Schumpeter in 1912 argued that the existence of financial institutions 
fosters real economic growth as it channels capital to its most efficient use. Many empirical 
papers shows that the significant development in the U.S. banking industry over the past three 
decades featured by interstate banking deregulation has led to more bank competition, better 
service level in the banking industry, improved credit availability for businesses and contribute to 
economic development (Jayaratne and Strahan 1996; Huang 2008). In this study, I argue that the 
mobility of incumbent bank employees is the key channel through which out-of-state banks can 
get access to local information, and the labor market friction in the target market influences the 
process of bank expansion and consequently the local lending market. I focus on the changes in 
jurisdictional enforcement of the non-compete covenants and exploit the heterogeneity in the 
non-compete enforcement as exogenous variations in labor market flexibility and test its impact 
on the mode how banks enter new markets. My findings highlight the importance of local 
information accessibility for banks expanding into new markets. Banks choose different modes 
to acquire local information in response to the flexibility of the local labor market. The difference 
in entry modes has different implications for local economic activity. Bank entries via new 
branches - but not via acquisition of incumbent banks’ branches - significantly increase bank 
competition, improve the availability of credit to small businesses, and facilitate economic 
growth. This study has important policy implications. The findings show that policymakers 
should pay attention to the local labor legislation in order to unleash the full benefit of financial 
development on real growth. 
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Chapter 2 
The Impact of Government Intervention in 
Banks on Corporate Borrowers’ Stock Returns 
 
 
2.1 Introduction 
Financial and banking crises have a significantly negative impact on the corporate sector, 
resulting in a lower stock market valuation of borrowing firms and a subsequent decrease in 
aggregate economic activity. However, little is known empirically about the existence and nature 
of spillover effects that might arise from a removal or mitigation of shocks to the financial and 
banking system to the corporate sector. Do stock prices of corporate borrowers react to rescue 
measures for banks? If yes, what are the direction, magnitude and speed of the reaction? Which 
firms exhibit the strongest stock price reaction? To shed light on these questions, we investigate 
whether and how government interventions in the U.S. banking sector influence the stock returns 
of corporate borrowers during the global financial crisis of 2007-2009. 
Financial crises, such as the Japanese, the Russian, the Asian, and the recent global one, have 
not only adversely affected the financial system but also the real economy in many countries 
through a tightening of bank lending (e.g., Chava and Purnanandam (2011), Campello et al. 
(2010), Carvalho et al. (2011), Giannetti and Simonov (2013), Ivashina and Scharfstein (2010), 
                                                        
*This Chapter is based on Norden, Roosenboom and Wang (2013). We are especially grateful for the helpful comments and 
suggestions from an anonymous referee and Hendrik Bessembinder (the editor). This paper also benefits tremendously from very 
helpful discussions with, among many others, Shantanu Banerjee, Dion Bongaerts, Olivier De Jonghe, Werner Neus, Steven 
Ongena, David Robinson, Jörg Rocholl, Mathijs van Dijk, and participants at the European Finance Association 2011 Meetings 
in Stockholm, the Banking Workshop 2011 in Münster, the Corporate Finance 2011 in Lille, the IFABS 2011 Conference in 
Rome, the Belgian Financial Research Forum 2012 in Antwerp, and the ERIM PhD seminar at Erasmus University. I gratefully 
acknowledge financial support from the National Science Foundation of the Netherlands (NWO) under Mosaic grant 
number 017.007.128 and the Vereniging Trustfonds Erasmus University Rotterdam. 
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and Lemmon and Roberts (2010)). Related studies document a sharp drop in bank credit supply 
to the corporate sector during the peak of the financial crisis. To “restore liquidity and stability to 
the financial system” (U.S. Congress (2008), p. 2), the Federal Reserve System cut the target 
interest rate from 5.25% to close to zero from September 2007 to December 2008. When this 
monetary intervention proved ineffective, the U.S. government was forced to step in and use tax 
payers’ money to bail out the troubled banking industry. Under the Emergency Economic 
Stabilization Act, the U.S. government provided certain banks with additional equity to stabilize 
the financial industry via the Capital Purchase Program (CPP), a prominent part of the Troubled 
Asset Relief Program (TARP). The stated aim of the CPP was to “strengthen the capital base of 
the financially sound banks” by providing them with extra liquidity and equity so that banks 
could “increase their capability of lending to U.S. consumers and businesses to support the U.S. 
economy” (U.S. Department of Treasury, October 14, 2008). However, evidence is mixed on 
whether banks have actually used this government support to keep on lending (e.g., Li (2013)) or 
to repair their own balance sheets (e.g., SIGTARP (2010), Taliaferro (2009)). Thus, the question 
whether such intervention in banks has implications for corporate borrowers remains largely 
unanswered. 
In this paper, we depart from the existing literature by investigating the impact of U.S. banks’ 
participation in the CPP on borrowing firms’ stock price performance. To identify the impact, we 
focus on the bank lending channel and define a firm-specific time-varying intervention score that 
is based on the firms’ pre-crisis structure of bank relationships and their banks’ participation in 
government capital support programs. We focus on the corporate borrowers’ stock price 
performance to capture the effect of government intervention on the bank lending channel. Using 
short-term event study methodology and panel data analysis, we investigate whether and how 
corporate borrowers’ stock returns during the financial crisis of 2007-2009 relate to the variation 
in their intervention scores, controlling for the general stock market performance. We also test 
whether pre-crisis firm, bank, and bank-firm relationship characteristics influence this link. 
While related studies document the negative spillover effects from the banking to the 
corporate sector in the first stage of the financial crisis, we show that bank-firm relationships 
serve as a transmission channel for positive spillover effects on the corporate sector in situations 
when shocks to banks are mitigated through government interventions. Our principal results 
indicate that firms significantly benefit from the CPP infusions in their banks. Firms display 
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positive abnormal stock returns around intervention events in their banks and also higher average 
daily stock returns the higher their intervention scores. We further show that the positive effect 
on borrowing firms’ stock returns is not merely significant for the forced CPP interventions but 
also when banks voluntarily participated in the CPP. Moreover, the impact of government 
intervention varies with pre-crisis firm and bank characteristics. Firms that are riskier (i.e., more 
levered, less profitable, more financially distressed), bank-dependent and more strongly hit by 
the financial crisis benefit more from government capital infusions in their banks during the 
crisis. Firms also benefit more from government intervention when they borrow from banks that 
are less capitalized and smaller. Various empirical checks confirm these findings and their 
robustness. We further find some indication that financial constraints of firms have been reduced 
during the year after their banks received capital infusions, which is consistent with our main 
results based on firms’ stock price performance. 
Our paper relates to three strands of the banking and finance literature. The first strand 
examines the impact of financial and banking crises. Several studies show that such crises are 
associated with reductions in the aggregate output level (e.g., Dell’Ariccia et al. (2008), Reinhart 
and Rogoff (2009)). Other studies examine the impact of the financial crises on banks and show 
that there are significant negative effects on banks’ capital that reduce the supply of loans to the 
corporate sector (e.g., Panetta et al. (2010), Santos (2011)). For instance, Shin et al. (2008) 
document that banks, especially the under-capitalized ones, were forced to swiftly repair their 
capital structure by reducing loan provisions during the Korean crisis to avoid bankruptcy. 
Further evidence suggests that adverse consequences from increased losses in the banking sector 
spill over to the corporate sector and negatively affect borrowing firms’ performance (Chava and 
Purnanandam (2011), Lemmon and Roberts (2010)). Moreover, Campello et al. (2010) provide 
survey evidence that the recent financial crisis more adversely affected financially constrained 
firms, which were forced to cut heavily in their spending in R&D, marketing, and employment, 
and forego profitable investment opportunities. We extend this research by showing that 
corporate borrowers’ stock returns positively respond to government capital infusions in their 
banks. 
Second, our work relates to the increasing literature on government interventions in the 
banking sector. Previous studies have focused on the characteristics of banks that were subject to 
intervention and the changes in their performance. For example, banks that received capital 
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infusions under TARP are larger, and have lower capital ratios, lower market-to-book ratios, and 
better asset quality than non-TARP recipient banks (Bayazitova and Shivdasani (2012)). The 
finding on asset quality suggests that the U.S. government has predominantly supported those 
banks that were sufficiently healthy to recover from the crisis. Furthermore, evidence suggests 
that earlier rounds of TARP capital infusions resulted in wealth gains for the banks’ shareholders 
(Bayazitova and Shivdasani (2012), Veronesi and Zingales (2010)). There is mixed evidence on 
the question whether TARP capital infusions effectively stimulated bank lending during the 
crisis. Li (2013) suggests that the TARP program has indeed encouraged bank lending. However, 
other studies argue that due to severe capital losses of banks during crisis, most banks use the 
TARP funds to repair their balance sheets rather than lending to businesses (e.g., SIGTARP 
(2010), Taliaferro (2009)). In addition, government intervention was accompanied by stricter 
supervisory and governance rules that might have further tightened banks’ lending (e.g., Adams 
(2012), Kim (2010), Fahlenbrach and Stulz (2011)). Unlike studies that investigate 
characteristics of TARP capital recipient banks and their performance, we analyze the impact on 
TARP banks’ borrowers to identify spillover effects associated with the capital infusion program 
on the corporate sector. 
The third strand of literature investigates the importance of bank-firm relationships. Given 
that the vast majority of corporate borrowers rely on multiple bank relationships, the 
effectiveness of the bank lending channel essentially depends on the structure of firms’ bank 
relationships and the banks’ ability and willingness to provide credit. Previous studies suggest 
that firms benefit from establishing and maintaining a close relationship with banks (James 
(1987), Petersen and Rajan (1994), Berger and Udell (1995), Boot (2000), Norden and Weber 
(2010), Bharath et al. (2011)). Closer banking ties increase firms’ access to credit and facilitate 
loan renegotiation (e.g., Petersen and Rajan (1994), Cole (1998), Shin et al. (2008), Gopalan et 
al. (2011)). Strong bank relationships are particularly valuable when borrowers face temporary 
liquidity problems or face adverse economic situations (e.g., Bolton and Scharfstein (1996), 
Elsas and Krahnen (1998), Detragiache et al. (2000)). However, theory argues that the 
information monopoly arising from close bank relationships can create a “hold up problem” for 
the borrowers to obtain alternative funds from other banks (e.g., Rajan (1992), Gopalan et al. 
(2011)). This reasoning implies that a close bank relationship exposes the firm to a higher 
sensitivity to potential shocks to the bank. Empirical evidence confirms that banks that 
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experience large exogenous shocks tighten their lending and banks’ financial insolvency 
negatively impacts their borrowers’ stock returns (Slovin et al. (1993), Kang and Stulz (2000), 
Bae et al. (2002), Ongena et al. (2003)). Lemmon and Roberts (2010) highlight the important 
role of bank credit supply by showing that even large firms with access to the public credit 
market are vulnerable to shocks in bank credit supply. Chava and Purnanandam (2011) 
investigate the impact of the Russian crisis on U.S. banks and find that adverse shocks to bank 
capital mostly affect bank-dependent borrowers. Carvalho et al. (2011) confirm this result for the 
recent financial crisis by showing how negative shocks to banks spill over to the corporate sector. 
They find that sharp decreases in banks’ market capitalization are associated with equity 
valuation losses of firms that have credit relationships with these banks. The effect is strongest 
for firms with close credit relationships, higher informational asymmetry, and a higher need to 
roll over their debt. Gokcen (2010) looks at whether the first TARP intervention positively 
impacted corporate borrowers. He reports a positive short-term impact on firm’s stock returns if 
the firm’s top lead bank is one of the nine banks that were forced to participate in TARP. In this 
paper, we use complementary empirical methods that make it possible for us to take into account 
the specific nature of the CPP. In addition to short-term event study methodology, which captures 
jump effects in stock prices due to the expected impact of the intervention, we apply a novel 
measurement approach, the intervention score, in panel data regressions to investigate the impact 
of intervention events over a longer time horizon. The intervention score reflects the impact of 
intervention-induced expected and actual changes in bank lending on corporate borrowers’ stock 
returns, considering the number of banks that obtain capital infusions, the bank-specific 
magnitude of the capital infusions, and the bank-specific duration of the capital infusion. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section II describes the institutional 
background of the Capital Purchase Program (CPP). Section III presents our main hypotheses. 
Section IV describes the data. Section V reports the main findings. Section VI summarizes the 
results from further empirical checks. Section VII concludes. 
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2.2 Institutional Background of the Capital Purchase 
Program (CPP) 
Under the Emergency Economic Stabilization Act (EESA) of 2008, TARP was initiated by 
the U.S. Treasury Department to purchase up to $700 billion troubled assets from financial 
institutions and other companies. Secretary Paulson revised the TARP implementation plan on 
October 14, 2008 and decided to directly infuse $250 billion to the financial system through the 
Capital Purchase Program (CPP). The CPP allows qualifying financial institutions to sell 
preferred stocks and warrants to the U.S. Treasury Department. The first nine banks were forced 
to participate in the CPP whereas all the later recipient banks participated in the CPP voluntarily. 
Until the end of 2009, more than 600 financial institutions have received capital support that in 
total amounts to roughly $202 billion. Table 2.1 provides an overview of the CPP. 
TABLE 2.1 The Capital Purchase Program 
This table provides information on banks that participated in the Capital Purchase Program (CPP). Panel A contains 
information on banks that received CPP funds and banks that paid back CPP funds later. Panel B provides statistics 
on the distribution of the CPP infusions. The sample period starts from 28 October 2008 and ends at 31 December 
2009. Amounts of the CPP are calculated as cumulative numbers in billions of dollars. 
 
Panel A. Top 10 banks in terms of total amount of CPP received and redeemed 
CPP capital infusion  CPP redemption 
Bank name Amount (in billion $)  Bank name Amount (in billion $) 
Wells Fargo  25  Bank of America  25 
JPMorgan Chase 25  JPMorgan Chase  25 
Citigroup  25  Wells Fargo  25 
Bank of America 25  Morgan Stanley 10 
The Goldman Sachs 10  The Goldman Sachs 10 
Morgan Stanley 10  U.S. Bancorp 6.60 
PNC 7.58  American Express  3.39 
U.S. Bancorp 6.60  BB&T  3.13 
SunTrust Banks 4.85  Bank of New York Mellon  3 
Capital One  3.56  State Street 2 
Total amount 142.58  Total amount 113.12 
As a percentage of total CPP 
infusion 
70.33%  As a percentage of total CPP 
repayment  
95.04% 
 
Panel B. The distribution of CPP infusions (Banks are ranked in terms of total amount of CPP received) 
    Amount (in 
billion $) 
 As a percentage of 
total CPP infusion 
First quartile of CPP recipient banks (top 25% capital recipients) 
Second quartile of CPP recipient banks (25% -50% capital 
recipients) 
Third quartile of CPP recipient banks (50%- 75% capital 
recipients) 
Fourth quartile of CPP recipient banks (75%-100% capital 
recipients) 
 197.95 
 
 97.64% 
 3.10 
 
 1.53% 
 1.23 
 
 0.61% 
 0.46  0.22% 
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Panel A lists the top 10 banks in terms of the amount of CPP capital received and repaid. 
Note that the list of top CPP recipient banks does not fully coincide with the list of the first nine 
banks that were forced to participate. There are also a number of large voluntary capital infusions 
that happened at a later stage; for example, US Bancorp was not forced to participate in the 
initial CPP infusion but voluntarily opted for CPP funding and obtained $6.6 billion in total. 
Panel B shows that the distribution of CPP infusions is highly concentrated. We rank all CPP 
recipient banks in terms of the amount of capital received, and the result shows that the top 25% 
of CPP recipient banks in terms of the amount received have taken almost all (97.6%) of the total 
CPP funds. 
For the CPP redemption, 63 banks had paid back $118 billion by the end of December 2009. 
The initial CPP conditions made it impossible for banks to repurchase the stock completely at par 
within three years after receiving the CPP. In February 2009, the enactment of the American 
Recovery and Reinvestment Act (ARRA) introduced stricter rules on incentive-based executive 
compensation, but also made the early repayment of CPP funds possible. 
Figure 2.1 illustrates the number of events and amounts associated with CPP infusions and 
redemptions. Most capital infusions happened during the fourth quarter of 2008 and the first 
quarter of 2009 and all CPP redemptions took place after February 2009. CPP redemptions peak 
on June 16 2009, when 64.74 billion dollars were redeemed by several large banks. Those banks 
include JP Morgan Chase, Morgan Stanley, and Goldman Sachs that were forced to participate in 
the CPP initially. They choose to pay back funds at the same time in order not to leak 
information on their relative financial soundness to the market. Several recent studies on the 
impact of TARP and CPP show that the government intervention was predominantly associated 
with increases in banks’ stock prices and decreases in CDS spreads (e.g., Veronesi and Zingales 
(2010), Li (2013), Elyasiani et al. (2011), Bayazitova and Shivdasani (2012)). Li (2013) shows 
that banks used approximately one-third of the TARP capital to support new loans and the rest to 
strengthen their balance sheets. Figure 2.2 displays banks’ quarterly loan growth from the FDIC 
Call Reports to document potential changes in credit supply around the government intervention 
events. Banks that obtain capital infusions indeed increased total lending in the quarter the 
intervention took place compared to the quarter before. Non-CPP banks did not. This observation 
suggests that CPP capital infusions have at least in part been used to restore business lending.  
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FIGURE 2.1 Number and Amount of CPP Capital Infusions and Redemptions over Time 
Panel A. Number of CPP capital infusions and redemptions 
This figure displays the distribution of the number of capital infusions and redemptions from October 2008 to 
December 2009. The data on banks’ participation in the CPP come from the website of U.S. Treasury Department 
(http://www.financialstability.gov). 
 
 
Panel B. Amount of CPP capital infusions and redemptions 
This figure displays the distribution of capital infusions and redemptions (in billion $) from October 2008 to 
December 2009. The data on banks’ participation in the CPP come from the website of U.S. Treasury Department 
(http://www.financialstability.gov). 
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FIGURE 2.2 Growth in Total Loan Volume of CPP and Non-CPP Banks 
This figure plots the growth rate in total loan volume for the group of banks that received CPP money in 2008Q4, 
2009Q1 and 2009Q2, respectively. The figure shows the growth in total loan volume one quarter before (q-1), the 
quarter of (q) and one quarter after (q+1) the bank received a capital infusion. For comparison, we also include the 
growth in total loan volume of the group of non-CPP banks in 2008Q4. N indicates the number of banks used to 
compute the growth in total loan volume. We aggregate quarterly loan volume from FDIC Call Reports across 
individual banks to obtain total loan volume. We then compute the percentage growth rate in total loan volume from 
one quarter to the next. 
 
 
2.3 Hypotheses 
The declared purpose of the U.S. government’s intervention via CPP was to stabilize banks 
with extra liquidity and make it possible for them to keep on lending or to increase lending to the 
corporate sector. If investors expect that government interventions in banks could help 
alleviating the negative credit shocks and improving the credit availability to firms through the 
bank lending channel, then a positive valuation impact on corporate borrowers’ stock price 
performance would be observed. Therefore, we propose the following hypothesis:  
Hypothesis H1: CPP interventions in banks have a significantly positive impact on corporate 
borrowers’ stock price performance. 
We next investigate whether borrowers’ characteristics affect the stock price impact of CPP 
intervention. Given the fact that the recent financial crisis originated from the supply side 
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(Ciccarelli et al. (2010), Ivashina and Scharfstein (2010), Ongena et al. (2010)) the entire 
banking industry became cautious and reluctant to grant new loans. Other things equal, it was 
more difficult for smaller, bank-dependent, less profitable clients with a higher leverage ratio and 
bankruptcy risk to get sufficient credit or to switch to alternative financing sources due to the 
high risk level and information asymmetry between banks and those firms. Also, a lower level of 
cash holdings prior to the crisis makes firms more vulnerable to the credit supply shocks during 
the banking crisis. It is also more difficult for more bank-dependent firms, such as firms with low 
liquidity and firms that lack an investment-grade rating, to raise external finance. These firms are 
therefore more sensitive to shocks to banks and government intervention in the banking industry 
is expected to be especially helpful for those firms. We expect that the crisis stock price 
performance of these firms is more positively affected when the shocks to banks are mitigated by 
capital infusions in their banks. In addition, consistent with Chava and Purnanandam (2011), we 
expect firms that were most strongly affected during the financial crisis are also the ones that 
benefit most once the negative shocks are mitigated by the government interventions.  
Hypothesis H2: CPP interventions in banks have a significantly stronger impact on stock 
returns of corporate borrowers who are smaller (H2a), more leveraged (H2b), less profitable 
(H2c), closer to financial distress (H2d), short on cash (H2e), less liquid (H2f), more strongly 
hit during the financial crisis (H2g) and more bank-dependent (H2h). 
We also investigate whether bank characteristics influence the magnitude of the impact of 
government interventions on firm’s stock price performance. Previous studies on the bank 
lending channel argue that large and well-capitalized banks are better able to buffer their lending 
activity against shocks affecting the availability of external finance (Kishan and Opiela (2000), 
Gambacorta and Mistrulli (2004)). Empirical evidence from the recent financial crisis shows that 
banks with higher capital ratios are less adversely hit by the crisis since they are better able to 
absorb potential losses (Bayazitova and Shivdasani (2012), Li (2013)). Without capital infusions 
in their banks, firms borrowing more from weaker and smaller banks would have experienced 
more funding difficulties (e.g., increase in loan spread paid) during the credit crunch (Santos, 
2011). In line with this argument, we expect a stronger improvement in the stock price 
performance of firms that borrow from smaller and financially distressed banks once shocks on 
these banks are alleviated by CPP intervention. 
Hypothesis H3: CPP interventions in banks have a significantly stronger impact on stock 
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returns of corporate borrowers that borrow from banks that are less profitable (H3a), less 
capitalized (H3b), and smaller (H3c). 
 
2.4 Data 
Our data comprise information on firm stock price performance, firm characteristics, bank-
firm lending relationships, banks’ characteristics and their participation in the Capital Purchasing 
Program. We consider firms that are included in the CRSP, Compustat and LPC Dealscan 
databases. We identify firm characteristics prior to the start of the crisis in the second quarter of 
2007. Bank-firm relationships are measured prior to the government intervention in the banking 
sector We identify banks’ participations in the CPP interventions and borrowing firms’ stock 
price performance during the crisis period, which starts from August 9, 2007 (when the Fed first 
increased the level of temporary open market operations; see Cecchetti (2009)) to December 31, 
2009. In total, our sample consists of 1,156 firms, of which 260 are included in the S&P 500 
index. The total market value of firms in our sample accounts for more than half of the total 
market capitalization of the listed U.S. firms. Table 2.2 reports summary statistics for the main 
variables and the Appendix A2.1 shows variable definitions, data sources, and the period of 
measurement. We describe these variables in more detail in the remainder of this section. 
 
TABLE 2.2 Summary Statistics 
This table reports summary statistics for the main variables. Detailed variable descriptions are provided in the 
Appendix A2.1. Panel A reports summary statistics of firm characteristics and bank characteristics. The data for firm 
and bank characteristics come from the second quarter of 2007. Crisis performance is calculated as the buy-and-hold 
stock return from August 9, 2007 to September 30, 2008. Panel B reports summary statistics on firms’ daily stock 
returns, the daily market returns based on the CRSP value-weighted market portfolio, and the two intervention 
scores (INT_SCO_DM, INT_SCO_AMT). The sample period starts on August 09, 2007 and ends on December 31, 
2009. The pre-CPP period refers to the period from August 09, 2007 to October 27, 2008, and the post-CPP period 
refers to the period from October 28, 2008 to December 31, 2009. 
 
Panel A. Firm characteristics and bank characteristics 
Variable group Variables Mean Median St. Dev. Units 
Firm characteristics Firm size 11,041 1,721 88,396 Million $ 
 Log(Firm size) 7.46 7.45 1.62 1 
 Leverage 28.60 26.09 21.70 % 
 ROA 1.31 1.17 2.61 % 
 Altman’s Z 1.33 1.24 1.35 1 
 Bank-dependence 0.60 1.00 0.49 Dummy 
 Cash holdings 14.00 4.61 24.61 % 
 Bid-ask spread 0.21 0.12 0.39 % 
 Crisis performance -0.18 -0.19 0.52 1 
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Panel B. Firm stock price performance, general stock market performance, and government intervention 
   Pre-CPP   Post-CPP     
Variable group Variables Mean Median St. Dev.   Mean Median 
St. 
Dev. 
  Units 
Firm stock return RETURN -0.0017 -0.0012 0.0377  0.0027 0.0007 0.0553  1 
Stock market return Rmt -0.0016 -0.0005 0.0188  0.0014 0.0026 0.0222  1 
Government 
intervention 
INT_SCO_DM 0 0 0  1.1042 1 0.6699  1 
  INT_SCO_AMT 0 0 0   0.0284 0.02 0.0459   1 
Number of firms 1,156          1,156         
Number of obs. 350,504         341,356         
 
2.4.1 Firm Characteristics and Stock Market Data 
We collect data on firms’ accounting variables and bank dependence (based on S&P credit 
ratings) from Compustat, and data on firms’ stock market performance from CRSP. We merge 
the stock market performance data with firm accounting data using the CRSP identifier, 
“permno”. We exclude the financial firms (SIC codes between 6000 and 6999). In order to avoid 
endogeneity problems in our analysis, we identify firms based on their pre-crisis accounting 
characteristics (2007Q2). 
We include firms’ total assets, cash holdings, and other variables that indicate the level of 
firms’ financial distress; such as leverage ratio, ROA, Altman’s Z-score, and the crisis stock price 
performance. We also consider variables that reflect the ease of firms’ access to the external 
financial resources, such as the bid-ask spread and bank-dependence. In line with Kashyap et al. 
(1994) and Chava and Purnanandam (2011), we evaluate a firm’s dependence on banks by 
examining their public debt rating status. We treat the non-rated and not investment-grade rated 
firms as bank-dependent firms and the investment-grade rated firms as not bank-dependent. In a 
credit crunch of such a scale, it is very difficult for the non-investment-grade firms to obtain 
alternative finance from either public debt market or commercial paper market. In our sample, 
roughly 60% of firms are categorized as bank-dependent borrowers according to their pre-crisis 
credit rating status.  
 
2.4.2 Bank-Firm Lending Relationships 
  Table 2.2 – continued from the previous page 
Bank characteristics Bank ROA 0.64 0.66 0.24 % 
 Bank capital ratio 12.19 12.02 10.53 % 
 Bank size 1,685,739 1,585,788 1,134,451 Million $ 
 Log(Bank size) 14.05 14.27 0.96 1 
Number of firms 1,156 
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The strength of the bank-firm relationship is a key factor influencing the credit channel that 
transmits shocks from banks to their borrowers. Therefore, in order to examine the impact of 
government interventions on borrowing firms’ performance we first measure the strength of each 
pair of bank-firm relationships. Having a stronger lending relationship with a bank allows 
borrowers to have better access to credit from this bank but also makes them more sensitive to 
the shocks to this bank at the same time. 
To establish bank-firm relationships, we employ the LPC Dealscan database, which has been 
used in related studies (e.g., Dennis et al. (2000), Bharath et al. (2011)). This database contains 
detailed information on bank loans, mostly syndicated loans, granted to large companies. There 
are various ways of measuring the strength of a bank-firm relationship; some studies focus on the 
time dimension and measure the length of the lending relationship (e.g. Berger and Udell 
(1995)), while others employ the existence of repeated lending, concurrent underwriting, lines of 
credit, and checking accounts as proxies for a strong bank relationship (e.g., Schenone (2004), 
Drucker and Puri (2005), Bharath et al. (2007), Norden and Weber (2010), Bharath et al. (2011)). 
Since the LPC database starts in 1982, it would not be possible to observe the exact starting point 
of the lending relationship and thus difficult to calculate the length of any of such a lending 
relationship. Thus, instead of focusing on the “time dimension” of the banking relationship, we 
choose to focus on the “exclusivity dimension” of bank relationships, which takes into account 
the number of bank lending relationships and the concentration of bank debt. 
In line with the related studies that suggest that repeated contracting between firms and banks 
correlates with a strong bank-borrower relationship, we take the repeated lending of banks to 
firms in the past as an indication for a strong bank-firm relationship. Similar to the method used 
by Bharath et al. (2007), we construct a firm-specific and time varying bank-firm lending 
relationship variable LRij,t that quantifies the relative importance of the relationship with bank j 
among all lending relationships of firm i at time t. We construct this lending relationship measure 
by analyzing the loan portfolio of firm i at time t. To do so, we review the history of new 
business loans extended to firm i by bank j prior to time t over a four-year window period from 
2004 to 2007. We use such window length because the median maturity of the loans in the LPC 
Dealscan database is 4.8 years. Given that our analysis period is from August 2007 to December 
2009, a loan granted during 2004-2007 should still be counted as part of firm’s total loan 
portfolio in our analysis period and thus would provide information about the strength of bank-
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firm relationship.  
The reason why we only review the loan history until 2007 and then freeze the relationship 
during the government intervention period is that tracking relationships through the crisis could 
create an endogeneity problem since certain firms might have started new relationships with 
banks that participated in the CPP because they expected that these banks are more willing or 
better able to provide credit. However, this does not seem to have happened on a large scale 
since significantly less new lending relationships have been formed after the beginning of the 
crisis in 2008 and 2009 (see Figure 2.3).  
 
FIGURE 2.3 Loan Origination from 2001 to 2009 
This figure reports the total number and total volume (in billion $) of new bank loans to U.S. firms originated from 
January 01, 2001 to December 31, 2009. The data come from the LPC Dealscan database. 
 
 
 
 
We construct the banking relationship LRij,t by looking at firm i’s top lead arrangers (banks) 
for each of firm i’s historical loan in the LPC database. Suppose that firm i obtained n loans 
during the past four years prior to time t, the lending relationship between firm i and one lending 
bank j at time t is calculated as: 
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(1) 
 
where Leadij,x is a dummy variable that equals one if bank j (among the others) acts as a lead 
arranger in loan x to firm i, and zero otherwise. numLi,x is the number of lead arrangers involved 
in loan x to firm i. 
The calculation of LRij is best illustrated by an example. LPC Dealscan reports that 
Accenture has entered two new loan contracts over the four-year period from 2004 to 2007; the 
first loan contract was granted in June 2004 with Bank of America and JP Morgan as lead 
arrangers. The second loan was granted in June 2006 with Bank of America and Citigroup as 
lead arrangers. In this case, the strength of relationship between Accenture and Bank of America 
is calculated as: LRAccenture, BankofAmerica=2/(2+1+1)=0.5; similarly, LRAccenture, JPM=1/(2+1+1)=0.25 
and LRAccenture, Citi=1/(2+1+1)=0.25. This method does not only identify the most important banks 
(lead arrangers) for each firm, but also differentiate the relative importance among lead arrangers 
over the past years. Note that for many cases in the LPC database, information on the actual 
shares of the individual banks in each syndicated loan are missing or not reliable, i.e., we cannot 
calculate the relative importance of each lead arranger based on loan volumes. Therefore, we use 
an indicator variable-based measurement approach, which is the closest we can get to accurately 
reflect the strength of a bank-firm relationship. 
For both borrowing firms and lead banks, we aggregate data to the parent-bank level. We use 
the parent bank in our analysis because the CPP is only conducted at the parent-firm level. We 
also exclude finance companies as lenders from our analysis because these institutions are not 
eligible to receive CPP capital infusions. 
The large number of mergers and acquisitions in the U.S. banking industry during our sample 
period makes it challenging to track the dynamics of bank-firm relationships. We use the 
Thomson One Banker and Zephyr database to document bank mergers and acquisitions events 
from 2004-2009 and construct dynamic relationships between banks and firms. Similar to other 
studies we assume that in most of the cases, the post-merger/post-acquisition bank inherited the 
loans of the pre-merger/pre-acquisition banks under normal economic situations. When bank A is 
acquired by bank B at time t1, all clients of bank A are automatically counted as clients of bank B 
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after time t1, and LRiB,t for firm i is recalculated by taking into account the prior relationship with 
bank A.  
Based on the information extracted from 2,449 loan contracts from January 2004 till 
December 2007, we are able to construct 127,748 pairs of bank-firm relationships LRij,t at the 
beginning of 2005 and this number is then reduced to 112,512 pairs at the end of 2009 due to 
mergers and acquisitions in the banking sector. We use the borrower parent ticker from LPC 
Dealscan to match to the ticker of Compustat. Using the link of Michael R. Roberts 
(http://finance.wharton.upenn.edu/~mrrobert/) we also match the company names from LPC 
Dealscan to the “gvkey” from Compustat (see Chava and Roberts (2008) for more details on this 
link). This produces a similar match given that all firms in our sample are publicly listed and 
have a borrower parent ticker available in LPC Dealscan. 
 
2.4.3 CPP Capital Infusions and Redemptions 
The data on banks’ participation in TARP’s capital infusion program CPP come from the 
website (http://www.treasury.gov/initiatives/financial-stability) of the U.S. Treasury Department. 
It includes information on capital infusions and capital redemptions. We employ an innovative 
measurement to assess the intensity of the positive spill-over effects stemming from intervention 
by defining a firm-specific and time-varying CPP intervention score which takes a firm’s bank 
relationships and the banks’ participation in the CPP program into account. We create two 
intervention variables for each firm to capture the presence (INT_SCO_DM) and magnitude 
(INT_SCO_AMT) of CPP interventions. For INT_SCO_DM, we first create a time-varying 
intervention variable Intervention_DMj,t for each firm’s bank j. Intervention_DMj,t increases its 
value by one when a capital infusion took place and decrease value by one if there is capital 
redemption. Second, we transform the bank-level variable Intervention_DMj,t into a firm-level 
intervention score, INT_SCO_DMi,t, for each firm i by considering the lending relationships with 
its m banks. The daily firm-level intervention score is calculated as shown in equation (2). 
(2)              tj
m
j
tijti DMonInterventiLRDMSCOINT ,
1
,, ___ 

            
Following similar procedure, we create a second firm-level intervention measure by 
considering firm i’s lending relationships with m banks and the amount of CPP capital that is 
injected into each of the m lending banks. First, for each bank, we create a time-varying 
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intervention variable Intervention_AMTj,t, which increases (decreases) its value by the CPP 
dollar amount injected to (redeemed by) bank j scaled by the total asset value of bank j prior to 
the start of the crisis (2007Q2). 
(3)           
jbankofassetstotalcrisispre
jbanktoinjectedamount
AMTonInterventi tj

,_              
We then transform the bank-level variable Intervention_AMTj,t into a daily firm-level 
intervention score, INT_SCO_AMTi,t by considering the lending relationships with its m banks, 
as shown in equation (4): 
(4)             tj
m
j
tijti AMTonInterventiLRAMTSCOINT ,
1
,, ___ 

       
Since the impact of the CPP intervention on firms’ stock market performance is the main 
focus of our analysis, we use an example from our dataset to illustrate the first intervention score 
INT_SCO_DMi,t and firms’ stock price performance in Figure 2.4. 
 
FIGURE 2.4 The Co-Movement of the Intervention Score and Firm Stock Price 
This figure shows the co-movement of stock price and the intervention score (INT_SCO_DM) of Archer Daniels 
Midland Company from August 09, 2007 until December 31, 2009.  
 
 
 
The company Archer Daniels Midland Company (NYSE: ADM, agriculture and food 
industry) started three loan contracts from 2004 till 2007, which involved a total of 26 lead 
arrangers (16 unique banks). As displayed in Figure 2.4, INT_SCO_DMi,t (measured on the left 
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axis) first increased during the initial CPP infusion since three banks (acted as lead arrangers 
eight times) received CPP funds. As more banks obtained CPP funds later on, the intervention 
score INT_SCO_DMi,t increased further. After the enactment of the American Recovery and 
Reinvestment Act (ARRA) on February of 2009, some banks started to pay back the CPP money, 
and thus we see a decrease in INT_SCO_DM. 
 
2.5 Empirical Results 
2.5.1 The Short-Run Impact of CPP Intervention on Firm’s Stock Returns 
In our first set of tests, we examine the short-run impact of CPP intervention events on firms’ 
stock performance. We calculate the 5-day cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) for the time 
interval [-2, +2] around days on which corporate borrowers’ banks experience CPP capital 
infusions. We calculate firms’ abnormal returns using the market-adjusted model by subtracting 
the return of the CRSP value-weighted stock market returns (including dividends distributions) 
as the market portfolio, comprising all NYSE/AMEX/Nasdaq listed firms. We also use the 
market model to calculate abnormal returns based on a pre-crisis estimation window of 255 days 
ending August 9, 2007 or a pre-intervention estimation window of 255 days ending October 1, 
2008. 
 We test the short-term stock price reaction for firms surrounding the first up to the sixth 
intervention event in one or more of their banks. We also distinguish between forced events 
(when the government forced nine banks to accept a capital infusion on October 28, 2008) and 
voluntary events (when banks applied for a capital infusion at a later date on a voluntary basis).   
 Table 2.3 shows the short-term event study results. Consistent with our Hypothesis H1, firms 
display a significantly positive stock price reaction around intervention events in their banks. On 
average, using the market-adjusted model in Panel A of Table 2.3 we find that the mean (median) 
cumulative abnormal return (CAR) equals 1.41% (0.84%) during the 5-day event window. The 
first event and forced event show the largest stock price reaction. Note that the 1,109 first 
intervention events include the 1,026 forced events. This shows that most firms in our sample 
borrow from at least one of the nine banks that were forced by the U.S. government to participate 
in CPP. However, it is important to note that later intervention events and voluntary events also 
trigger a significantly positive stock price reaction.  
 The results remain robust when we calculate abnormal returns using the market model using 
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a pre-intervention estimation period (255 days; up to October 1, 2008; Panel B of Table 2.3) or 
using a pre-crisis estimation period (255 days; up to August 9, 2007; Panel C of Table 2.3). We 
also used the Fama French 3-factor model in unreported tests using the pre-crisis and the pre-
intervention estimation period. The mean (median) CAR equals 1.2% (0.63%) for the pre-
intervention estimation period and 1.12% (0.39%) for the pre-crisis estimation period. All CARs 
are significantly different from zero at the one percent level of significance. 
 
TABLE 2.3 Short-Term Impact of Government Interventions in Banks on Corporate 
Borrowers’ Stock Returns 
This table shows the event study results of government intervention in banks on corporate borrowers’ stock returns. 
We report the mean and median 5-day cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) during an event window of [-2, +2] 
surrounding government intervention in one or more of the firm’s banks (in percent). We distinguish between the 
first up to the sixth intervention event, the forced intervention event on October 28, 2008, subsequent voluntary 
intervention events, and all intervention events together. Panel A shows CARs using the market-adjusted model, 
Panel B shows CARs using the market model with a pre-intervention estimation window of 255 trading days 
(ending on October 1, 2008) and Panel C shows CARs using the market model with a pre-crisis estimation window 
of 255 trading days (ending on August 9, 2007). We use the CRSP value-weighted stock market returns (including 
dividends distributions) as the market portfolio, comprising all NYSE/AMEX/NASDAQ listed firms.*, ** and *** 
indicate significance 10%, 5% and 1% level. 
 
Panel A. CARs during event window [-2, +2] using the market-adjusted model 
 
Panel B. CARs during event window [-2, +2] using the market model (pre-intervention estimation period) 
 
 
Intervention 
event 
Mean t-stat 
p-
value 
sig. Median 
% 
positive 
p-value 
Wilcoxon 
sign test 
p-value 
Wilcoxon 
rank sum test 
Number of  
observations 
1 3.29 4.423 0.000 *** 2.07 58.7 0.000 0.000 1,109 
2 0.97 1.881 0.030 ** 0.69 52.9 0.084 0.077 907 
3 1.01 2.134 0.016 ** 0.44 52.5 0.157 0.153 840 
4 -0.63 -1.623 0.109  0.04 50.4 0.870 0.268 603 
5 1.55 2.621 0.000 *** 1.24 58.6 0.000 0.000 406 
6 1.68 2.086 0.019 ** 1.05 58.7 0.095 0.055 104 
Forced  3.45 6.626 0.000 *** 1.75 56.9 0.000 0.000 1,026 
Voluntary  0.71 3.245 0.000 *** 0.29 51.3 0.139 0.110 2,943 
All events 1.41 4.362 0.000 *** 0.84 54.7 0.000 0.000 3,969 
Intervention 
event 
Mean t-stat 
p-
value 
sig. Median 
% 
positive 
p-value 
Wilcoxon 
sign test 
p-value 
Wilcoxon 
rank sum test 
Number of  
observations 
1 2.72 4.488 0.000 *** 1.99 57.08 0.000 0.000 1,109 
2 1.08 2.131 0.017 ** 0.28 51.16 0.506 0.114 907 
3 1.16 2.493 0.006 *** -0.10 48.93 0.557 0.255 840 
4 -0.41 -0.843 0.200  -0.25 48.25 0.414 0.132 603 
5 1.67 2.879 0.002 *** 1.19 59.80 0.000 0.000 406 
6 1.63 2.041 0.021 ** 1.21 57.28 0.167 0.089 104 
Forced  2.83 5.668 0.000 *** 2.15 57.7 0.000 0.000 1,026 
Voluntary 0.87 4.119 0.000 *** 0.28 51.9 0.035 0.011 2,943 
All events 1.42 4.484 0.000 *** 0.57 57.08 0.000 0.000 3,969 
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Panel C. CARs during event window [-2, +2] using the market model (pre-crisis estimation period) 
 
2.5.2 The Longer-Run Impact of CPP Intervention on Firms’ Stock Returns 
In our second set of tests, we estimate panel data regressions to examine the longer-run impact of 
CPP interventions on firms’ stock price performance. There are several reasons why panel data 
regressions are well-suited in our setting. First, we can take into account the specific nature of 
the CPP, especially its scale, scope and timing. Except in the first round of capital infusions 
which were forced, banks could apply for government capital infusions during a pre-defined time 
horizon. The series of bank-specific intervention events sometimes followed close to each other, 
did not happen simultaneously, were spread out over several quarters, and differ between banks 
in terms of number, timing and magnitude. We use the intervention score to not only capture the 
mere presence of the intervention but to measure the time-varying exposure to interventions and 
capital redemptions at the individual borrowing firm-level.  
 Second, panel data regressions allow us to better deal with the dynamics of change and 
omitted unobservable variables than pure cross-sectional or pure time-series data (Hsiao, 2003). 
This could be important given that we study intervention events where contemporaneous 
correlation of residuals across firms may be non-trivial and omitted unobservable variables could 
influence the results. 
 Third, the short-term event study from the previous section captures the expectation effect in 
stock markets, while panel data analysis captures changes in firms’ average stock returns over a 
longer period, comprising the initial expectation effect and (unexpected) subsequent effects due 
to the actual increase in bank lending. Considering the short-term and the longer-term 
perspective with different methods also alleviates the concern that the short-term event study 
results are up- or downward biased because of the uncertainty surrounding the events. We 
estimate the following two panel data regression equations: 
Intervention 
event 
Mean t-stat 
p-
value 
sig. Median 
% 
positive 
p-value 
Wilcoxon 
sign test 
p-value 
Wilcoxon 
rank sum test 
Number of  
observations 
1 1.19 2.510 0.000 *** 0.67 52.36 0.100 0.192 1,082 
2 1.24 3.797 0.017 ** 1.07 56.79 0.000 0.000 891 
3 1.25 3.985 0.000 *** 0.59 53.63 0.040 0.037 826 
4 -0.20 -0.641 0.261  0.23 51.60 0.461 0.976 596 
5 1.44 4.603 0.000 *** 1.00 58.21 0.001 0.001 402 
6 1.47 3.122 0.000 *** 0.30 52.94 0.621 0.158 103 
Forced 1.17 2.222 0.027 *** 0.78 52.6 0.094 0.149 1,004 
Voluntary 0.98 4.528 0.000 *** 0.67 54.3 0.000 0.000 2,896 
All events 1.11 5.533 0.000 *** 0.75 54.51 0.001 0.000 3,900 
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(5)         tiimttiit uRDMSCOINTRETURN ,2,1 __    
(6)         tiimttiit uRAMTSCOINTRETURN ,2,1 __    
We regress each firm’s daily stock return RETURNit on its intervention score 
INT_SCO_DMit and INT_SCO_AMTit, the market factor Rmt, and firm fixed effects ui, as shown 
in equation (5) and (6). Table 2.4 reports the estimation results. 
The table shows that CPP interventions in general have a significantly positive impact on 
firms’ stock returns. The regression results using the full sample show that both INT_SCO_DM 
(Panel A) and INT_SCO_AMT (Panel B) are positively and significantly related with firms’ 
stock returns. For example, the findings from Model (1) indicate that moving from the first to the 
third quartile of INT_SCO_DM is associated with an additional daily stock return of 0.042 
percentage points, which translates into a substantial additional return per year of 11.34 
percentage points. Hence, we find evidence in favor of our Hypothesis H1. 
We then categorize firms into three groups according to the types of CPP interventions in 
their lending banks (i.e., forced only, voluntary only, and mixed) and re-run the regression 
models of equations (5) and (6) for these groups separately. Firms are categorized as forced only 
if they only have lending relationships with one of the nine banks that were forced into a bail out 
by the government on October 28, 2008 (63 firms), while firms are categorized as voluntary only 
if they only have a relationship with banks that voluntarily participated in the CPP at a later stage 
(79 firms). “Mixed” firms are those that borrow from banks that were forced to participate and 
voluntarily participated in the CPP (963 firms). The results, which are not reported here but 
available upon request, show that for both intervention score measures, the positive valuation 
effect on firms’ stock price performance stays robust and consistent across three categories of 
intervened firms. 
A potential problem with our panel data regressions is that the residuals of a given firm may 
be time-series dependent (i.e., a firm effect correlated across time) and residuals of a given day 
may be dependent in the cross-section (i.e., a time effect correlated across firms). We address 
these issues by using two-way clustered standard errors in Model (2) of Table 2.4, following 
Petersen (2009). The results are similar to the panel regression shown in Model (1). 
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Another potential concern is whether our intervention score fully captures the cross-sectional 
and time-varying dynamics of the impacts of CPP interventions on each firm. For this purpose, 
we create an indicator variable (Post-intervention dummy) that equals one from the first CPP 
intervention to the end of the sample period to capture the macro-level time-series effects from 
interventions. We then orthogonalize the intervention score with this indicator variable and 
include both variables in the panel regression model with daily data. This approach makes sure 
that we consider only that part of the intervention score that is left unexplained by the macro 
effect indicator variable. Model (4) of Table 2.4 shows that the indicator variable (Post-
intervention dummy) and the orthogonalized intervention score (INT_SCO_DMorthog) exhibit 
positive coefficients that are statistically significant (t-stat=6.73 and 7.11). Thus, the variation in 
the intervention score does not only reflect the macro-level structural changes to the market as a 
result of the CPP interventions but also captures both the cross-sectional and time-varying 
dynamics of the impact of CPP interventions on corporate borrowers’ stock returns. 
 A final problem with our panel data regressions may be that we do not allow the coefficient 
on the intervention score variables to vary across firms. We therefore repeat our analysis in the 
spirit of Schipper and Thomson (1983) using daily raw returns over the period the crisis period 
starting from August 09, 2007 until December 31, 2009 as a dependent variable in 1,156 firm-by-
firm time-series regressions and using the intervention score and the daily market return as 
independent variables. Model (5) of Table 2.4 indicates that the mean of the 1,156 coefficients 
on INT_SCO_DM equals 0.0012 (with more than 55% of the coefficient estimates being 
positive). The mean of the 1,156 coefficients on INT_SCO_AMT equals 0.0722 (with more than 
57% of the coefficients estimates being positive). These mean values are both significantly 
different from zero at the 1% level of significance (the same holds for the corresponding 
medians). We will further analyze the cross-sectional determinants of these coefficients in 
Section VI. 
 We conclude that there is strong support for our Hypothesis H1, regardless of whether we 
conduct a short-term event study, panel data regressions or firm-by-firm time-series regressions. 
All results consistently show that government intervention in banks had positive spill-over 
effects on borrowing firms. 
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2.5.3 The Influence of Firm Characteristics 
To test our Hypothesis H2, we consider the influence of pre-crisis firm characteristics and 
investigate whether firms with certain characteristics are more sensitive to the impact of CPP 
interventions. We run the daily panel data regression shown in equation (5) on quintiles that we 
created based on firms’ pre-crisis characteristics except for bank-dependence. This empirical 
approach also makes it possible for us to examine whether the influence of firm characteristics is 
monotonic or not. The empirical results are reported in Table 2.5. 
We obtain two main findings. First, consistent with the results shown in Table 2.4, we note 
that CPP interventions in general have a positive impact on firms’ stock returns in almost all 
quintile groups. Second, the magnitude of the impact of CPP interventions on firms’ stock returns 
varies depending on firm characteristics. 
For firm size, daily stock returns of smaller firms are more sensitive to CPP infusion, which 
is in line with Hypothesis H2a. However, we note that the difference between quintile 1 and 5 is 
not significant. Results on firm’s financial ratios (Hypotheses H2b: leverage ratio, H2c: 
profitability, and H2d: Altman’s Z-Score) indicate that during adverse economic situations, CPP 
capital infusion in banks has had a more pronounced impact on stock price performance of more 
financially distressed firms. Differences between the lowest and highest quintiles are all 
significant at the 1%-level. Stock returns of less profitable firms are significantly more sensitive 
to CPP infusions. The CPP interventions have stronger positive valuation impacts on the stock 
price of firms with lower Altman’s Z-score and the impact declines as the Altman’s Z-score 
increases (although not monotonically). This set of results confirms that the borrower’s level of 
financial distress (leverage, profitability, Z-Score) is an important factor that influences the 
impact of CPP intervention on corporate borrowers’ stock returns. 
Results on firms’ pre-crisis cash holdings indicate that firms that are short on cash benefit 
significantly more when the government infuses capital in their lending banks, which is in line 
with Hypothesis H2e. Moreover, conforming to Hypothesis H2f, government capital infusions 
have more pronounced impacts on firms with lower-liquid stocks (higher bid-ask spread). In 
addition, we find firms that were most strongly hit by the financial crisis also benefit the most 
from CPP interventions in their lending banks, which is support for Hypothesis H2g. 
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We find that bank-dependent firms benefit more from the capital infusions in their banks 
during the financial crisis than less bank-dependent firms, which is consistent with Hypothesis 
H2h. Results show a significantly positive impact of CPP intervention on bank-dependent firms’ 
daily stock returns, while there is no significant impact of CPP intervention on stock returns of 
firms that are not bank-dependent. The difference is significant at 1%-level. This result is in line 
with Chava and Purnanandam (2011), who document stronger positive stock price reactions for 
bank-dependent firms after a positive liquidity shock to banks due to an unexpected cut of the 
Fed Funds rate. As discussed earlier, the goal of the CPP capital infusion program is to stimulate 
bank’s lending to the industry by providing extra liquidity to banks. Since bank lending is the 
primary source of financing for bank-dependent borrowers, they are most sensitive to CPP 
interventions in banks. It is important to note that all the results presented above remain similar 
when we use the INT_SCO_AMT instead of the INT_SCO_DM to measure government 
intervention in banks. 
Summarizing, our results provide evidence that firm characteristics influence the impact of 
the CPP on firm’s stock performance. We find that riskier (i.e., more levered, less profitable, 
more financially distressed) and bank-dependent firms are more sensitive to the positive impact 
of government capital infusions. These effects are not only significant from a statistical 
perspective but also economically significant. 
 
2.5.4 The Influence of Bank Characteristics 
We now examine the impact of bank characteristics on the sensitivity of firm’s stock returns to 
intervention in these banks. We construct weighted bank characteristics for each firm i at time t 
by considering the relationship between firm i and its lending bank j, as well as bank j’s specific 
characteristics l (i.e., bank profitability, capital ratio and bank size) at time t.  
(7)     


n
j
tjltijtil sticsCharacteriBankLRsticsCharacteriBankWeighted
1
,,,          
We refer to Table 2.2 for descriptive statistics on these weighted bank characteristics. For 
each bank characteristic, we estimate the regression model shown in equation (5) on sub-samples 
that result from a quintile split based on the weighted bank characteristics measuring during the 
second quarter of 2007. Table 2.6 reports the results. 
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First, we find that firms borrowing from the least profitable banks (quintile 1) benefit more 
from the government capital infusion. As proposed in Hypothesis H3a, the positive impact 
becomes weaker for those firms that borrow from more profitable banks (quintile 5). However, 
the difference between quintile 1 and 5 is not significant. Second, stock returns of borrowers of 
banks with weaker capital ratios are more sensitive to CPP infusions. The effect is strongest for 
least-capitalized banks’ clients (quintiles 1 and 2) and weakest for firms that borrow from banks 
with the highest capital ratio (quintile 5), which is in line with Hypothesis H3b. We further find 
that capital infusions matter more for corporate borrowers of smaller banks. Consistent with 
Hypothesis H3c, the impact of interventions becomes stronger when they borrow from smaller 
banks. Our finding is consistent with studies that argue that smaller banks with weaker capital 
ratios were most strongly hit by the crisis and also benefited the most once the negative shock is 
alleviated by the CPP (e.g., Panetta et al. (2010), Santos (2011)). 
 
2.6 Further Checks 
We also estimate cross-sectional regressions using the estimated coefficients on the 
intervention score obtained from firm-by-firm time series regressions as the dependent variable. 
We use firm and bank characteristics from the second quarter of 2007 as independent variables. 
An examination of the pair-wise correlations and variation inflation factors indicates that there is 
no severe multicollinearity problem. Table 2.7 reports the findings. 
Models (1) and (2) are estimated on the full sample, whereas Models (3) and (4) are 
estimated for those firms with significantly positive coefficients on the intervention score. 
Moreover, we alternatively include either leverage and firm profitability (ROA) or the Altman’s 
Z-Score. Model (1) and (3) indicate that higher leverage is associated with a higher coefficient 
on the intervention score. In addition, firm profitability (ROA) and the crisis stock price 
performance prior to intervention are negatively related to the intervention score coefficient. 
Model (2) and (4) show that higher bankruptcy risk (lower Altman’s Z-score) significantly 
increases the positive impact of CPP intervention on firms’ stock returns. Bank dependence leads 
to higher coefficients on the intervention score in all four models. We further find that lower 
bank profitability and smaller bank size is associated with a higher coefficient on the intervention 
score in firm-by-firm time-series regressions. These findings show that the impact of government 
interventions on stock returns is more pronounced for firms that having stronger lending 
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relationship with smaller, and less profitable banks. Overall, the results from Table 2.7 largely 
confirm our earlier results using panel data regressions. 
 Next, we investigate potential real effects associated with government intervention in the 
banking industry. Specifically, we examine potential changes in firms’ financial constraints after 
government interventions in their lead banks. We estimate the corporate borrower’s investment-
cash flow sensitivity that indicates its dependence on internal financing. We are aware that there 
has been debate on how to measure financial constraints in the literature (e.g., univariate criteria 
(firm size, earnings retention, tangible assets, and bond ratings), investment-cash flow-
sensitivities, cash holdings-cash flow sensitivities, and various indices such as those by Kaplan 
and Zingales (1997), Cleary (1999), Whited and Wu (2006), and Hadlock and Pierce (2010)). 
However, an application of all these methods would be beyond the scope of our paper. 
Table 2.8 shows the results of panel data regressions that control for time-varying firm-
specific growth and investment opportunities by including the market-to-book ratio and firm-
fixed effects and time-fixed effects. The coefficient of cash flow ratio is significantly positive, 
suggesting that the investments of the average firm depend on their availability of internal 
finance. We examine whether the investment-cash flow sensitivity has changed by interacting 
the cash flow ratio with the intervention score. We find that the coefficient on the interaction 
effect of the cash flow ratio and the intervention score is significantly negative, indicating that 
firms’ cash flow sensitivities have decreased after capital infusions in their banks. Corporate 
borrowers therefore became less financially constrained after government intervention in their 
banks. This provides some indication that the government intervention in banks helped to relax 
financial constraints. 
Although the results are consistent with our main findings on firms’ stock returns, we feel 
that these findings should be interpreted with caution. It might be premature to conclude that 
CPP interventions have positive real effects on firms because of lead-lag effects between 
intervention and banks’ and firms’ reactions. In addition, confounding events at the bank and 
firm level might have delayed or compromised the positive effects of intervention. Moreover, we 
do not consider potential changes in demand for investment and consumption that might have 
taken place during the post-intervention period. We acknowledge that these issues complicate the 
interpretation and make it hard to uncover “clean” real effects in our setting. 
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TABLE 2.8 
Government Intervention in Banks and Corporate Borrowers’ Financial Constraints 
This table shows the results of a panel data regression with time and firm fixed effects for firms’ quarterly capital 
expenditures during post-intervention crisis period from 2008Q4 to 2009Q4. The dependent variable is the firm’s 
capital expenditure (divided by lagged total assets) and the independent variables are the cash flow ratio, the 
interaction term of the cash flow ratio and the intervention score INT_SCO_DM, the intervention score 
INT_SCO_DM, and the market-to-book ratio. The market-to-book ratio is the ratio of the market value of assets to 
total assets, where the market value is calculated as the sum of market value of equity, total debt, and preferred stock 
liquidation value less deferred taxes and investment tax credits. The cash flow ratio is calculated as the cash flow 
from operations divided by lagged total assets. The reported t-statistics and level of significance are based on Huber-
White robust standard errors. *, **, *** indicate coefficients that are significantly different from zero at the 10%, 
5%, and 1% level. 
 
Dependent variable: Capital expenditure Coeff. t-stat. sig. 
Cash flow ratio 0.2009 14.37 *** 
INT_SCO_DM * cash flow ratio -0.0351 -3.43 *** 
INT_SCO_DM 0.0146 8.51 *** 
Market-to-book ratio -0.0067 -2.84 *** 
Constant 0.0340 14.30 *** 
Time fixed effects Yes    
Firm fixed effects Yes   
Number of firms 1,078   
Number of firm-quarter obs. 5,160   
Adj. R2 0.283   
 
2.7 Conclusion 
We investigate whether the U.S. government capital infusion program for banks, the Capital 
Purchase Program (CPP), affects corporate borrowers’ stock returns during the financial crisis of 
2007-2009. Based on detailed information on the firms’ borrowing history, we identify credit 
relationships with banks as channels that transmit financial shocks from banks to their borrowers. 
Our principal result is that CPP interventions in banks have a significantly positive impact on the 
borrowing firms’ stock returns. The short-term event study indicates that corporate borrowers of 
banks that obtained CPP capital infusions experience abnormal stock returns of 1.41 percentage 
points during the 5-day event window. In the panel data analyses, we find that moving from the 
first to the third quartile of the intervention score is associated with an additional daily stock 
return of 0.042 percentage points, which translates into a substantial additional return per year of 
11.34 percentage points. We further find that the positive impact of CPP intervention is more 
pronounced for riskier and bank-dependent firms and those that borrow from banks that are less 
capitalized and smaller. These findings extend the evidence from related studies on negative 
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credit supply-driven spillover effects from banks to the corporate sector in the first stage of the 
recent financial crisis and previous crises (Campello et al. (2010), Ivashina and Scharfstein 
(2010), Lemmon and Roberts (2010), Chava and Purnanandam (2011)). 
 Our study contributes to the existing literature by identifying significantly positive spillover 
effects on corporate borrowers when negative shocks to their banks are mitigated. We leave it to 
future research to analyze whether similar effects exist when economic shocks spill over from 
the corporate to the banking sector (demand-driven shocks and real economy crises). Our 
evidence is consistent with the broader view that bank-firm relationships serve as an important 
transmission channel for positive shocks to banks. 
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Chapter 3 
Do Firms Spread Out Bond Maturity to 
Manage Their Funding Liquidity Risk? * 
 
 
3.1 Introduction 
Managing funding liquidity risk is essential for the success of a firm. Funding liquidity risk 
arises when a firm cannot meet its financing needs – either being unable to rollover its debt at 
maturity or being unable to finance new investment opportunities (e.g., Diamond, 1991). 
When a firm faces severe funding liquidity risk, it may be forced to search for expensive 
alternative financing sources, undertake a costly debt restructuring process, or even liquidate 
its assets, possibly at fire-sale prices (e.g., Brunnermeier and Yogo, 2009). Survey evidence 
suggests that, when deciding on debt issues, one of the primary concerns for CFOs is to avoid 
the clustering of debt maturity dates (e.g., Graham and Harvey, 2001; Servaes and Tufano, 
2006). Ideally, firms with a well-spread maturity structure of outstanding debt expect to 
straddle the funding liquidity risk fas they have to refinance only a small fraction of their total 
debt at any point of time. Despite its popularity in practice, research on the corporate debt 
maturity dispersion is scarce. This raises the question whether and how firms can manage 
their funding liquidity risk by spreading out the maturity structure of bonds and how effective 
it is. 
In this paper we document the existence and use of bond maturity dispersion to manage 
funding liquidity risk from three perspectives. First, we identify the types of firms that exhibit 
a dispersed maturity structure of outstanding bonds over time. Second, we study how firms 
                                                        
* This Chapter is based on Norden, Roosenboom and Wang (2015). This paper benefits tremendously from very helpful 
discussions with, among many others, Dion Bongaerts, Zhiguo He, Henri Servaes, and participants at the IFABS Conference 
2014 in Lisbon, Australasian Finance and Banking Conference 2013 in Sydney, Corporate Finance Day 2013 in Liege, and 
the ERIM PhD seminar at Erasmus University. I gratefully acknowledge financial support from the National Science 
Foundation of the Netherlands (NWO) under Mosaic grant number 017.007.128 and the Vereniging Trustfonds 
Erasmus University Rotterdam.  
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manage their bond maturity dispersion structure through new bond issuances. Third, we 
evaluate whether bond maturity dispersion helps to mitigate firms’ funding liquidity risk. 
Results suggest a dispersed maturity structure improves the funding access and lowers the 
funding costs when firms have (re-)financing needs, controlling for other factors. Our findings 
complement and extend studies that document severe funding liquidity risk and credit risk for 
firms having a large portion of debt maturing within a short-term horizon, especially for 
financially constrained firms and during the financial crisis (e.g., Duchin et al. 2010; Almeida 
et al. 2012; Gopalan et al. 2013). 
We focus on publicly listed firms from the US to study whether and how the bond maturity 
structure is used to manage funding liquidity risk. We consider firms’ financing with public 
debt for several reasons. First, different from the equity financing which has infinite maturity 
debt financing has fixed maturity. This gives repeatedly rise to corporate funding liquidity 
risk, making debt finance a natural area to study firms’ maturity management. Second, in 
contrast to the private debt market the public debt market is characterized by a large number 
of bond investors. This makes public debt renegotiation extremely costly if not impossible 
when firm faces large liquidity risk, as it requires unanimous bondholder consent under the 
“Trust Indenture Act” (Smith and Warner, 1979; Buchheit and Gulati, 2002). As the costs of 
funding liquidity risk of bond financing are higher, firms have an additional incentive to 
manage the bonds maturity structure to prevent the higher costs associated with liquidity risk. 
Third, previous research shows that due to the market frictions, firms that have access to 
public debt market are the ones that are subject to less informational asymmetries (e.g. Myers, 
1984; Diamond, 1991; Denis and Mihov, 2003). Public bond offerings are sold to public at a 
fixed “take-it-or-leave-it basis” (Kwan and Carleton, 2010). Therefore firms that borrow in 
the bond market have a stronger position vis-à-vis their investors, and there is little input from 
public investors especially with respect to the design of bond contract features. This implies 
that those firms would have more flexibility in building up a desired maturity structure using 
bond financing.   
We base our analysis on data on corporate bond taken from the Mergent FISD database. 
We merge the bond data with a wide set of firm characteristics collected from Compustat and 
examine which firms maintain a dispersed maturity structure of outstanding bonds. We find 
that larger, more leveraged, less profitable, growth-oriented, and non-bank dependent firms 
exhibit the most dispersed maturity structure of outstanding bonds. Next, we look at bond 
issues activity and investigate the types of firms that maintain a dispersed maturity structure 
over time by frequently issuing a set of bonds with heterogeneous maturities. The result is in 
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line with our first finding of firm’s maturity structure of outstanding bonds. We find that firms 
with larger total assets, higher leverage ratio, and a well-spread maturity structure of bonds at 
issuance issue more frequently, and are more likely to issue multiple bonds with different 
maturities. A combination of these two financing policies leads to a maturity structure of 
outstanding bonds that is well spread over time. 
In the final step, we examine whether a dispersed maturity structure helps firms manage 
their funding liquidity risk. Our results indicate that having a dispersed maturity structure 
improves a firm’s funding availability and reduces its funding costs. Firms that have a 
dispersed bond maturity structure are more likely to meet their (re-)financing needs arising 
from bonds expiries or new investment opportunities, and they face lower funding costs when 
they issue new bonds. In addition, we find that the effect is the strongest among firms with 
higher funding liquidity risk, i.e., firms that are bank-dependent or that have a large 
proportion of bonds maturing in the short term. 
Our study contributes to the classic line of research on how managing funding liquidity 
concerns may affect firms’ choice of debt maturity structure. Diamond (1991) points out that 
managing liquidity risk is an important consideration when firms decide about the debt 
maturity. He defined liquidity risk as the risk of a borrower being forced into inefficient 
liquidation because refinancing is not available. Morris and Shin (2009) argue that liquidity 
risk could also be seen as the probability of a default due to a run by short-term creditors 
when the firm would otherwise have been solvent. Theory and empirical evidence suggests 
that the use of short-term debt exposes firms with funding liquidity risks and higher chance of 
inefficient liquidation (Diamond, 1991; Guedes and Opler, 1996; Brunnermeier, 2009; Cheng 
and Milbradt, 2012; He and Xiong, 2012a). Gopalan et al. (2013) show that the liquidity risk 
associated with having short-term debt also increases firms’ credit risk – featured by a severe 
deterioration in their credit quality. Our research contributes to this strand of literature by 
showing that spreading out the bond maturity structure is one effective way for firms to 
manage funding liquidity risk.  
Moreover, our paper provides evidence on recent theoretical work about the costs and 
benefits of maturity dispersion (Choi, et al. 2013; He and Xiong, 2012b; Acharya, et al., 
2011). Empirical evidence on the dispersion of corporate bond maturity structure is scarce. 
The survey of Graham and Harvey (2001) indicates that many firms aim at dispersing their 
bond maturity structure to “limit the magnitude of refinancing in any given year”. The latter 
has also been emphasized by Servaes and Tufano (2006) as the primary concern for CFOs 
when making decisions on the bond maturity. The recent studies by Gopalan et al. (2013) and 
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Almeida et al. (2012) relate to our paper by showing the adverse impact on credit quality and 
investment for firms having a large proportion of debt maturing within a year. However, an 
important difference is that our paper focuses on the dispersion of the maturity structure. The 
theoretical model of Choi et al. (2013) describes the firm’s choice between a concentrated or 
“granular” bond maturity structure as a trade-off between flexibility benefits and transaction 
costs. Our findings are in line with their model as we show that firms that consistently 
maintain a well-spread maturity structure over time are the ones that have higher funding 
availability and lower funding costs and that can afford the transaction costs of maintaining 
the dispersed maturity structure. Our analysis also provides insights beyond their model as we 
examine the incremental maturity choice of new bond issues conditional on the maturity 
structure prior to the issue and the impact of having a dispersed bond maturity structure on 
funding availability and funding costs. We show that a well-spread maturity structure has a 
positive impact on corporate funding liquidity. 
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 describes data and explains how we 
measure the dispersion of the maturity of outstanding bonds and new bond issues. Section 3 
presents our empirical strategy and reports the main results. Section 4 summarizes the 
findings of additional analyses. Section 5 concludes.  
 
3.2. Data and Measurement 
3.2.1 Data 
Our dataset comprises information on firm characteristics, bond characteristics, and macro-
economic variables. We collect yearly data on firms’ accounting variables and S&P long-term 
debt ratings from Compustat. We start with all publicly listed firms from the US and exclude 
utility and financial companies (SIC 4000-4999 or 6000-6999). We collect data on bond 
issues and maturity structure from the Mergent FISD database and merge it with the 
Compustat data using firms’ CUSIPs. As the FISD database has only sufficient coverage from 
the early 1990s, we limit the sample period of our analysis from January 1, 1991 to December 
31, 2011. The final sample comprises 16,857 firm-year observations from 2,388 firms. 
Appendix A3.1 displays the main variables, the variable definitions, and the data sources. 
We winsorize all accounting variables from Compustat at 1% and 99% level to limit the 
impact of potential outliers. We consider three macro-economic variables to control for 
market conditions using data from the Federal Reserve Board. We take into account that it is 
easier for firms to issue bonds with a lower cost during economic booms than recessions, 
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which should have an effect on firms’ funding availability and funding costs. Table 3.1 
provides summary statistics on the main variables.  
 
TABLE 3.1. Summary Statistics 
This table reports summary statistics of the main variables. The sample is based on data from the Mergent FISD 
and Compustat database and comprises 2,236 firms. We exclude utility and financial firms with SIC code of 
4000-4999 and of 6000-6999. The sample period starts on January 1, 1991 and ends on December 31, 2011. We 
report the mean, 25 percentile, median, 75 percentile, standard deviation and units of measurement of the 
variables. Detailed variable descriptions are provided in the Appendix A3.1. 
 
Variable Mean 25 Pct. Median 75 Pct. St. Dev. Units 
Dispersion 2.016 1.000 1.000 2.130 1.808 1 
Maturity 9.255 5.000 7.600 11.092 6.202 Year 
Bond_start_yr 1996 1992 1998 2003 10 Year 
Firm_size 3874 263 862 2891 9716 Million $ 
Log_firm_size 6.764 5.574 6.759 7.969 1.825 1 
Cash flow volatility 0.069 0.012 0.028 0.068 0.125 1 
Leverage 0.328 0.149 0.289 0.448 0.259 1 
ROA 0.108 0.075 0.124 0.174 0.139 1 
Cash flow -0.015 -0.021 0.025 0.059 0.172 1 
Cash holdings 0.136 0.019 0.061 0.172 0.182 1 
Tobin’s Q 1.964 1.122 1.463 2.135 1.721 1 
Bank dependence 0.710 0.000 1.000 1.000 0.454 1 
Number of firms 2236           
 
Firms in our sample exhibit a mean leverage ratio is 32.8%. Corporate bonds are the key 
source of debt finance as the median bond-to-total debt ratio is 72%. We also identify the year 
when the firm issued its first bond and the year when the firm was first assigned a credit 
rating by Standard and Poor’s. It turns out that more than 50% of firms in our sample issued 
their first bond and/or received a credit rating in the mid-1990s. This observation indicates 
that the majority of firms have access to the corporate bond market during our sample period. 
 
3.2.2 Maturity Dispersion of Firm’s Outstanding Bonds 
We create the variable Dispersion to quantify the degree to which the maturity structure of 
outstanding bonds is spread over time. For each firm, we look at all outstanding bonds at the 
end of each calendar year and measure how much the total volume of outstanding bonds is 
spread across different maturity years. Intuitively, having 1% of the total volume of bonds 
equally distributed across one-hundred different maturity years exposes a firm with a lower 
funding liquidity risk than having all bonds maturing in the same year.  
A dispersed bond structure differs from a concentrated structure in two ways. First, it 
matters how many different years the bonds are maturing in. Second, it matters how different 
the bond volume maturing in each of the maturity years is. For each firm i we look at all 
outstanding bond issues which have not matured yet at the end of each calendar year t. We 
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assign the bonds with the same maturity year p to the same group and calculate the aggregate 
amount of bonds that mature in each maturity year p. We divide this number by the total 
amount of bonds that are outstanding in calendar year t. This gives us 𝑤𝑖,𝑡,𝑝 – the percentage 
of the total amount of bonds that mature in each particular maturity year p. We then calculate 
the sum of squared percentages ∑ 𝑤𝑖,𝑡,𝑝
2𝑛
𝑝=1  and take the inverse of it. This gives the maturity 
dispersion variable, which corresponds to the inverse of the Herfindahl index of bond 
volumes maturing in different years. It measures the inverse of concentration – the dispersion 
of the total amount of outstanding bonds (see Equation (1)): 
(1)                                       𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑠𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖,𝑡,𝑝 =
1
∑ 𝑤𝑖,𝑡,𝑝
2𝑛
𝑝=1
                           
Let us consider an example to illustrate how Dispersioni,t,p measures the maturity structure 
of outstanding bonds, and what kind of actions could change the dispersion of the maturity 
structure. Suppose there are two firms A and B, and both firms have the same amount of 
public debt capacity D, meaning that they could only issue bonds up to the maximum amount 
of D. Firms A and B follow different strategies with regard to their maturity structure. The two 
situations are illustrated in Figure 3.1. 
The horizontal axis indicates the time in calendar years. For simplicity we consider the 
period from year t to year t+4. The vertical axis shows that the total public debt capacity D is 
the same and assumed constant over time for both firms. Firm A does not follow a maturity 
dispersion policy. In year t, the firm issues only one bond with a maturity of two years that 
corresponds to 100% of the debt capacity. In t+2, when the bond matures, firm A rolls over 
the bond through issuing a new bond of the same amount D and the same maturity of two 
years. The value of Dispersion for firm A equals one according Equation (1). Firm A has a 
concentrated maturity structure and faces high funding liquidity risk every other year when 
the bond matures. Firm B builds up a dispersed maturity structure by issuing two bonds with 
different maturities. At year t, firm B divides the total amount of public debt capacity D into 
two and issues two bonds each to the amount of  
𝐷
2
 but with different maturities of one year 
and two years, respectively. Then, in year t+1 and t+2, when the two bonds mature, firm B 
issues new bonds to the amount of  
𝐷
2
  with maturity of 2 years to replace the maturing bonds.  
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Firm B has to repeat this policy again until year t+3 and t+4 and so forth. The higher value of 
Dispersion for firm B (
1
0.52+0.52
= 2) indicates a more dispersed maturity structure and means 
that firm B faces less funding liquidity risk than firm A in expiry years, while it keeps the total 
amount of outstanding bonds stable over time.  
 
3.2.3 The Incremental Maturity Dispersion Choice at Bond Issuance 
Firms can build up and maintain their bond maturity structure at a certain level of dispersion 
through issuing bonds with particular maturities. The incremental maturity dispersion choice 
made by firms at issuance leads to a more dispersed or a more concentrated maturity structure 
of the outstanding bonds over time. Comparing the patterns of the bond issue activities of the 
two firms shown in Figure 3.1 we observe two key indicators of firm B’s incremental 
dispersion activity at issues. First, the maturity structure of new bonds issued in each issue 
year is more dispersed. Second, the issue frequency is higher. Firms could build up or 
maintain well-spread maturity structure over time if they issue bonds with more dispersed 
maturity structure, and issue bonds more frequently. Following this logic we look at both the 
maturity dispersion at issuance and the frequency of bond issues.  
We use the variable Dispersion_issue to measure how dispersed the maturity structure of 
the new bond issues is. It is constructed in a similar way as the dispersion measure of 
outstanding bonds, except that we look only at new bond issues rather than at all outstanding 
bonds. For each firm i at the end of each calendar year t, we first consider all bonds that are 
issued during the year and assign bonds to their expiry year p. Then, for each of the expiry 
years p, we calculate the fraction of the total amount of issued bonds that mature in an expiry 
year (𝑤𝑖,𝑡,𝑝
∗ ). We then take the inverse of the sum of the squared terms of the fractions and that 
gives 𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑠𝑖𝑜𝑛_𝑖𝑠𝑠𝑢𝑒𝑖,𝑡,𝑝 (see Equation (2)). 
(2) 𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑠𝑖𝑜𝑛_𝑖𝑠𝑠𝑢𝑒𝑖,𝑡,𝑝 =
1
∑ w𝑖,𝑡,𝑝
∗2n
p=1
                                    
Intuitively, the higher the value of this variable, the more dispersed is the maturity of the 
bond issues. The measure has a minimum of one (i.e., there is only one bond issued or bonds 
with different terms are issued but they have the same maturity), which means no maturity 
dispersion is observed at issuance. Next, we measure the frequency of firms’ bond issues. For 
each issue year, we measure the time in years that elapsed between the previous year of bond 
issue and the current year of bond issue and call this variable Issue_time_gap. The more 
frequently a firm issues, the shorter the time gap is. 
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3.3  Empirical Results 
3.3.1 The Maturity Dispersion of Firms’ Outstanding Bonds 
A major challenge in our analysis is that the current maturity dispersion of outstanding bonds 
is determined by firms’ bond issues from the past, and the latter are determined by firms’ 
business conditions at that time. To investigate what factors influence the degree to which a 
firm’s bond maturities are spread out over time, we have to consider firm characteristics from 
earlier periods. In this case, the mean maturity of bond issues in our sample is 10 years; this 
means that firms’ current overall maturity structures should be determined by bond issue 
activities during the past ten years, and the activities should reflect firms conditions back then. 
Following this logic, we first regress firms’ maturity dispersion of outstanding bonds on the 
average firm characteristics measured over the past 10 years. If the years of firm’s existence t 
is shorter than 10 years, we take the average firm characteristics of the past t years.  
We estimate a multivariate panel data regression model using robust standard errors 
clustered at the firm level. Cavalho and Santikian (2012) argue that firms within an industry 
manage funding liquidity in an interdependent way and their debt maturity decisions also 
reflect the situation in the industry. We therefore control for industry fixed and time fixed 
effects. We consider key characteristics such as firm size, cash flow volatility, leverage ratio, 
profitability, cash holdings, Tobin’s Q and bank dependence in the regression. We expect that 
bigger and non-bank dependent firms face less information asymmetry in the public debt 
market and thus enjoy more flexibility in establishing dispersed maturity structure of bonds. 
We use cash flow volatility, leverage ratio and Tobin’s Q to capture firms’ needs to hedge 
rollover risks. Firms with higher cash flow volatility and higher leverage are more likely to 
face a funding illiquidity problem and therefore have incentives to spread out the bond 
maturity structure more strongly. Earlier studies document that growth firms are more likely 
to issue short-term bonds to mitigate the underinvestment problems caused by the agency 
problem (e.g., Myers, 1977; Barclay and Smith, 1995). They face higher costs once hit by 
funding illiquidity and we thus expect that high-Q firms spread out the payment schedule 
more strongly to hedge against the funding liquidity risk. Profitability and cash holdings are 
used as alternative ways to cope with funding liquidity risk. We hypothesize that firms that are 
less profitable and that hold less cash have stronger incentives to spread out their bonds 
maturity structure. Table 3.2 reports the regression results.  
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TABLE 3.2. Maturity Dispersion of Outstanding Bonds and Firm Characteristics 
This table reports the results of a panel data regression with industry fixed effects and year fixed effects of firms’ 
maturity structure of outstanding bonds. The dependent variable is the maturity dispersion of firm’s outstanding 
bonds and the explanatory variables are averages of firm characteristics measured over the years t-1 to t-10. The 
sample period is from January 1, 1991 to December 31, 2011. *, **, *** indicate coefficients that are 
significantly different from zero at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level. Robust standard errors are employed and 
clustered at firm level. Variables are defined in the Appendix A3.1. 
 
Dep. Var.:  Dispersion  
 Coeff. t-stat. sig.  
Firm characteristics      
Log_firm_size t-1,t-10 0.640 14.64 ***  
Cash flow volatility t-1,t-10 0.264 0.57   
Leverage t-1,t-10 1.410 6.31 ***  
ROA t-1,t-10 -1.568 -3.65 ***  
Cash holdings t-1,t-10  0.213 0.74   
Tobin’s Q t-1,t-10 0.064 1.75 *  
Bank dependence t-1,t-10 -0.918 -8.63 ***  
     
Industry fixed effects Yes    
Year fixed effects Yes    
Within R2 0.355    
Number of obs. 12409    
Number of firms 1695    
 
We find that firm size positively relates to the dispersion structure of bond outstanding. 
This result suggests that bigger firms have a more sophisticated policy to spread out their 
maturity structure over time since they are the ones that could afford the transactions costs 
associated with repeated access to the public debt market. This finding is in line with the 
theoretical prediction of Choi et al. (2013). We also find that firms with higher leverage are 
more likely to have a dispersed maturity structure. A one percentage point increase in the 
leverage ratio is associated with a 1.41 percentage point increase in the Dispersion variable. 
One explanation is that firms with a relatively high leverage are more exposed to funding 
liquidity risk than others and therefore strive for a dispersed bond maturity structure to 
mitigate this risk. Furthermore, profitability negatively relates to the bond maturity dispersion. 
Less profitable firms tend to face higher costs of financial distress and therefore have a strong 
interest to establish a diversified maturity structure to mitigate the likelihood of financial 
distress. Moreover, firms’ growth and investment opportunities measured by Tobin’s Q 
positively relate to the maturity dispersion. Firms with higher growth and investment 
opportunities are known as firms that heavily rely on short-term debt to finance investment 
opportunities. As short-term bond finance increases the chance of a potential illiquidity 
problem a well-spread maturity structure is helpful for growth firms. Furthermore, we find 
that bank dependent firms have a less dispersed maturity structure. Those firms tend to be 
more financially constrained as they face a smaller set of financing alternatives. Previous 
research shows that bank-dependent firms exhibit higher informational asymmetries, which 
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limits their abilities to issue bonds, especially long-term bonds (e.g., Myers, 1984; Diamond, 
1991; Rajan, 1992; Denis and Mihov, 2003). As a result, bank-dependent firms are often 
constrained to issue only short-term bonds and it is harder for them to realize a policy that 
aims at establishing a dispersed bond maturity structure. 
Overall, we find that firms’ maturity structure of outstanding bonds reflects their ability to 
spread out the bond maturity and their need for doing so. 
 
3.3.2 Incremental Bond Maturity Choices at Issuance 
Following the studies of Guedes and Opler (1996) and Denis and Mihov (2003), we examine 
firms’ incremental maturity decisions when they issue new bonds. This approach has several 
advantages and can be seen as complementary to the analysis of the maturity structure of 
outstanding bonds. The latter is a cumulative result of a sequence of incremental decisions 
made by firms at the time of bond issuances in the past. The incremental analysis makes it 
possible for us to link a firm’s maturity choices at issuance with firm characteristics measured 
before the issue. Moreover, this approach is better suited to capture changes in a firm’s 
incremental maturity choice due to the time-variation in firm characteristics. 
We use two alternative dependent variables Dispersion_issue and issue_time_gap. Both 
variables capture how issue activity contributes to a dispersed maturity structure of 
outstanding bonds. As shown in the example in Figure 3.1, the overall maturity structure of 
outstanding bonds is expected to become more dispersed over time if a firm jointly issues 
multiple bonds with different maturities (Dispersion_issue is high) and/or if the firm issues 
bonds frequently (Issue_time_gap is low). We also expect to find that firms with dispersed 
maturity structure are also the ones that exhibit incremental maturity dispersion at the time of 
bond issuances. We use cross-sectional OLS models with industry fixed effects and lags of all 
explanatory variables including the maturity dispersion of outstanding bonds. We also control 
for macro-economic factors and use robust standard errors clustered at the firm level. Table 
3.3 reports the results. 
 
TABLE 3.3 Maturity Dispersion of Bond Issues, Time Gap Between Issues, and Firm Characteristics 
 
 
This table reports the results of OLS regression models with industry fixed effects. The dependent variables are 
(1) the maturity dispersion firms’ bond issues (Dispersion_issue) and (2) the time gap between current new 
issues and the last issues (Issue_time_gap). The explanatory variables are the lagged firm accounting variables, 
bond maturity structure variables, and variables. The sample period is from January 1, 1991 to December 31, 
2011. *, **, *** indicate coefficients that are significantly different from zero at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level. 
Robust standard errors are employed and clustered at firm level. Variables are defined in the Appendix A. 
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 (1)  (2)  
Dep. Var.:  Dispersion_issue  Issue_time_gap  
 Coeff. t-stat. sig.  Coeff. t-stat. sig.  
Firm characteristics         
Log_firm_size t-1 0.172 10.51 ***  -0.291 -5.12 ***  
Cash flow volatility t-1 0.237 2.52 **  0.210 0.53   
Leverage t-1 0.109 1.77 *  -1.169 -4.48 ***  
ROA t-1 0.261 2.27 **  0.331 0.81   
Cash holdings t-1 0.235 2.64 ***  -0.133 -0.4   
Tobin’s Q t-1 0.011 0.91   -0.130 -3.95 ***  
Bank dependence t-1 -0.094 -2.95 ***  -0.375 -3.47 ***  
Bond_start_yr -0.001 -0.42   -0.058 -9.33 ***  
         
Dispersion t-1 0.041 4.01 ***  -0.270 -6.42 ***  
         
Macro-economic variables         
Term spread t-1 -0.013 -0.71   -0.179 -2.67 ***  
Default spread t-1  0.010 0.25   0.548 4.49 ***  
Risk free t-1 0.001 0.07   -0.074 -1.59   
         
Industry fixed effects Yes    Yes     
         
Adj. R2 0.221    0.153    
Number of obs. 3341    3337    
Number of firms 1120    1118    
 
The regression results of the two models indicate several interesting patterns. We note that 
the characteristics of firms that issue bonds with a more dispersed maturity structure largely 
but not completely overlap with the characteristics of firms that frequently issue bonds. The 
results are consistent for large firms and firms with higher leverage ratios, indicating that 
those firms issue bonds more frequently and issue bonds with more dispersed maturity 
structure at the same time. Over time, these firms are able to achieve the most dispersed 
maturity structure of outstanding bonds. This is in line with our results from the analysis of 
the overall maturity dispersion structure. A similar but slightly weaker result is found for 
firms’ cash holdings and growth opportunities. Firms’ growth opportunities negatively 
correlate with the time gap between issues. They positively correlate with maturity dispersion 
at issue although the impact is not significant. The result are consistent with our previous 
findings on the overall maturity dispersion of outstanding bonds and in line with the literature 
suggesting that firms with higher growth opportunities primarily issue short-term bonds, and 
thus need to issue frequently. It is also interesting to see that firms holding more cash are 
more likely issue bonds with dispersed maturities, as this potentially indicates that firms use 
complementary strategies to buffer against liquidity shocks. In addition, we find that firms 
with higher cash flow volatility issue bonds with more dispersed maturity structure but they 
do not issue more frequently. The latter suggests that the costs of following a maturity 
dispersion policy to manage funding liquidity risk might be lower than the costs of frequently 
issuing corporate bonds. 
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We further find that the time gap between bond issues negatively correlates with bank 
dependence and the year when firms first issued bonds, but negatively correlates with the 
maturity dispersion at issuance. This indicates that these firms are frequent issuers but not 
spreading out maturity. The related literature shows that those bank dependent firms and firms 
that recently get access to the bonds market are more financially constrained and subject to 
high information asymmetries. They do not have the flexibility to issue bonds with both short 
and long maturity, but are rather constrained to issue short-term bonds (e.g., Diamond, 1991). 
Patterns in the data confirm this explanation: the average maturity of new bonds issued by 
bank dependent firms is 9.5 years, which is shorter than the average maturity of 13.6 years for 
non-bank dependent firms. Similarly, the maturity of new issues for firms that have later 
access to bond market is 10 years versus 12.3 years for the ones that had earlier access. 
Taking the evidence together enables us to conclude that the issue activity of bank-dependent 
firms and firms that have late access to the public debt market is largely limited to bonds with 
concentrated and short maturity. 
Another interesting finding is that the existing maturity dispersion has an important impact 
on the issue activity. Maturity dispersion of outstanding bonds significantly positively relates 
to both the maturity dispersion of bonds issues and negatively to the issue time gap (i.e., 
positively to the issue frequency). This finding suggests that firms with a more dispersed 
maturity structure continue to follow dispersion policy when issuing new bonds. A one point 
increase in the maturity dispersion of outstanding bonds is associated with a 4 percentage 
point increase of maturity dispersion of new issues and a 27.5 percentage point decrease of 
the time gaps between two issues.  
Macro-economic factors matter for the issue time gap but not for the maturity dispersion at 
issuance. We find that the time gap between issues negatively correlates with the term spread 
and positively correlates with the default spread between average BAA and AAA rated bonds. 
This result indicates that firms tap into the public debt market less frequently during 
recessions when the term spread and risk free rate tend to be lower and the default spread 
tends to be higher. Taking into account that the average maturity of new bond issues during 
recessions is on average shorter we conclude that firms face more difficulties to raise external 
finance and have limited access to the public debt market at that time.  
We conclude that firms that are bigger, more leveraged, and that have a more dispersed 
maturity structure of outstanding bonds are the ones that are more likely to issue more 
frequently and simultaneously bonds with different maturities. 
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3.3.3 The Impact of Bond Maturity Dispersion on Funding Liquidity 
In this section, we investigate the impact of a dispersed bond maturity structure on firms’ 
funding availability and the funding costs to see whether this strategy helps mitigate funding 
liquidity risk. 
First, we examine the availability of funding by considering the probability of a firm being 
able to meet its financing needs arising from (i) expiring bonds and (ii) new investment 
opportunities. We define years when firm’s refinancing needs arise due to bonds’ expiry if at 
least one bond expires in that year. We define years when firm’s financing needs arise due to 
new investment if firms’ total investments (measured by the sum of firm’s capital expenditure, 
R&D expense, and advertising expense) grow by at least 40% in that year (this happens less 
than 25% of all firm-year observations in our sample).  
Specifically, we create two dummy variables that indicate the success of firms in meeting 
the two types of financing needs. The dummy variables equal one if at least one new bond is 
placed by the firm during the year when firm’s financing needs arise in either of the two 
situations, and equal to zero when no bond is issued during the year when financing needs 
arise. Importantly, in this analysis we do not consider firms’ financing activities in years in 
which no financing need arises. Summary statistics show that on average, successful 
refinancing of expiring bonds through new issues occurs more frequently (38.6%) than 
successful financing of new investments (20.4%).  
We use Probit models to estimate the probability of successfully (re-)financing. 
Specifically, we regress the dummy variables of a firm’s funding success in year t on its 
lagged maturity structure, controlling for firm characteristics, and macro-economic conditions 
measured at the end of year t-1. Since a well-dispersed maturity structure implies that the firm 
faces lower funding liquidity risk, we expect that this lower risk increases the firm’s funding 
availability in year t, controlling for the other factors. Table 3.4 reports the results. 
 
TABLE 3.4. The Impact of Maturity Dispersion of Outstanding Bonds on Funding Availability 
This table reports the results of probit regression models that estimate the likelihood of successfully refinancing 
(1) expiring bonds (Funding_success_dummy_mat) and (2) new investments (Funding_success_dummy_inv). 
Explanatory variables are the lagged maturity dispersion of outstanding bonds and lagged bond maturity 
dispersion, accounting variables and macro-economic variables. The sample period is from January 1, 1991 to 
December 31, 2011. *, **, *** indicate coefficients that are significantly different from zero at the 10%, 5%, and 
1% level. Robust standard errors are employed and clustered at firm level. Variables are defined in the Appendix 
A3.1. 
 (1)  (2) 
Dep. Var.:  Funding_success_dummy_mat   Funding_success_dummy_inv 
 Coeff. t-stat. sig.  Coeff. t-stat. sig. 
        
Dispersion t-1 0.053 3.28 ***  0.136 4.28 *** 
Firm characteristics         
Log_firm_size t-1 0.160 4.53 ***  0.169 5.26 *** 
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Table 3.4, continued from the previous page 
Cash flow volatility t-1 -0.589 -1.09   -0.181 -0.57  
Leverage t-1 0.784 3.59 ***  0.457 2.83 *** 
ROA t-1 0.360 0.76   -0.518 -1.53  
Cash holdings t-1 -1.021 -2.55 **  -0.516 -2.3 ** 
Tobin’s Q t-1 0.087 1.94 *  0.068 2.76 *** 
Bank dependence t-1 -0.131 -1.15   0.048 0.53  
Bond_start_yrt-1 0.003 0.79   0.014 3 *** 
        
Macro-economic 
variables    
 
   
Term spread t-1 0.004 0.06   0.133 2.6 *** 
Default spread t-1 0.319 2.86 ***  0.119 1  
Risk free t-1 -0.031 -0.78   0.052 1.41  
        
McFadden’s Adj. R2 0.092    0.054   
Number of obs. 1573    2242   
Number of firms 724    1148   
 
The findings from both regression models point to the same direction. We observe that, 
ceteris paribus, having a dispersed maturity structure has a significantly positive impact on 
firm’s funding success. A one standard deviation increase in the variable Dispersion 
corresponds to a 9.58 percentage points increase in the probability of successfully refinancing 
a maturing bond, and a 24.60 percentage points increase in the probability of issuing bonds to 
finance new investments. Moreover, the impact of firm characteristics is consistent across the 
two models. Larger firms and firms with a higher leverage ratio, lower cash holdings, and 
higher growth opportunity are more likely to be able to refinance maturing bonds and/or new 
investments. Large firms face less information asymmetry and thus are more likely able to 
refinance when it is needed, while firms with higher leverage ratio, lower cash holdings, and 
higher growth opportunity are more sensitive to the funding liquidity risk. 
We also analyze the impact of having a dispersed maturity structure on corporate funding 
costs associated with bond finance. According to He and Xiong (2012a), firm’s funding 
liquidity risk leads to an increase in the liquidity premium of corporate bonds and also higher 
firms’ credit risk. The evidence provided by Gopalan et al. (2013) shows that the credit 
quality deteriorates when the firm faces higher funding liquidity risk caused by a large 
proportion of short-term debt. We measure firms’ costs of bond financing with the average 
yield spread per year in basis points. This variable captures the average firm-specific costs of 
bond financing and reflects credit risk and funding liquidity risk in a year. For every new bond 
issue, we calculate the differences between the yield to maturity of the new bond and the yield 
on treasury bonds (rf) with similar a maturity. We then calculate the average spreads of all 
bonds that firms issue during each year to obtain the average yield spread of the firm’s new 
issues per year. The average yield spread in our sample is 246 basis points.  
We use the same specifications as in the analysis of firms’ funding availability to analyze 
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whether firms with a more dispersed maturity structure benefit from lower funding costs when 
they issue new bonds, controlling for firm characteristics and macro-economic conditions. We 
lag the explanatory variables by one period to avoid potential endogeneity issues. The results 
are shown in Table 3.5. 
 
TABLE 3.5. The Impact of Bond Maturity Dispersion on Funding Costs 
This table reports the results of an OLS regression with industry fixed effects of the funding costs associated 
with new bond issues (Yield spread) on the lagged maturity dispersion of outstanding bonds, lagged firm 
characteristics, and macro-economic variables. We measure the yield spread as the average spread between the 
yield on firm’s new issues and the yield of US government bonds with the same maturity in year t. The sample 
period is from January 1, 1991 to December 31, 2011. *, **, *** indicate coefficients that are significantly 
different from zero at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level. Robust standard errors are employed and clustered at firm 
level. Variables are defined in the Appendix A3.1. 
 
Dep. Var.:  Yield spread  
 Coeff. t-stat. sig. 
    
Dispersion t-1 -3.768 -2.23 ** 
    
Firm characteristics     
Log_firm_size t-1 -17.916 -4.29 *** 
Cash flow volatility t-1 395.650 3.93 *** 
Leverage t-1 129.036 4.59 *** 
ROA t-1 -236.429 -4.27 *** 
Cash holdings t-1 -71.352 -1.3  
Tobin’s Q t-1 -26.582 -4.79 *** 
Bank dependence t-1 96.450 9.87 *** 
Bond_start_yrt-1 1.050 3.07 *** 
    
Table 3.5 – continued from the previous page 
Macro-economic variables    
Term spread t-1 -96.606 -21.22 *** 
Default spread t-1 108.301 10.57 *** 
Risk free t-1 -42.256 -14.76 *** 
    
Industry fixed effects Yes    
    
Adj. R2 0.533   
Number of obs. 2091   
Number of firms 737   
 
We find that the maturity dispersion of outstanding bonds negatively relates to the firm’s 
funding costs as measured by the yield spread. A one standard deviation increase of the 
dispersion structure of outstanding bonds reduces the yield spread by 6.81 basis points. This 
suggests that spreading out the bond maturities effectively improves firms funding costs. In 
addition, coefficients on firm characteristics indicate that firm fundamentals have significant 
impact on the costs of firms’ new bonds issues. Larger firm size and earlier access to bonds 
market lower firm’s funding costs because of lower information asymmetry and stronger 
fundamentals. Furthermore, we find that firms are more likely to enjoy lower funding costs in 
times of favorable macro-economic conditions, as reflected by the coefficients for the term 
spread, default spread, and risk free rate.  
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In sum, we show that bond maturity dispersion yields important benefits as it helps 
increase funding availability and lower funding costs. 
 
3.4. Additional Analyses 
3.4.1 The Influence of Maturity Dispersion for Firms with More and Less Funding Liquidity 
Risk 
Our findings indicate that certain types of firms manage to achieve a dispersed maturity 
structure over time, and having a dispersed maturity of outstanding bonds improve firms’ 
funding availability and funding costs. In the next step, we investigate whether the magnitude 
of these benefits depends on firms’ funding liquidity risk being higher or lower. In this case, 
we use bank dependence and the average remaining years to maturity of outstanding bonds 
(short vs. long term) to differentiate between firms.  
First, bank-dependent firms are more likely financially constrained and have difficulties in 
issuing bonds because of the higher information asymmetry compared to non-bank dependent 
firms. Thus, there is additional room for improvement in the funding availability for bank 
dependent firms. Based on this reasoning, we expect that bank-dependent firms should exhibit 
the highest marginal benefits if they succeed in building up a well-spread bond maturity 
structure.  
Second, as the average year to maturity of outstanding bonds becomes shorter the rollover 
risk in the near future gets bigger. The maturity of outstanding bonds thus partially reflects the 
level of firms’ funding liquidity risk (Gopalan et al., 2013). The related literature documents 
that having outstanding bonds with a shorter maturity creates large rollover risk and the 
potential for inefficient liquidation (Froot et al., 1993; Brunnermeier and Yogo, 2009; Cheng 
and Milbradt, 2012). In this case, as the median maturity of outstanding bonds for all firms is 
7.6 years, we create the dummy variable Short_maturity that equals one if the firm’s average 
maturity of outstanding bonds is shorter than 7.6 years and zero otherwise. We re-estimate the 
models of corporate funding availability and funding costs from Table 3.4 and 5 and include 
the lagged interaction term of Dispersion and Bank dependence, and alternatively, the lagged 
interaction term of  Dispersion and Short_maturity. Panel A of Table 3.6 reports the results for 
bank-dependence and Panel B of Table 3.6 the results for the maturity focus. 
 
TABLE 3.6. The Impact of Maturity Dispersion of Outstanding Bonds on Funding Availability by 
Bank Dependence and Short-Term Maturity Focus 
This table reports the results of probit regression models that estimate the likelihood of successfully refinancing 
(1) expiring bonds (Funding_success_dummy_mat) and (2) new investments (Funding_success_dummy_inv). 
Explanatory variables are the lagged maturity dispersion of outstanding bonds and lagged bond maturity 
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dispersion, accounting variables and macro-economic variables. Panel A shows the impact of bank dependence. 
Panel B shows the impact of firms’ maturity focus, which we measure with the dummy variable Short_maturity 
(one if the average remaining years to maturity of the outstanding bonds is below the median, otherwise zero). 
The sample period is from January 1, 1991 to December 31, 2011. *, **, *** indicate coefficients that are 
significantly different from zero at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level. Robust standard errors are employed and 
clustered at firm level. Variables are defined in the Appendix A3.1. 
 
Panel A. Bank dependence 
 (1)  (2)  
Dep. Var.:  Funding_success_dummy_mat  Funding_success_dummy_inv  
 Coeff. t-stat. sig.  Coeff. t-stat. sig.  
         
Dispersion t-1 0.044 2.81 ***  0.110 3.17 ***  
         
Bank dependence t-1 * Dispersiont-1 0.108 2.55 **  0.092 1.69 *  
Firm characteristics          
Log_firm_size t-1 0.125 3.34 ***  0.157 4.87 ***  
Cash flow volatility t-1 -0.559 -1.01   -0.178 -0.56   
Leverage t-1 0.733 3.32 ***  0.433 2.69 ***  
ROA t-1 0.442 0.92   -0.512 -1.51   
Cash holdings t-1 -0.972 -2.4 **  -0.510 -2.27 **  
Tobin’s Q t-1 0.088 1.95 *  0.069 2.79 ***  
Bond_start_yrt-1 0.003 0.76   0.015 3.1 ***  
Bank dependencet-1 -0.506 -3.04 ***  -0.137 -1.02   
         
Economic situation         
Term spread t-1 -0.007 -0.12   0.130 2.56 **  
Default spread t-1 0.334 2.99 ***  0.117 0.98   
Risk free t-1 -0.036 -0.89   0.051 1.39   
         
Industry fixed effects Yes     Yes     
McFadden’s Adj. R2 0.095    0.054    
Number of obs. 1573    2242    
Number of firms 724    1148    
 
Panel B. Short-term maturity focus 
 (1)  (2) 
Dep. Var.:  Funding_success_dummy_mat  Funding_success_dummy_inv 
 Coeff. t-stat. sig.  Coeff. t-stat. sig. 
        
Dispersion t-1 0.165 5.17 ***  0.190 4.06 *** 
        
Short_maturity t-1 * Dispersion t-1 0.141 4.23 ***  0.076 1.51  
        
Firm characteristics        
Log_firm_size t-1 0.131 3.65 ***  0.163 5.11 *** 
Cash flow volatility t-1 -0.514 -0.93   -0.162 -0.5  
Leverage t-1 0.644 2.9 ***  0.445 2.76 *** 
ROA t-1 0.418 0.86   -0.550 -1.62  
Cash holdings t-1 -0.969 -2.4 **  -0.505 -2.26 ** 
Tobin’s Q t-1 0.088 1.89 *  0.070 2.87 *** 
Bond_start_yrt-1 0.003 0.79   0.014 2.97 *** 
Bank dependencet-1 -0.109 -0.95   0.044 0.49  
Short_maturity t-1 -0.494 -3.24 ***  -0.210 -1.97 ** 
        
Economic situation        
Term spread t-1 0.012 0.2   0.120 2.31 ** 
Default spread t-1 0.311 2.78 ***  0.135 1.13  
Risk free t-1 -0.025 -0.61   0.046 1.22  
Industry fixed effects Yes     Yes    
McFadden’s Adj. R2 0.100    0.054   
Number of obs. 1573    2242   
Number of firms 724    1148   
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The analysis confirms our expectation that spreading out bond maturity improves the 
funding availability for firms that face more funding liquidity risk. Panel A of Table 3.6 shows 
that bank-dependent firms exhibit the highest benefits of having a dispersed bond maturity 
structure. The economic effect is strong: the coefficient of the interactive term is more than 
twice as big than the base effect (column (1): 0.108 compared to 0.044) for the probability of 
refinancing expiring bonds and approximately as big as the base effect for the probability of 
financing new investment (column (2): 0.092 compared to 0.110), suggesting substantial 
additional benefits of improving funding availability for bank dependent firms compared to 
the non-bank dependent ones.  
Panel B of Table 3.6 shows that firms that focus on bond finance with short maturities 
exhibit the highest benefits of having a dispersed bond maturity structure. We see that having 
short-term outstanding bonds increases the probability of successfully refinancing expiry 
bonds by 30.6 percentage points, which is almost twice as compared to the impact of bond 
dispersion on refinancing success for firms with bonds maturing in longer term.  
We also test the influence on firms’ funding costs (not reported here). We find that having a 
dispersed maturity structure creates benefits for bank-dependent firms and firms with short-
term outstanding bonds. However, these effects are not statistically significant. This result 
implies that having a dispersed maturity structure lowers the funding costs for weaker and 
stronger firms in a more equivalent matter. Having a dispersed maturity structure primarily 
translates into improved funding availability (and thus funding liquidity) but the market still 
considers the lower credit quality of these firms and thus demands a higher premium. 
In sum, our finding suggests that having a well-spread bond maturity structure creates 
additional benefits in form of higher funding availability for firms that face higher funding 
liquidity risk. 
 
3.4.2 The Maturity-Weighted Dispersion Variable and the Heterogeneity in Maturity Structure 
When we investigate firms’ maturity structure it matters how far the maturities of different 
bonds are away from each other. For example, the maturity structure for firms with two bonds 
of equal amounts that mature in year t+5 and t+6 is different from firms with two bonds of 
equal amounts that mature in year t+1 and t+10. The key difference between the two 
situations is how stretched out are the years to maturity, or how heterogeneous are they are. 
We consider use a modified version of the variable Dispersion to capture the heterogeneity. 
We calculate the deviations of all the years to maturity of all bonds from the average years to 
maturity of the outstanding bonds to account for the heterogeneity in bond maturity. We add 
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this maturity deviation |𝑚𝑖,𝑡,𝑝 − ?̅?𝑖,𝑡| as a weight to the formula to calculate the variable 
Dispersion and get an alternative variable for bonds dispersion, which we label 
Dispersion_maturity_weighted (see Equation (3)). We avoid zero or negative weights by 
taking the absolute value of the difference between an individual maturity and the average 
maturity and add one to the value.  
(3)                   𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑠𝑖𝑜𝑛_𝑚𝑎𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑖𝑡𝑦_𝑤𝑒𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑡𝑒𝑑𝑖,𝑡,𝑝 =
𝟏
∑ 𝒘𝒊,𝒕,𝒑
𝟐 ∙
𝟏
|𝒎𝒊,𝒕,𝒑−?̅?𝒊,𝒕|+𝟏
𝒏
𝒑=𝟏
                  
The variable has a mean of 8.803 and a median of 2.5. Intuitively, the more heterogeneous 
the maturity of outstanding bonds is, the higher the score is. We compare this variable with 
our original dispersion measure and conduct the same set of analyses using the maturity 
weighted dispersion variable. We find that this variable highly correlates with Dispersion as 
Pearson’s correlation coefficient equals to 0.826. The regression results on the relationship 
between firm characteristics and weighted dispersion are largely similar to results using the 
original variable – firm size, leverage, and Tobin’s Q are positively related to the weighted 
dispersion, and bank dependence is negatively related to it. Results for the incremental 
dispersion at bonds issues also largely resemble our findings using the Dispersion. 
We further use the maturity weighted dispersion variable to test the impact on firms’ 
funding availability and funding costs. Results show that the maturity weighted dispersion 
measure decreases firm’s funding costs to a similar degree as the Dispersion does. We observe 
a significant positive impact on firm’s new investment funding activities but no significant 
impact on funding expiring bonds. We further show that the impacts are much stronger for 
bank dependent firms and firms with outstanding bonds of short maturities, which is 
consistent with the findings from Table 3.6. We conclude that the results using the maturity 
weighted dispersion variable yields similar results as the variable Dispersion. 
 
3.4.3 The Fraction of Funding Needs Met 
In addition to the probability of whether financing needs are met it is useful to examine to 
which extent firm’s financing needs are met. Instead of using dummy variables we now 
calculate the ratio of “financing raised over financing needed” for the two cases mentioned in 
Section 3.3. The variable is zero if there are financing needs but zero dollar-amount of bonds 
is issued in the year. We find that when new bonds are issued to replace existing bonds’ 
expiry, the median refinancing ratio is 2.2, meaning that the new bonds issued on average are 
more than enough to cover the amount of bonds maturing. The refinancing ratio is 4.67 for 
cases when there is an increase in the investment. Thus, the two types of financing needs are 
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more than sufficient when firms issue bonds during the year. We also re-estimate the same 
regressions as in Table 3.4 but now use the weighted dispersion variable.  
We find that the dispersion of outstanding bonds has a significant and positive impact on 
the fraction of financing needs that is met when a firm has new investment opportunities. A 
one point increase in the maturity dispersion relates to an 8.84 percentage point increase in the 
fraction of financing needs that are met when firms have new investment opportunities. 
Overall, the results point to the same direction as our findings with the dummy variables. 
Having a dispersed maturity structure not only matters for the probability of a refinancing but 
also matters for the extent to which funding needs are met. 
 
3.4.4 Firms’ Reliance on Bond Financing 
One concern might be that bond maturity dispersion is less or not relevant for firms that do 
not heavily rely on bonds financing. To investigate this issue, we compare the dispersion of 
firm’s overall maturity structure for firms that rely more and less on bond financing and also 
check the difference in their bond issues activity. We measure to what degree firms rely on 
bond financing using firms’ bond to total debt ratio and create two subsamples of firms 
according to the median bond ratio (72% in our sample). We rerun the tests similar to the ones 
in Table 3.2 and 3 on the two subsamples of firms with higher and lower bond ratio 
separately.   
The results are consistent with the findings using the full sample. We find that the 
relationship between firm’s maturity dispersion of outstanding bonds and various firm 
characteristics stays largely unchanged across the two sub-samples of firms with different 
bonds to debt ratios. Analysis on firms’ new bonds issuance also exhibit comparable patterns 
across the two sub-samples. Overall, we find that firms that rely less on bond finance also 
manage the bonds maturity dispersion overtime through their bond issuance activities.  
 
3.5 Conclusion 
In this paper we investigate whether and how firms manage funding liquidity risk through 
spreading out the maturity of bonds. We examine the dispersion of US firms’ bond maturity 
structure over time and at issuance during the period 1991-2011 and their impact on funding 
availability and funding costs. 
 We find that larger, more leveraged, less profitable, growth-oriented, and non-bank 
dependent firms exhibit the largest maturity dispersion of outstanding bonds. Firms maintain 
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such dispersed maturity structure by frequently issuing sets of bonds with different maturities. 
We also find that having a more dispersed maturity structure helps increase funding 
availability and lower funding costs. Interestingly, the effects are stronger for firms with a 
higher exposure to funding liquidity risks. The result is consistent with the survey evidence 
documented in the previous research, and suggests that certain firms effectively follow a 
maturity dispersion policy. Finally, our paper also extends the literature on the firms’ rollover 
risk management, and we show that firms could successfully mitigate the funding liquidity 
risk through building up and maintaining a dispersed bond maturity structure over time. 
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Chapter 4 
Bank Entry Mode, Labor Market Flexibility and 
Economic Activity* 
 
 
4.1 Introduction 
Since Schumpeter (1912) who first pointed out the importance of banking system in economic 
progress, the link between financial development and economic growth has been a subject of 
debate. Over the past three decades, the banking sector has been progressively deregulated around 
the globe. Looking at the interstate banking expansions in the United States, recent studies 
highlight the positive impact on local economic activity as a result of an increase in bank 
competition and financial integration (Jayaratne and Strahan 1996; Huang 2008). In bank 
expansions, knowledge about the local market can act as an important barrier for potential entrants 
to compete with incumbent banks (Dell’Ariccia and Marquez 2004). Studies show the lack of the 
direct access to local information is a disadvantage for banks seeking to enter a new market 
(Dell’Ariccia et al. 1999). How can banks get local information when they plan to expand across 
state borders? In the banking industry, employees (e.g., loan officers) are the ones who collect and 
update information about local clients (Petersen and Rajan 1994). To this end, I focus on the key 
                                                        
* This chapter is based on Wang (2015). This paper benefits tremendously from very helpful discussions with, among many others, 
Franklin Allen, Taylor Begley, Allen Berger, Dion Bongaerts, Matthieu Chavaz, Jarrad Harford, Karl Lins, Robert Marquez, Lars 
Norden, Marcus Opp, Joe Peek, Buhui Qiu, Peter Roosenboom, Farzad Saidi, Rui Shen, Fabrizio Spargoli, Greg Udell, Jim Wilcox 
and discussants and participants at the 4th MoFiR 2015 workshop on Banking in Kobe, the 2015 China International Conference in 
Finance in Shenzhen, participants at the seminars at Paris Dauphine University, Erasmus University, Cornerstone Research, Board 
of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond and City University Hong Kong. Part of this 
study was conducted during my research visit to UC Berkeley. I gratefully acknowledge financial support from the National 
Science Foundation of the Netherlands (NWO) under Mosaic grant number 017.007.128, the Vereniging Trustfonds Erasmus 
University Rotterdam, and the ERIM Talent Placement Program. 
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channel through which an out-of-market bank could gain access to local information: the mobility 
of incumbent bank employees with critical knowledge of local markets.  
Entrant banks gain access to important local information by hiring incumbent banks 
employees to work for their new branches. However, if local labor market frictions restrict this 
inter-organizational labor mobility, entrant banks cannot gain access to local information through 
hiring; they will have to acquire existing incumbent branches instead. This potential entrance 
scenario indicates that the modes of bank entry may be affected by local labor market flexibility.  
In this paper, I investigate whether the accessibility of local information through labor 
mobility influences entrant banks’ strategy on how to enter into the local market following the 
U.S. interstate branching deregulation. The main challenge in establishing the causal effect is to 
identify exogenous variation in the local labor market. In order to do this, I focus on the changes 
in jurisdictional enforcement of the non-compete covenants. Such a regulation introduces frictions 
into the labor market and imposes significant constraints on the mobility of the labor force in the 
same industry. The enforcement on the non-compete covenants reduces local employee turnover, 
and restricts entry banks’ access to local information. As the former chief of the antitrust division 
of the U.S. Department of Justice stated, “the branch manager and loan officers are critical in local 
small business and retail lending and that tying up good branch managers or loan officers with 
non-compete agreements can be detrimental to new entrant banks’ ability to attract or retain 
customers” (Kramer 1999, p323). I exploit the heterogeneity in enforcement of non-compete 
agreements across different states and over time, and use it to explain the dynamics of banks’ entry 
modes during the post- interstate banking deregulation era in the U.S. from 1994 to 2010. A 
difference-in-differences approach is used to identify the causal relationship between local labor 
market flexibility and out-of-state banks’ mode of market entry. 
Banks use two different approaches when they enter a new market. Are there different 
economic consequences associated with each approach? In the first approach, new branches 
established by out-of-market banks increase the total number of credit providers in the market, and 
lead to a more competitive credit market. In the second approach, the number of credit providers 
remains constant when local branches are acquired by entrant banks. An increase in bank 
competition after interstate bank branching deregulation ultimately contributed to improvement in 
local bank service, credit availability, economic growth, and job creation (Black and Strahan 2002; 
Dick 2006; Rice and Strahan 2010; Chodorow-Reich 2014), whereas it is less clear if banks enter 
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local market using the second approach. This indicates that the local economy will benefit more 
from new market entrants who establish new branches. To test the prediction, I compare the real 
consequence on local credit market and economic activity after banks enter a new market by 
establishing branches versus through mergers and acquisitions (M&As) of existing branches. 
The main result from the difference-in-differences analysis shows that the relaxation of 
enforcement of non-compete agreements causes an average 37.3 percentage point increase in the 
proportion of out-of-state banks entering the market by establishing branches (in contrast to 
acquisitions). To mitigate the concerns about unobserved heterogeneity, I build on Huang (2008) 
and test the impact of non-compete enforcement on banks’ entry modes only using contiguous 
counties bordering the law-change states. The result shows that the positive impact of labor market 
flexibility on the likelihood that a bank expands by establishing branches in new markets remains 
robust. I then differentiate the real consequences on credit market and local economic activity after 
out-of-state banks enter a new market by establishing a branch rather than acquiring a branch 
through an M&A. I find that establishment of a new branch increases local credit market 
competition, leads to an increase in small business lending, more economic activity, and faster per 
capita income growth. For instance, adding one new branch in the county increases the amount of 
loans to small businesses by 0.591 percentage points. The effect is also economically significant – 
as it is equivalent to a 5.2% increase compared to the average changes in the amount of loans to 
small businesses across counties and over time. Interestingly no significant effect could be 
observed on the local credit market or economy after local branches are acquired by out-of-state 
banks.  
In addition, I conduct various robustness checks including a placebo experiment and 
alternative measurements, and the results substantiate the validity of the empirical tests and 
increases confidence in the interpretation of the main finding. Overall, the evidence indicates that 
the accessibility of local information through labor turnover in the target market matters for banks 
when they are considering how to enter a new market. Their decisions could ultimately facilitate 
financial and economic development in the local market. 
This study contributes to the literature on the role of local information for the financial 
industry. Petersen and Rajan (2002) show that local lenders collect information about small firms 
through loan contracts, and enjoy an informational advantage over more remote competitors. 
Empirical evidence shows that lenders also collect information about local borrowers through 
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other financial services such as checking account agreements, which also helps to improve lending 
decisions (Mester et al. 2007; Norden and Weber 2010). Bird and Knopf (2014) shows that 
mobility of local knowledge impedes de novo banks creation and affects wage and profitability of 
commercial banks. Studies show that the local information possessed by incumbent banks 
including their lending relationships with borrowers serves as an entry barrier for banks looking to 
enter the market; it also affects the competitive structure of the local banking industry 
(Dell’Ariccia et al. 1999; Dell’Ariccia and Marquez 2004). Without access to the local 
information, entrant banks are especially susceptible to the “winner’s curse” problem in bank 
lending (Broecker 1990; Schaffer 1998). Because of their lack of information about the local 
market, those banks may often “win” some deals from poor quality borrowers that were previously 
rejected by local banks (Rajan 1992; Ogura 2006), and are more likely to experience higher loan 
default rates (Bofondi and Gobbi 2006). Berger and Dick (2007) show that banks that entered a 
market earlier, and make significant investments in building branch networks are able to gain 
better access to the local borrowers and depositors, thus gradually reducing the information 
disadvantages. The importance of locally collected information is also reflected in findings from 
financial institutions of other kinds and in general (e.g., Coval and Moskowitz 1999, 2001). 
Focusing on labor mobility as the channel for local information to flow across banks; my findings 
highlight the importance of local information accessibility for banks expanding into new markets. 
Banks choose different entry modes in response to the flexibility of the local labor market.  
This paper is related to the studies on the interplay between law, finance, and growth. It has 
long been argued that the development of financial systems contributes to economic growth (e.g., 
Schumpeter 1969; McKinnon 1973). A large amount of recent research strengthened this view and 
documents supporting evidence at the country level (King and Levine 1993; Levine and Zervos 
1998), as well as at the firm level (Demirgüç-Kunt and Maksimovic 1998; Guiso et al. 2004; Allen 
et al. 2005). Noticeably, many studies use the U.S. interstate banking reforms to identify the 
causality among law, finance, and economic growth. In general, studies document that bank 
expansion after the law was implemented increased local bank competition and financial 
integration, which ultimately led to the local economic growth (Jayaratne and Strahan 1996; 
Huang 2008). In particular, credit competition improves bank services (Dick 2006), expands credit 
availability and lowers interest rates (Zarutskie 2006; Rice and Strahan 2010), limits the access to 
credit for underperforming firms (Bertrand et al. 2007), and stimulates entrepreneurship and 
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corporate innovation (Black and Strahan 2002; Amore et al. 2013; Chava et al 2013). This paper 
contributes to this literature by highlighting the economic consequences associated with different 
modes of bank entry, which I argue are affected by the changes in the levels of labor law 
enforceability in the target market. This paper also adds new evidence to the classical law and 
finance literature. Previous studies primarily focus on the role of the enforcement of legal systems 
in the area of investor protection and show that strong law enforcement, which provides the best 
legal protections of the investors, also facilitates financial market development (La Porta et al. 
2001). By linking the development in the banking sector to law enforcement in the area of labor 
competition, I show that the flexible labor law enforcement leads to bank entries through 
establishing branches and facilitating local economic development. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 1, I discuss the institutional 
background, data and measurement for the main variables. The empirical strategy and results are 
reported in Section 2. The findings from robustness tests and further checks are discussed in 
Section 3. Concluding remarks are given in Section 4.  
 
4.2 Institutional Background, Data and the Measurement  
4.2.1 The Modes of U.S. Banks’ Interstate Expansions 
The unique history and regulation of the U.S. banking industry has created a relatively fragmented 
banking market with currently around 6,000 independent institutions that mainly operate in one 
specific geographic region. Prior to 1970s, interstate bank branching and acquisition were largely 
prohibited. The McFadden Act of 1927 together with the Douglas Amendment to the Bank 
Holding Companies of 1956 effectively forbade bank expansion either in the form of establishing 
new branches or acquiring banks across state lines. Even intrastate branching was highly 
constrained as many states maintained a unit banking system, which only allowed banks to have 
one full-service office.  
The process of bank deregulation in the U.S. started around 1970 when many states started 
to abandon the unit banking system and allowed for bank expansion within state borders. The 
passage of the Riegle-Neal Interstate Banking and Branching Efficiency Act (IBBEA) in 1994 not 
only has removed any restrictions left on interstate acquisitions, but also for the permitted banks to 
establish branches across state borders. The number of out-of-state branches increased 
dramatically from 308 at the end of 1994 after enactment of IBBEA to 43,201 in June 2013.  
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Figure 4.1 The Number of Interstate Branches Operated by FDIC-insured Commercial 
Banks during 1994-2010  
 
 
 
Figures 4.1 and 4.2 show the interstate bank expansion after the enactment of IBBEA. 
Interstate branching has become increasingly important over the past two decades. Branches 
owned by out-of-state banks outnumber those of in-state banks in many states (e.g., 61.4% in 
Michigan, 63.1% in California, and 86.5% in Arizona in June 2013).  
I collect data on U.S. commercial banks’ interstate expansion activity after the enactment 
of IBBEA, and construct measures for bank’s entry modes. The data are for the period from 1994 
to 2010. Using the summary of deposit data from the Federal Deposit Insurance Company (FDIC), 
I obtain information on the establishment of bank branches, as well as branches’ ownership 
changes due to M&As. Based on the information, I aggregate the total number of out-of-state bank 
entries through new branch establishment and incumbent branch acquisition at the county and year 
level. I calculate the ratio of total bank entries through established branches in each county for 
each year over time.  
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Figure 4.2 The Interstate Branching Expansion of the U.S. Banking Industry 
 
Panel A. Interstate Branches as a Percentage of Total Offices, Dec. 1994 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Panel B. Interstate Branches as a Percentage of Total Offices, Dec. 2010 
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County is often considered as a proxy for the local market in banking studies (e.g., Berger 
et al. 1999; Huang 2008), as valuable local information and bank-firm relationship can only be 
preserved at a short distance, as suggested by Petersen and Rajan (2002). Also a county-level 
study minimizes the potential endogeneity problem in this case as the change in state legal 
enforcement is less likely to be driven by the economic situation in a particular county (Huang 
2008).  
I also zoom in all events when a bank enters an out-of-state market and analyze the mode 
of banks’ interstate expansion decision at the commercial bank level. I construct a dummy variable 
equal to one if the bank establishes a new branch and zero if it acquires a local incumbent branch. 
I collect data from the FDIC Call Report to capture bank characteristics such as bank age, size, 
liquidity, profitability, and capitalization ratio. In addition, I consider the geographic distance 
between the target state and the home state where the bank is headquartered as a proxy for the 
entrant bank’s familiarity with the target market.1 My final dataset includes information on 59,270 
events of 698 out-of-state bank entries into 2,309 counties across U.S. from 1994 to 2010. I 
exclude Delaware as the target market from the analysis since its unique tax regime may influence 
the local development of the financial industry and outside banks’ entry mode. 
   
4.2.2 The Enforceability of Non-Compete Covenants  
A non-compete covenant is an employment contract in which an employee pledges not to work for 
a competitive firm for a designated period of time after resigning or being dismissed. Firms spend 
time and resources to accumulate knowledge, develop a product, and compile a client base. The 
non-compete covenants are designed to protect such corporate knowledge and confidential 
information that could otherwise be taken away as employees take jobs with competing firms 
(Franco and Mitchell 2008). The enforcement of non-compete contracts restrains labor market 
flexibility and cross-firm information flow (Fallick et al. 2006; Marx et al. 2009). Non-compete 
contracts are part of standard employment packages for executives, R&D staff, salespeople, and 
loan officers, among others, who have access to proprietary firm-specific information. Survey 
evidence suggests that around 90% of these employees have to sign non-compete agreements 
(Leonard 2001; Kaplan and Stromberg 2003). Recent study also document that the enforcement of 
non-compete covenant impedes the creation of new banks, and also affects banks’ labor costs and 
                                                        
1 I extract spatial information on the distance between states from the package developed by Scott Merryman. Source: 
http://econpapers.repec.org/software/bocbocode/s448405.htm. 
83_Erim Wang Stand.job
71 
 
 
profitability (Bird and Knopf 2014). Enforcement of these agreements helps incumbent banks 
preserve their informational advantage over new competitors (Kramer 1999). In the U.S., firms are 
free to write any sort of employment contract, but the enforcement of non-compete covenants is 
left to the states. The nature of what a firm can claim as a legitimate protectable interest depends 
on the state jurisdiction, and there is great variation across states and over time in the enforcement 
of the non-compete covenants. 
Following Garmaise (2011), I capture the cross-state variations in the labor market 
flexibility using the noncompetition enforcement index (NC_score). This index measures the 
extent to which the covenant not to compete is enforced at the state level, and it captures several 
important dimensions of the enforcement documented in Malsberger (2004)2 . The NC_score 
ranges from zero in California where non-compete covenants are not enforceable to nine in 
Florida where the noncompetition agreement is the most strictly enforced. As the NC_score only 
covers a period from 1994-2004, I collect additional information to identify changes in non-
compete enforcements in each state over the whole sample period. I am able to identify five 
shocks to the non-compete enforcement during the post deregulation period of 1994-2010 based 
on the analyses from the legal and management literature (Garmaise 2011; Malsberger 2011; Marx 
and Fleming 2011). To be specific, Idaho (Id. SB1393) strengthened the non-compete law by 
extending firms’ ability to enforce the non-compete in 2008, while New York (Ny. S02393) and 
Oregon (Or. SB248) have relaxed the enforcement of the non-compete covenants. The 
enforcement of non-compete covenants was radically relaxed in Louisiana (La. R.S. 23:921) in 
2001 after the supreme court’s ruling of SWAT 24 Shreveport Bossier, Inc. v. Bond, 808 So. 2d 294, 
and state legislation reversed the change in 2003.  
The states’ changes in the enforcement of non-compete covenants serve as natural 
experiments of shocks to local labor market flexibility. They are largely exogenous to the 
decision-making process of out-of-state banks on how to expand into a local market. The changes 
in the non-compete enforcement due to a court’s judicial decision is largely an idiosyncratic 
function of the particular case and the character of the justices. Also, there is no obvious reason to 
believe that the primary intention for state legislation to change non-compete enforcement is to 
influence the way in which potential out-of-state banks choose to enter a local market. In the 
empirical setup, I also control the local market condition, political climate, and banking market 
                                                        
2  For a complete overview of the construction of the index of enforcement of the non-compete covenants, see 
Malsberger (2004) and Garmaise (2011). 
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structure over time to further mitigate the possible endogeneity concerns.  
 
4.2.3 Economic Conditions and Political Climate 
In addition to have the legal enforcement of non-compete covenants as the main explanatory 
variable to estimate bank’s entry mode, I also control for other variables such as local market 
conditions and political climate. Extracting data from various sources such as the U.S. Census 
Bureau, Census County Business Pattern, Bureau of Economic Analysis, and Bureau of Labor 
Statistics, I construct variables such as market size, growth perspective, and credit market 
conditions to measure local market conditions. To proxy for the political climate in that state in a 
particular year, I manually collected archival data from website of the U.S. House of 
Representatives and calculate the percentage of the House of Representatives that are Democratic 
Party members for each state. 
To measure the economic implication of different modes of bank entries, I look at local 
bank competition, small business lending and economic activity. I measure the changes in the 
competitive structure of the local credit market using the Herfindahl index of local branch deposits 
concentration calculated at the county level. I collect local small business lending data from the 
Community Recovery Act database from the Federal Financial Institutions Examination Council 
(FFIEC). I calculate the yearly change in the total volume, as well as the amount of small business 
lending in the target counties over time. I calculate the yearly change in the local per capital 
income growth, number of establishments in the private sector, and unemployment rate to proxy 
for changes in the local economic activity after banks entries through branching and M&As. The 
final dataset includes 9,553 county-year observations of the U.S. from 1994 to 2010. Table 4.1 
provides an overview of the main variables, as well as the summary statistics. 
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Table 4.1 – continued from
 the previous page
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4.3 Empirical Results 
4.3.1 Cross-Sectional Analysis of Banks Entry Mode after IBBEA 
As shown in the previous section, there is a wide dispersion of enforcement of non-compete laws 
across states. Depending on the accessibility to the local information, out-of-state banks choose 
one of the two ways to penetrate the market: establish new branches or M&As. As a first step, I 
look into the cross-sectional heterogeneity in the primary banks entry mode across the U.S. after 
the IBBEA and link it to various levels of legal enforcement of non-compete covenants across 
states prior to the passage of IBBEA. In Figure 4.3, I compare the relative importance of bank 
entries through establishing new branching in states with flexible labor markets versus in states 
with less flexible labor markets. I use the intensity of enforcement of non-compete covenants 
(NC_score) and the job turnover in the local commercial banking industry to proxy for the local 
labor market flexibility. I find that a relatively higher percentage of out-of-state banks enter new 
markets by establishing new branches in places with relaxed enforcement of non-compete 
covenants and higher labor turnover in the commercial banking industry, after the interstate 
banking deregulation took place.  
 
Figure 4.3 Bank Entry Modes and Labor Market Flexibility 
This figure shows the relationship between bank entry modes and the local market flexibility during the first three 
years after banking deregulation. The broken line shows the average percentage of bank entries through establishing 
branches bank entries in states with flexible labor laws, and the solid line shows the mean percentage of out-of-
market banks entries through establishing new branches in states with restrictive labor laws. And the grey shaded 
areas illustrate the lower and upper bounds measured at 95% confidence interval. In Panel A, the 
flexibility/restrictive labor market states are defined using the median split of the NC_score prior to the IBBEA; and 
in Panel B, the two groups of states are defined using the mean split of local job turnover in the commercial banking 
industry prior to IBBEA.  
Panel A. Labor Market Flexibility measured by NC_score 
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Panel B: Labor Market Flexibility measured by the Average Job Turnover Ratio in the Commercial Banking Industry 
 
I continue to investigate the link between the heterogeneity of bank entry mode and 
variation in local legal enforcement of non-compete covenants in a regression setting. I begin 
with calculating the percentage of out-of-state banks that enter each county in the U.S. through 
branch establishment during the first one to three years after IBBEA implementation in the state 
where the county locates. I regress the percentage of bank entries via branching on the non-
compete enforcement while controlling for the local market conditions such as market size, bank 
concentration, growth perspectives, etc. as well as political climate  prior to the enactment of the 
IBBEA in that state. A cross-sectional comparison is suitable in this case as the NC_score 
measure varies largely across states but remains largely stable over the years it convers. The 
results are shown in Table 4.2.  
 
Table 4.2 Labor Market Flexibility and Bank Entry Modes – County- level Analysis 
This table presents estimated coefficients from cross-sectional regressions that relate banks entry mode to local labor 
market flexibility. The dependent variable is the number of out-of-state banks entries through establishing new 
branches as a percentage of total number of out-of-state bank entries (branching plus M&A) in a county. The labor 
market flexibility is measured using NC_score, which reflects the intensity of non-compete enforcement prior to the 
IBBEA. The analyses are conducted using yearly data. In models (1), (2), and (3), the dependent variables are 
measured using all out-of-state bank entries over the period of one year, two years, and three years after the 
implementation of IBBEA, respectively. I control for lagged state and county characteristics, and use robust standard 
errors. t-statistics are shown in parentheses. *, **, and *** denote an estimate that is statistically significantly 
different from zero at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
 (1)  (2)  (3) 
Dep. Var.:  
Ratio of bank entries through branching  
In the first 
year after 
IBBEA 
 In the first 
two years 
after IBBEA 
 In the first 
three years 
after IBBEA 
Labor market flexibility       
NC_score prior to the enactment of IBBEA  -0.017** 
 
-0.022***  -0.006** 
(-2.26) (-4.86)  (-2.05) 
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Table 4.2 – continued from the previous page 
State controls      
Local market size -0.000  -0.000**  -0.000 
 (-0.94)  (-2.38)  (-1.34) 
Local bank competition  0.222  0.246  0.646*** 
 (0.88)  (1.28)  (4.21) 
Local per capita income 0.000***  0.000***  0.000*** 
 (5.48)  (5.62)  (3.71) 
Average size of local firms -0.003  -0.004  0.01*** 
 (-0.42)  (-0.64)  (2.86) 
Political Balance 0.098  0.088*  -0.003 
 (1.56)  (1.75)  (-0.11) 
      
County controls      
Personal income growth rate 0.002  -0.001  -0.001 
 (0.62)  (-0.54)  (-1.27) 
Total population 0.000  0.000  0.000* 
 (0.7)  (1.38)  (1.86) 
      
Adj. R2 0.105  0.075  0.036 
Number of obs. 744  1055  1463 
 
Results from the cross-sectional analysis show a negative relationship between the 
intensity of non-compete enforcement and the ratio of out-of-state banks entering through 
establishing new branches after banking deregulation. This means that where the local non-
compete law is more restrictive, fewer out-of-state banks will enter the market through branching. 
The coefficients on the NC_score remain consistently negative in columns (1) to (3), regardless 
of the time window. This indicates that the cross-state difference in the legal enforcement of non-
compete covenants continues to affect the entry modes of out-of-state banks into local markets 
even after the interstate banking reform. The result is robust after controlling for local political, 
economic, and market situations, which might influence both the non-compete enforcement and 
banks entry mode. In addition, the result is also economically significant. During the first year 
after bank deregulation, moving to a county with one point higher in the non-compete 
enforcement intensity leads to a 1.7 percentage point decrease in the ratio of bank entries through 
establishing branches. This value is equivalent to a 13.5% decrease compared to the sample 
mean.  
I then use logistic regression to investigate out-of-state banks’ entry mode decision each 
event they enters a local market, I test whether the choice between branching and M&A entry is 
affected by the intensity of non-compete enforcement. The bank-level entry mode dummy 
variable equals one if an out-of-state bank enters the local market via setting up branches and 
zero if this entry is completed via a M&A. I regress the entry mode dummy on the local 
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NC_score. I control for county and bank characteristics prior to the deregulation of interstate 
branching, as well as geographical distance between the expanding bank’s home state and target 
state. I include the year fixed effects to control for the unobservable shocks that affect all counties 
in certain years. 
 
Table 4.3 Labor Market Flexibility and Bank Entry Modes –Bank-level Analysis 
This table presents estimated coefficients from logistic regressions that relate banks entry mode to local labor market 
flexibility. Conditional upon each time of an out-of-state bank’s entry, the dependent variable of bank entry dummy 
equals one if the out-of-state bank enters via establishing branches, and it is zero if the bank enters through M&A 
with a local bank branch. The labor market flexibility is measured using NC_score, which reflects the intensity of 
non-compete enforcement prior to the IBBEA. The analyses are conducted using yearly data. In models (1), (2), and 
(3), I conduct logistic regression for all out-of-state bank entries over the period of one year, two years, and three 
years after the implementation of IBBEA, respectively. I control for lagged state and bank characteristics, as well as 
year fixed effects. Marginal effects with associated significance for the NC_score variable are reported in square 
brackets. Robust standard errors are clustered at bank level and at state level. t-statistics are shown in parentheses. *, 
**, and *** denote an estimate that is statistically significantly different from zero at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, 
respectively. 
 (1)  (2)  (3) 
Dep. Var.:  
Bank entry mode dummy 
Banks entry 
mode in the 
first year 
after IBBEA 
 Banks entry mode 
in the first three 
years after 
IBBEA 
 Banks entry 
mode in the first 
three years after 
IBBEA 
      
Labor market flexibility       
NC_score prior to the 
enactment of IBBEA 
-0.318** 
 
-0.157***  -0.039 
(-2.36) (-3.24)  (-0.78) 
 [-0.020**]  [-0.013***]  [-0.003] 
State controls  
Local market size 0.000  0.000  0.000 
 (0.8)  (0.46)  (0.03) 
Local bank competition 10.355***  12.884***  10.351*** 
 (3.08)  (3.99)  (2.83) 
Local per capita income 0.000***  0.000***  0.000** 
 (3.44)  (4.47)  (2.1) 
Average size of local firms 0.091  -0.031  0.003 
 (0.73)  (-0.64)  (0.05) 
Political balance -0.988  -0.788  -1.071 
 (-0.68)  (-0.83)  (-1.38) 
Home-target distance 0.000  0.000  0.000 
 (0.16)  (0.6)  (0.75) 
Bank controls      
Bank age 0.032**  0.012  0.007 
 (2.14)  (0.99)  (0.67) 
Bank size 0.000  -0.000  0.000 
 (0.22)  (-1.52)  (0.32) 
Bank liquidity -3.579  -1.757  -9.498 
 (-0.37)  (-0.34)  (-1.56) 
Bank ROA -326.479*  -291.563**  -176.452 
 (-1.7)  (-2.06)  (-1.5) 
Bank capital ratio 1.097  1.676  10.747 
 (0.89)  (0.23)  (1.08) 
Year fixed effects Yes  Yes  Yes 
McFadden Adj. R2 0.146  0.092  0.054 
Number of obs. 4684     
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The results in Table 4.3 are consistent with the findings from the county-level analysis 
(Table 4.2). I find that more restrictive local enforcement of non-compete covenants decreases the 
likelihood for out-of-state banks to establish new branches as compared to acquiring local 
branches. The effect appears economically significant; the unconditional probability of bank’s 
entry through establishing branching is 7.7%, the marginal effect of -0.02 for bank entry mode in 
the first year after IBBEA indicates that a one-point increase in the intensity of non-compete 
enforcement decreases the probability of out-of-banks to enter through establishing a branch by 
26% (0.02/0.077). In columns 2 and 3, I repeat the analysis using a longer test period after the 
IBBEA. The sign of the coefficients and the marginal effects are consistent with the results using 
one year. Overall, the results of both the county-level and bank-level analyses indicate that the 
intensity of non-compete enforcement is an important factor that affect out-of-state banks’ 
decision of how to enter a local market right after interstate banking deregulation. 
 
4.3.2 Difference-in-Differences Analysis of Bank Entry Mode 
The cross-sectional regression shows that after IBBEA, out-of-state banks use different modes to 
enter local markets. Their choice depends upon the intensity of non-compete enforcement. I use a 
difference-in-differences (DD) approach to examine whether there is a causal relationship 
between local labor market flexibility and banks’ entry mode. I identify changes in the intensity 
of state legal enforcement of non-compete covenants over the sample period from 1994 to 2010. I 
construct a DD indicator relaxation of non-compete enforcement to capture those changes. In the 
three cases in which the non-compete enforcement becomes more relaxed, I set the indicator 
equal to zero for all years preceding the year that the non-compete enforcement was relaxed, and 
one afterwards. And I set the indicator value reversely in the other two cases in which states 
strengthened the non-compete enforcement (i.e., set the indicator to one for all years preceding 
the year that law enforcement was strengthened and zero afterwards). The model specification is: 
(1)  𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜 𝑜𝑓 𝑏𝑎𝑛𝑘 𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑒𝑠 𝑡ℎ𝑟𝑜𝑢𝑔ℎ 𝑏𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑐ℎ𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑐,𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝑅𝑒𝑙𝑎𝑥𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑜𝑓 𝑛𝑜𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑒𝑡𝑒 𝑒𝑛𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑐𝑒𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑠,𝑡−1 
+ 𝛽2𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠𝑠,𝑐,𝑡−1 + 𝜔𝑐 + 𝜇𝑡 + 𝜀𝑐𝑡.               
Model (1) tests the impact of relaxation of non-compete enforcement on bank entry mode at the 
target county and year level, where c represents county, s represents the state, and t represents 
year. The ratio of bank entries through branching is the measure of county-level bank entry mode, 
relaxation of non-compete enforcement is the DD indicator, and β1 is the DD estimate, which 
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captures the effects of the relaxation of the non-compete enforcement on the modes of entry by 
out-of-state banks. I control for variables that capture the local economic, political, and market 
characteristics. For instance, I control for the wealth level and business condition of the local 
market using the local per capita income; local competitive landscape of banking industry using 
Herfindahl index of banks’ deposit size; and the importance of smaller-size firms using the 
average number of employees hired in local firms. I control the state political climate using the 
fraction of Democratic congressional members who represent their states in the U.S. House of 
Representatives. I also include total population and personal income growth rate to capture the 
size and growth perspectives of the local economy. Including those variables mitigates the 
concern that local business conditions and political climate may affect both changes in the non-
compete enforcement and out-of-state banks entry mode decision. In addition, I include county 
fixed effect ωi and year fixed effect μt to control for both time-invariant unobservable county 
factors and nation-wide shocks that happened during a particular year that could possibly affect 
both changes in the non-compete enforcement and banks entry mode. I cluster the standard error 
at the state level to address the concern that the residuals might be serially correlated within a 
state, as well as any serial correlation induced by the small variation in the DD indicator 
(Bertrand et al. 2004). 
Table 4.4 Relaxation of Non-compete Enforcement and Bank Entry Mode 
This table presents estimated coefficients from difference-in-differences (DD) analyses of the impact of the change in 
non-compete enforcement on the mode of out-of-state bank entry into counties after the commencement of IBBEA 
using OLS regressions. The dependent variable is the number of out-of-state banks entries through establishing new 
branches as a percentage of total number of out-of-state bank entries (branching plus M&A) in a county. The 
coefficient on Relaxation of non-compete enforcement captures the DD estimate of the impact of the relaxation of 
non-compete enforcement on out-of-state banks’ interstate entry mode. Model (1) is conducted using all counties in 
the U.S. Model (2) is conducted using only contiguous counties on the border of law-changed states and neighboring 
states in order to control for the unobserved variable bias. I control for lagged state and county characteristics, county 
fixed effects, and year fixed effects in both regressions and also contiguous county paired fixed effects in model (2). 
The analyses are conducted using yearly data covering the period from January 1994 to December 2010. Robust 
standard errors are clustered at the state level. t-statistics are shown in parentheses. *, **, and *** denote an estimate 
that is statistically significantly different from zero at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
 
  (1)   (2) 
Dep. Var.:  
Ratio of bank entries through branching 
 All counties in the U.S.   Contiguous counties on the 
border of the law-change 
states and neighboring states 
      
Changes in labor law      
Relaxation of non-compete enforcementt-1  0.373***  
 
0.323*** 
  (3.63)  (2.9) 
      
State controls      
Local market sizet-1  -0.000*   -0.000 
  (-1.71)   (-1.44) 
93_Erim Wang Stand.job
81 
 
 
Table 4.4 – continued from the previous page 
Local bank competitiont-1  0.635*   0.579 
  (1.67)   (1.00) 
Local per capita incomet-1  -0.000*   -0.000 
  (-1.94)   (-0.99) 
Average size of local firmst-1  0.112***   -0.037 
  (2.54)   (-0.4) 
Political Balancet-1  0.098   0.327** 
  (1.11)   (2.09) 
      
County controls      
Personal income growth ratet-1  0.000   0.001 
  (0.03)   (0.11) 
Total populationt-1  0.000   0.000 
  (0.29)   (0.41) 
County fixed effects  yes   yes 
Neighboring county paired fixed effects  no   yes 
Year fixed effects  yes   yes 
Within-sample R2  0.091   0.317 
Number of counties  2309   129 
Number of obs.  9553   1407 
 
Column 1 of Table 4.4 reports the DD estimates of the impact of changes in the non-
compete enforcement on banks’ entry modes. The baseline regression result of column 1 indicates 
that the relaxation of non-compete enforcement on average leads to 37.3 percentage point 
increase in the proportion of banks entering a target market by establishing branches. Considering 
the average ratio of bank entries through establishing branches (25.3%), the economic 
significance is sizable.  
Next, I repeat the analysis using a logit regression model to investigate the impact of 
changes in non-compete enforcement on the decision of banks entry mode at the bank level. The 
regression is conducted using observations for each bank entry. The dependent variable Bank 
entry mode is a dummy variable that equals one if an entrant bank set up a branch in the target 
market and zero if it acquires a local branch instead. The regression model is: 
(2)               𝐵𝑎𝑛𝑘 𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑦 𝑚𝑜𝑑𝑒𝑏,𝑐,𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝑅𝑒𝑙𝑎𝑥𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑜𝑓 𝑛𝑜𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑒𝑡𝑒 𝑒𝑛𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑐𝑒𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑠,𝑡−1 
+ 𝛽2𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠𝑏,𝑠,𝑐,𝑡−1 + 𝜇𝑡 + 𝜀𝑏𝑐𝑡 
Similar to the Model (1), I use the relaxation of the non-compete enforcement as the DD indicator 
for the local information flow. The coefficient of β1 indicates the impact of the change in the 
labor law on bank’s entry mode decision. I expect to observe a shift in the preference of banks’ 
entry mode from acquiring existing incumbent branches to establishing new branches after non-
compete enforcement was relaxed. To control for the heterogeneity in the local market and the 
entry banks, I include control variables at the county, state, and bank level. I also control for the 
geographic distance between the entry bank’s headquarters and the target state. The further the 
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distance, the less local information the entry bank would have prior to the entry, which makes a 
M&A likely. I include time fixed effects to control for the shocks that happen to both control and 
treatment groups in the same year. And I cluster the standard error at both the state and bank level 
to account for the correlations in the error terms. The result is reported in column 1 of Table 4.5. 
The findings are consistent with the result (Table 4.4, column 1) using the county-level bank 
entry mode analysis. The relaxation of non-compete enforcement leads to an increase in the 
probability of bank entries through branching. Considering that the unconditional probability of 
bank entry via branching is 0.177, the marginal effect of 0.121 for bank entry mode indicates the 
relaxation of non-compete enforcement results in a 68.36% increase in the likelihood that out-of-
state banks will enter new markets by establishing new branches (0.121/0.177). 
To further refine the identification strategy and mitigate concerns about unobserved 
heterogeneity, I repeat the DD analysis using a sample that consists only of contiguous counties 
lying on the border of states that experience changes in the non-compete enforcement. 
Contiguous counties are geographically close, so they are likely to subject to the same 
unobserved factors, such as trends in economic development or shocks to the local economy 
(e.g., resource discovery, natural hazards) (Holmes 1998; Huang 2008). The model specification 
is: 
(3)            𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜 𝑜𝑓 𝑏𝑎𝑛𝑘 𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑒𝑠 𝑡ℎ𝑟𝑜𝑢𝑔ℎ 𝑏𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑐ℎ𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑐,𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1R𝑒𝑙𝑎𝑥𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑜𝑓 𝑛𝑜𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑒𝑡𝑒𝑠𝑠,𝑡−1 
+𝛽2𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠𝑠,𝑐,𝑡−1 + 𝜔𝑐 + 𝜔𝑐𝑐 + 𝜇𝑡 + 𝜀𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑡      
The test is similar to the regression discontinuity design by Black (1999) and the major difference 
between Model (3) and Model (1) is that I now include the contiguous county fixed effects, ωcc, 
that control for the unobserved linear time trend and common shocks that happened to contiguous 
counties that might influence out-of-state banks’ entry mode. Column 2 of Table 4.4 reports the 
within-county level response of the ratio of bank entry to the relaxation of non-compete 
enforcement. The result shows that the percentage of bank entries through branching has 
significantly risen in counties from states that experience a relaxation of non-compete 
enforcement. The relaxation of non-compete enforcement on average results in 32.3 percentage 
point increase in the proportion of banks entering a target market by establishing branches. The 
economic magnitude of the impact is substantial and comparable to the DD estimates from the 
full sample regression. This shows that the causal relationship between the relaxation of local 
non-compete enforcement and the increase of the bank entries through branching remains robust 
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after taking into account the unobservable trends and shocks to the target market. A similar 
pattern is documented by applying a bank-level logistic regression on bank entries into 
contiguous counties (Table 4.5, column 2). The results again confirm the positive impact of labor 
market flexibility on bank entries into new markets by establishing new branches. 
 
Table 4.5 Relaxation of Non-compete Enforcement and Bank Entry Mode – Bank-level 
Analysis 
This table presents estimated coefficients from difference-in-differences (DD) analyses of the impact of the change in 
non-compete enforcement on the mode of out-of-state bank entry after the commencement of IBBEA to year 2010 
using logistic regressions. Conditional on one out-of-state bank’s entry, the dependent variable of bank entry dummy 
equals one if the out-of-state bank enters via establishing branches, and it is zero if the bank enters through a M&A 
with a local bank branch. The coefficient on Relaxation of non-compete enforcement captures the DD estimate of the 
impact of the relaxation of the non-compete enforcement on out-of-state banks’ interstate entry mode. Model (1) is 
conducted using all counties in the U.S. Model (2) is conducted using only contiguous counties on the border of law-
changed states and neighboring states in order to control for the unobserved variable bias. I control for lagged state 
and county characteristics, as well as year fixed effects in both regressions. Marginal effects with associated 
significance for law change in the diff-in-diff variable are reported in square brackets. Robust standard errors are 
clustered at the bank level and at state level. t-statistics are shown in parentheses. *, **, and *** denote an estimate 
that is statistically significantly different from zero at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.  
 
  (1)  (2) 
Dep. Var.:  
Bank entry mode dummy 
 All counties in the U.S.  Contiguous counties on the 
border of the law-change 
states and neighboring states 
Changes in labor law     
Relaxation of non-compete enforcementt-1  0.893* 
 
0.612*** 
  (1.64) (2.91) 
  [0.121***]  [0.069*] 
State controls     
Local market size t-1  0.000*  -0.000 
  (1.89)  (-1.60) 
Local bank competitiont-1  2.394**  10.051*** 
  (1.96)  (5.48) 
Local per capita incomet-1  0.000  0.000 
  (0.4)  (0.48) 
Average size of local firmst-1  0.075  -0.000 
  (1.27)  (0.00) 
Political Balancet-1  -0.486*  0.794* 
  (-1.74)  (1.88) 
Home-target distancet-1  0.000  -0.000 
  (1.22)  (-0.59) 
Bank controls     
Bank aget-1  -0.005  -0.009 
  (-1.52)  (-1.05) 
Bank sizet-1  -0.000  -0.000* 
  (-0.73)  (-1.92) 
Bank liquidityt-1  -0.293  3.12 
  (-0.85)  (0.54) 
Bank ROAt-1  37.506  -43.71 
  (0.83)  (-0.89) 
Bank capital ratiot-1  3.038  2.65 
  (0.89)  (1.05) 
Year fixed effects  Yes   Yes 
McFadden Adj. R2  0.076  0.182 
Number of obs.  59270  7435 
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4.3.3 Economic Implications  
Banks choose different modes to expand across state borders depending on the accessibility of 
local information. In this section, I investigate the economic repercussions on local bank 
competition, credit availability, and economic activity after banks enter new markets. Dick 
(2006), Zarutskie (2006) and Rice and Strahan (2010) document the increase in bank competition 
following the interstate branching deregulation. The deregulation benefited local clients by 
improving the service level of banks, along with the credit supply. I take a further step and 
compare the differences in how banking competition changes after out-of-banks enter new 
markets by establishing new branches and through acquiring local branches. I argue the two 
modes of entry have different effects on the competitive landscape of the local credit market. I 
regress the changes in local credit market competition on different modes of bank entries in the 
preceding year of bank entries. The model specification is: 
(4)    ∆𝑐𝑟𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑡 𝑚𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡 𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑒𝑡𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑐,𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝑁𝑟 𝑜𝑓 𝑏𝑎𝑛𝑘 𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑒𝑠 𝑡ℎ𝑟𝑜𝑢𝑔ℎ 𝑏𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑐ℎ𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑐,𝑡−1 
              + 𝛽2𝑁𝑟 𝑜𝑓 𝑀&𝐴 𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑒𝑠𝑐,𝑡−1 + 𝛽3𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠𝑠,𝑐,𝑡−1 + 𝜔𝑐 +  𝜇𝑡 + 𝜀𝑐𝑡  
where β1 and β2 capture the impact of two different bank entry modes on the competitive 
landscape of the local banking market. I control for the local market conditions at the state and 
county level, and include county and year fixed effects ωc and μt, respectively, to mitigate the 
omitted variable bias. The results reported in column 1 of Table 4.6 show that the Herfindahl 
index decreases, which means an increase in local banking market competition after bank entries 
through establishing branches; there is no change in the competitive structure after bank entries 
via M&As.  
Table 4.6 Economic Implications of Bank Entries Modes 
This table presents estimated coefficients from panel data regressions of the impact of different modes of interstate 
bank entries on the local bank credit market and economy. I measure the dependent variables using the average 
percentage change in the small business credit market and local economy one year following bank entries. 
Dependent variables in model (1) capture the changes in the bank competition of local market, dependents in models 
(2)-(3) capture the changes in the local small business lending, and dependents in models (4)-(6) capture the changes 
on the local economic activity. The analyses are conducted using yearly data covering the period from January 1994 
to December 2010. I control for lagged state and county characteristics, county fixed effects, and year fixed effects. 
Robust standard errors are clustered at the state level. t-statistics are shown in parentheses. *, **, and *** denote an 
estimate that is statistically significantly different from zero at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Dep. Var.:  %Δ 
Herfindahl 
index of bank 
competition 
%Δ volume 
of small 
business 
loans 
%Δ number 
of small 
business 
loans 
%Δ per capita 
personal 
income  
%Δ nr of 
establish-
ment 
%Δ local 
unemploy-
ment rate 
Bank entries       
Nr of bank entries via branchingt-1 -0.002** 0.591*** 0.441*** 0.056** 0.056*** -0.123 
 (-2.26) (4.46) (3.32) (2.13) (3.72) (-1.11) 
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Table 4.6 – continued from the previous page 
Nr of bank entries via M&At-1 
 
0.000 0.039 0.015 -0.005 -0.007** 0.046* 
(0.00) (0.82) (0.29) (-0.75) (-2.13) (1.73) 
       
State controls       
Local market sizet-1 -0.000 -0.000* -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 0.000* 
 (-0.81) (-1.71) (-1.48) (-0.34) (-0.83) (1.74) 
Herfindahl Index of bankst-1 -0.025 12.082 6.4 -0.899 0.355 -25.978*** 
 (-1.22) (0.75) (0.63) (-0.66) (0.21) (-2.7) 
Local per capita incomet-1 -0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.000*** -0.000 0.001** 
 (-1.06) (0.06) (0.02) (-3.78) (-0.87) (2.18) 
Average size of local firmst-1 0.000 -5.789** -5.83*** 0.727* 0.946*** -1.919 
 (0.1) (-2.1) (-3.08) (1.83) (4.06) (-0.85) 
Political Balancet-1 -0.007 -16.167** -6.553 0.113 0.24 4.491 
 (-1.14) (-2.32) (-1.5) (0.18) (0.64) (1.01) 
       
County controls       
Personal income growth ratet-1 0.000 -0.035 -0.017  0.025*** -0.009 
 (1.3) (-0.21) (-0.33)  (3.92) (-0.25) 
Total populationt-1 0.000 0.000*** 0.000** -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000 
 (0.8) (3.08) (2.43) (-4.07) (-4.19) (-0.18) 
       
County fixed effects  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes Yes  
Year fixed effects Yes  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Within-sample R2 0.003 0.107 0.577 0.279 0.111 0.589 
Number of obs. 36164 36170 36170 36174 36164 36152 
 
Changes in the competitive structure of the local banking market after new out-of-state 
banks are added is likely to be reflected in the local credit market, especially in the small business 
lending market. Because of the severe information asymmetry problem between local opaque 
small businesses and banks, those firms tend to be financially constrained in the pre-deregulation 
era. As a result, small businesses are likely to gain better access to credit after newly established 
branches expand the credit base in the lending market. Focusing on the small business lending 
helps us to understand changes in the credit market. I follow a regression setup similar to model 
(4) using changes in local small business lending as the dependent variable. The model 
specification is: 
(5)     ∆𝑆𝑚𝑎𝑙𝑙 𝑏𝑢𝑠𝑖𝑛𝑒𝑠𝑠 𝑙𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑐,𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝑁𝑟 𝑜𝑓 𝑏𝑎𝑛𝑘 𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑒𝑠 𝑡ℎ𝑟𝑜𝑢𝑔ℎ 𝑏𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑐ℎ𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑐,𝑡−1 
          + 𝛽2𝑁𝑟 𝑜𝑓 𝑀&𝐴 𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑒𝑠𝑐,𝑡−1 + 𝛽3𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠𝑠,𝑐,𝑡−1 + 𝜔𝑐 + 𝜇𝑡 +  𝜀𝑐𝑡 
Consistent with my hypothesis, the results in column 2 of Table 4.6 indicate that newly 
established branches by out-of-state banks increase the credit supply to small businesses. One 
newly established branch contributes 0.591 percentage point of additional growth in the amount 
of small business lending. This is equivalent to a 5.2% increase, considering the average growth 
rate of local small business lending is 11.39%, which suggests the result is economically 
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meaningful. Next, the results show that the M&As of out-of-state banks do not have a clear 
impact on the local small business lending market.  
In addition, I also look at the changes in the number of loans to local small businesses and 
the finding is consistent with the evidence observed using the loan volume. The result show that 
adding one new branch in the county increases the number of loans to small businesses by 0.441 
percentage points, which is equivalent to a 4.9% increase compared to the average increase in the 
number of loans to small businesses. Also, there does not appear to be a change in number of 
small business loans after out-of-state bank M&As. I conclude that there is a substantial shift in 
the local credit market following new branches established by out-of-state banks, which benefit 
local clients ultimately. This is consistent with research that documents that credit competition 
expands credit availability for local small businesses (Petersen and Rajan 1994; Beck et al. 2004; 
Zarutskie 2006; Rice and Strahan 2010), whereas bank consolidation fails to have a positive 
impact on local small business lending growth (e.g., Berger et al. 1998). 
Small businesses are the key to regional job creation and economic growth (Chodorow-
Reich 2014). A bank entry through branching increases local bank competition, improves credit 
availability for small businesses, and should facilitate local economic activity. So I examine 
changes in three different aspects of the local economic activity: unemployment, number of 
establishments, and per capita real income growth. The model specification is: 
(6)   ∆𝐿𝑜𝑐𝑎𝑙 𝑒𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑜𝑚𝑖𝑐 𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑒𝑠𝑐,𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝑁𝑟 𝑜𝑓 𝑏𝑎𝑛𝑘 𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑒𝑠 𝑡ℎ𝑟𝑜𝑢𝑔ℎ 𝑏𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑐ℎ𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑐,𝑡−1 
+ 𝛽2𝑁𝑟 𝑜𝑓 𝑀&𝐴 𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑒𝑠𝑐,𝑡−1 +  𝛽3𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠𝑠,𝑐,𝑡−1 + 𝜔𝑐 +  𝜇𝑡 + 𝜀𝑐𝑡 
I find that the establishment of one new bank branch results in 0.056 percentage point increase in 
the growth rate of per capita real income in that county in the following year, whereas branch 
M&A does not accelerate the income growth. Also, bank entries through establishing branches 
are associated with an increase in the number of establishments in private sector in the following 
year. The growth in the number of establishments indicates that the local economy is expanding 
faster after the establishment of one branch. The incremental rate of establishment expansion is 
22.3% compared with the average expansion rate of the number of local establishments. This 
means that on average establishing one branch leads to an increase of 80 establishments in the 
county. I also find that bank entries through M&As slow down the increase in establishments, 
although the economic significance is much lower. Finally, I find that branch M&As increases the 
local unemployment rate, while no significant effect is observed following bank entries through 
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branching. This indicates that the job growth rate is lower than the destruction rate, and more 
people ended up unemployed. In general, my finding adds to previous research that documents 
that credit market development stimulates local economic activity and improves employment 
outcomes (Black and Strahan 2002; Amore et al. 2013; Chava et al 2013; Chodorow-Reich 
2014). 
Taking the evidence together, I conclude that bank entries through branching increase 
bank competition, improve credit availability for small business lending, and ultimately 
stimulates the local economy, whereas there is no clear economic impact on the local credit 
market after a branch acquisition.   
 
4.4. Robustness Tests and Further Analysis 
4.4.1 Alternative Measure of the Local Labor Market Flexibility 
In the analysis, I use the intensity of legal enforcement of local non-compete covenants as the 
main measure for the level of labor market flexibility. I construct an alternative measure for labor 
market flexibility by directly looking at the labor mobility within the local banking industry. I 
collect county-level data on the local job turnover in the commercial banking industry (with the 
first three digits of NAICs codes of 522) from the Census Quarterly Workforce Indicators (QWI) 
database. I calculate the year-average turnover ratio in the local commercial banking industry in 
each target county after the enactment of IBBEA. There is a significant negative correlation 
between the new local job turnover variable and the NC_score at the 1% confidence level. This 
indicates that a restrictive non-compete enforcement restricts local inter-organizational labor 
mobility. The negative correlation of -0.05 indicates that the labor mobility variable contains 
extra information that is not completely explained by the differences in the legal enforcement.  
To ensure the comparability of the test results with the earlier analysis using the 
NC_score, I apply a similar set of tests and check for the impact on the bank’s entry mode 
aggregated at county level and at the bank level. I use the job turnover rate prior to the enactment 
of IBBEA to avoid a potential reverse causality problem. The result of the first test is shown in 
Appendix Table A4.1. Consistent with expectations, local job turnover in the commercial banking 
industry has a positive effect on the ratio of out-of-state bank entries through establishing 
branches. The result is also economically significant. A one percentage point increase in the local 
inter-organizational job mobility in the commercial banking industry increases the ratio of out-of-
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state bank entries through establishing branches by 2.38 percentage points during the first year 
after the IBBEA. I continue to investigate banks’ entry mode decision at bank level using a 
logistic regression. The results are shown in Appendix Table A4.2 and are consistent with the 
findings using NC_score. I find that the initial difference in local job mobility matters for the 
mode of bank entry. A higher initial job turnover rate increases the likelihood that out-of-state 
banks establish branches when entering a new market.  
Compared with the NC_score, an important feature of the local labor mobility variable is 
that it varies significantly across years and counties. This makes it suitable to use the fixed effects 
panel data regression model. I use lagged local job turnover in the commercial banking industry 
as the main explanatory variable. I test the impact on the bank entry mode aggregated at the 
county and bank level. The results are reported in Appendix Tables A3 and A4, respectively. The 
significant positive effect of the local job turnover on banks’ branching entry remains robust 
using the new regression specifications. The economic significance remains large: a one 
percentage point increase in the local job turnover ratio increases the likelihood of bank entries 
through branching by 7.8 percentage points (1.376%/17.7%). The result confirms my finding 
using the non-compete enforcement as the measure for labor market flexibility (as shown in Table 
4.2 and 3).  
 
4.4.2 Placebo Tests  
I employ a difference-in-differences analysis to establish the causal relationship between the 
intensity of state legal enforcement of non-compete covenants and out-of-state banks’ entry 
mode. The research design relies on the parallel trend assumption, in which the control and 
treatment states should share the same common trend and subject to no other idiosyncratic shock 
that affect one group of states and not the other at the same time. I design a placebo experiment to 
show that the conditions of applying the DD approach are met in this case. I create fictitious 
shocks in the non-compete enforcement that happened in years that are different from the actual 
shocks in the treatment states. I test whether fictitious shocks influence the entry mode of out-of-
state banks. If the common trend assumption is true and there are no other shocks affecting either 
group, there should not be observable significant positive effects on the ratio of branching entry 
after the “placebo” shocks took place.  
To mimic the real effects of the changes in the enforcement of non-compete covenants, I 
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create a placebo relaxation of the non-compete enforcement variable, which is a dummy variable 
that switches to one after the fictitious shocks to non-compete enforcement take place. I construct 
two placebo DD indicators that switch to one two years and three years prior to the actual shock 
and repeat the analysis as shown in models (1). I apply the experiment on the whole sample 
including all U.S. counties that experience out-of-state bank entries, as well as on the subsample 
that includes only contiguous counties on the borders to better control for unobservable 
heterogeneity. The results are reported in Appendix Tables A5. In all cases, the placebo relaxation 
in the non-compete enforcement fails to yield any significant positive effects on bank entries 
through establishing branches. Next, I repeat the placebo experiment using a logit regression 
model similar to Model(2) to investigate the impact of changes in non-compete enforcement on 
the decision of banks entry mode at the bank level. Again, the results (not reported here) confirms 
my findings from the county-level analysis, and the placebo relaxation of non-compete 
enforcement doesn’t have any significant positive impact on bank mode decision. The results 
show that the parallel trend assumption for the DD method is not violated and the causal effect 
between changes in the non-compete enforcement and bank entry mode remains robust.  
 
4.4.3 Longer-Term Economic Implications 
In the previous section, I document different implications on the local credit market and 
economic activity after out-of-state banks enter new markets in the previous year. It is possible 
that it takes longer for the real effects on bank lending and the local economy to be detected. In 
this section, I examine the changes in the local credit market and economic activity for a longer 
period of time after bank entries with different modes.  
I conduct panel data regression using models (4) and (5). I calculate the dependent 
variable of the cumulative percentage changes in the competitive structure of local banks, small 
business lending growth, and economic activity for a two- and three-year window after bank 
entry. The results are shown in Panel A and B of Appendix Tables A6. The number of branches 
established by out-of-state banks increases credit market competition and facilitates the growth of 
small business lending in the target county. The total amount of loans to small business, along 
with the total number of loans increased significantly after out-of-state banks established 
branches. These results are largely consistent with earlier findings using a one-year window 
shown in Table 4.6. A similar positive effect is documented on the expansion rate of the number 
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of local establishment.  
Consistent patterns emerge when looking at the longer-period effects of out-of-state banks 
M&As. Combining earlier results using a one-year window, M&A entries by out-of-state banks 
do not change the credit market structure for local small businesses. The establishment of new 
branches by out-of-state banks on the other hand leads to more competition and results in 
additional growth in the local small business lending market, which is beneficial to the local 
economy.   
 
4.5 Conclusion 
Interstate deregulations in the U.S. banking industry lifted entry barriers that had protected the 
local inefficient banks, and ultimately led to faster economic growth. Getting access to local 
information is important for out-of-market banks seeking to enter new markets (Dell’Ariccia et 
al. 1999). In this study, I argue that the mobility of incumbent bank employees is the key channel 
through which out-of-state banks can get access to local information. Banks choose different 
modes to enter a local market depending on the labor market flexibility. I exploit the 
heterogeneity in the non-compete enforcement as exogenous variations in labor market flexibility 
and test whether it affects the way banks enter new markets — through establishment of new 
branches or through M&As of existing branches — in the process of interstate bank expansion. 
The main result shows a positive causal relationship between the relaxation of non-
compete enforcement in the local market and the likelihood for out-of-state banks to enter the 
market via establishing new branches. I further explore the economic implications of different 
modes of banks entry. I find an increase in bank competition in the local market and an 
improvement in credit availability for local small businesses after out-of-state banks’ entries 
through establishing branches, but not when they enter using M&As of incumbent branches. 
Moreover, when banks enter a new market by establishing local branches, they facilitate local 
economic activity based on evidence from the growth in the number of establishments and per 
capita real income. I conduct multiple robustness checks and the main results remain unchanged. 
Schumpeter (1912) was the first to question whether financial development could 
stimulate real economic progress. Along with many others, I add to the discussion by focusing on 
labor mobility. My findings highlight the importance of local information accessibility for banks 
expanding into new markets. Banks choose different modes to acquire local information in 
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response to the flexibility of the local labor market. The difference in entry modes has different 
implications for local economic activity. Bank entries via new branches - but not via acquisition 
of incumbent banks’ branches - significantly increase bank competition, improve the availability 
of credit to small businesses, and facilitate economic growth. This study has important policy 
implications. The findings show that policymakers should pay attention to the local labor 
legislation in order to unleash the full benefit of financial development on real growth.  
  
104_Erim Wang Stand.job
92 
 
Appendix Table A4.1. County-Level Analysis of Bank Entry Modes – Alternative Measure 
of Labor Market Flexibility 
 
This table presents estimated coefficients from cross-sectional regressions that relate banks entry mode to local labor 
market flexibility after the enactment of IBBEA. The dependent variable is the number of out-of-state banks entries 
through establishing new branches as a percentage of total number of out-of-state bank entries (branching plus 
M&A) in a county. I measure the labor market flexibility using lagged (by one year) actual local job turnover in the 
commercial banking industry. The analyses are conducted using yearly data. In models (1), (2), and (3), the 
dependent variables are measured using all out-of-state bank entries over the period of one year, two years, and three 
years after the implementation of IBBEA, respectively. I control for lagged state and county characteristics. I use 
robust standard errors. t-statistics are shown in parentheses. *, **, and *** denote an estimate that is statistically 
significantly different from zero at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
 (1)  (2)  (3) 
Dep. Var.: 
Ratio of bank entries through branching  
in the first 
year after 
IBBEA 
 in the first 
two years 
after IBBEA 
 in the first 
three years 
after IBBEA 
      
Labor market flexibility       
Local job turnover in the commercial banking 
industry prior to the enactment of IBBEA 
2.378*** 
 
1.644***  1.391*** 
(4.3) (3.73)  (3.94) 
      
State controls      
Local market sizet-1 -0.000***  -0.000***  0.000 
 (-3.35)  (-2.93)  (0.45) 
Local bank competitiont-1 -0.964  0.323  0.936*** 
 (-1.22)  (0.71)  (2.68) 
Local per capita income t-1 0.000*  0.000**  0.000 
 (1.92)  (2.45)  (0.09) 
Average size of local firms t-1 -0.051**  -0.025  0.003 
 (-2.11)  (-1.26)  (0.24) 
Political Balance t-1 0.726***  0.345**  0.123 
 (3.54)  (2.32)  (1.54) 
      
County controls      
Personal income growth rate t-1 0.009  0.006  0.001 
 (1.52)  (1.26)  (0.27) 
Total population t-1 0.000  0.000  0.000 
 (0.27)  (0.59)  (0.31) 
      
Adj. R2 0.214  0.095  0.066 
Number of obs. 207  316  413 
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Appendix Table A4.2. Bank-Level Analysis of Bank Entry Modes – Alternative Measure of 
Labor Market Flexibility 
 
This table presents estimated coefficients from logistic regressions that relate banks entry mode to local labor market 
flexibility. The dependent variable of bank entry dummy equals one if the out-of-state bank enters the county by 
setting up new branches, and it is zero if the out-of-state bank enters a county through M&A with a local bank 
branch. I measure the labor market flexibility using the lagged (by one year) actual local job turnover in commercial 
banking industry. The analyses are conducted using yearly data. Models (1), (2), and (3) are conducted using all out-
of-state bank entries over the period of one year, two years, and three years after the implementation of IBBEA, 
respectively. I control for lagged state and bank characteristics, as well year fixed effects. Marginal effects with 
associated significance for the job turnover variable are reported in in square brackets. Robust standard errors are 
clustered at bank and at state level. t-statistics are shown in parentheses and *, **, and *** denote an estimate that is 
statistically significantly different from zero at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
 (1)  (2)  (3) 
Dep. Var.:  
Bank entry mode dummy 
in the first 
year after 
IBBEA 
 in the first 
two years 
after IBBEA 
 in the first 
three years 
after IBBEA 
      
Labor market flexibility       
Local job turnover in the 
commercial banking industry t-1 
19.496* 
 
13.073***  7.976*** 
(1.84) (2.91)  (2.7) 
 [0.832*]  [1.042***]  [0.632**] 
      
State controls      
Local market size t-1 -0.000***  0.000  0.000 
 (-2.91)  (0.37)  (0.03) 
Local bank competition t-1 -20.313  1.208  3.312 
 (-1.25)  (0.3)  (0.84) 
Local per capita income t-1 0.001***  0.000  0.000** 
 (2.86)  (1.4)  (2.1) 
Average size of local firms t-1 1.324**  -0.402**  -0.264* 
 (2.08)  (-2.14)  (-1.92) 
Political Balance t-1 3.634  0.671  -0.113 
 (1.21)  (0.72)  (-0.14) 
Home-target distance t-1 0.002  0.000  0.000 
 (1.4)  (0.72)  (0.82) 
      
Bank controls      
Bank age t-1 0.064  0.013  0.006 
 (1.59)  (0.94)  (0.57) 
Bank size t-1 0.000  -0.000  -0.000 
 (0.59)  (-1.41)  (-0.02) 
Bank liquidity t-1 6.482  -5.075  -13.78 
 (0.35)  (-0.73)  (-1.44) 
Bank ROA t-1 -628.64**  -332.158*  -208.469 
 (-2.03)  (-1.72)  (-1.44) 
Bank capital ratio t-1 11.092  9.801  14.457 
 (0.43)  (0.53)  (1.18) 
Year fixed effects Yes  Yes  Yes 
McFadden Adjusted R2 0.361  0.133  0.083 
Number of obs. 1396  4822  8398 
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Appendix Table A4.3. County-Level Panel-Data Analysis of Bank Entry Modes – 
Alternative Measure of Labor Market Flexibility 
 
This table presents estimated coefficients from panel regression that relate banks entry mode to local labor market 
flexibility after the enactment of IBBEA. The dependent variable is the number of out-of-state bank entries by 
establishing new branches as a percentage of total number of out-of-state bank entries (branching plus M&A) in a 
county. I measure the labor market flexibility using lagged (by one year) actual county-level job turnover in the 
commercial banking industry. The analyses are conducted using yearly data at county level. I control for lagged state 
and county characteristics, as well as county and year fixed effects. Robust standard errors are clustered at the state 
level. t-statistics are shown in parentheses and *, **, and *** denote an estimate that is statistically significantly 
different from zero at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
Dep. Var.:  
 
Ratio of bank entries 
through branching 
  
Labor market flexibility   
Local job turnover in the 
commercial banking industry t-1  
0.647** 
(2.04) 
  
State controls  
Local market size t-1 -0.000 
 (-1.43) 
Local bank competition t-1 0.537 
 (1.11) 
Local per capita income t-1 -0.000 
 (-0.92) 
Average size of local firms t-1 0.112** 
 (2.16) 
Political Balance t-1 0.056 
 (0.57) 
  
County controls  
Personal income growth rate t-1 -0.001 
 (-0.54) 
Total population t-1 -0.000 
 (-0.98) 
  
County fixed effects Yes 
Year fixed effects Yes 
McFadden Adj. R2 0.091 
Number of obs. 7810 
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Appendix Table A4.4. Bank-Level Panel-Data Analysis of Bank Entry Modes – Alternative 
Measure of Labor Market Flexibility 
 
This table presents estimated coefficients from logistic regression that relate banks entry mode to local market 
flexibility. The dependent variable of bank entry dummy equals one if the out-of-state bank enters the county by 
setting up branches, and it is zero if the out-of-state bank enters a county through M&A with a local bank branch. I 
measure the labor market flexibility using the lagged (by one year) actual local job turnover in the commercial 
banking industry. The analyses are conducted using yearly data at the commercial bank level. I control for lagged 
state and bank characteristics, as well as year fixed effects. Marginal effects with associated significance for the 
local job turnover variable are reported in square brackets.  Robust standard errors are clustered at the bank and state 
levels. t-statistics are shown in parentheses. *, **, and *** denote an estimate that is statistically significantly 
different from zero at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
Dep. Var.:  
 
Bank entry mode dummy  
  
Labor market flexibility   
Local job turnover in the 
commercial banking industry t-1 
9.763*** 
(6.85) 
 [1.376***] 
  
State controls  
Local market size t-1 0.000 
 (1.43) 
Local bank competition t-1 1.602 
 (1.63) 
Local per capita income t-1 0.000 
 (0.06) 
Average size of local firms t-1 0.038 
 (0.76) 
Political Balance t-1 -0.039 
 (-0.2) 
Home-target distance t-1 0.000 
 (0.85) 
  
Bank controls  
Bank age t-1 -0.007** 
 (-2.1) 
Bank size t-1 -0.000 
 (-0.66) 
Bank liquidity  t-1 -0.419 
 (-1.02) 
Bank ROA t-1 65.864 
 (1.5) 
Bank capital ratio t-1 3.307 
 (0.78) 
Year fixed effects Yes 
McFadden Adj. R2 0.084 
Number of obs. 51267 
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Appendix Table A4.5. Placebo Experiment of the Relaxation of Non-compete Enforcement 
and Bank Entry Mode – County-level Analysis 
 
This table presents estimated coefficients from difference-in-differences (DD) analyses of the impact of fictitious 
changes in non-compete enforcement on the mode of out-of-state bank entry into counties after the enactment of 
IBBEA using OLS regressions. I run placebo experiments in which I create fictitious changes in non-compete 
enforcement that have taken place two and three years before the real changes in the four states, and test their effects 
on bank entry mode in Panels A and B, respectively. The dependent variable is the number of out-of-state banks 
entries by establishing new branches as a percentage of total number of out-of-state bank entries (branching plus 
M&A) in a county. The coefficients on Placebo relaxation of non-compete enforcement capture the DD estimate of 
the impact of the fictitious relaxation of the non-compete enforcement on out-of-state banks’ interstate entry mode. 
Model (1) is conducted using all counties in the U.S. Model (2) is conducted using only contiguous counties on the 
border of law-changed states and neighboring states in order to control for the unobserved variable bias. I control for 
lagged state and county characteristics, county fixed effects, and year fixed effects in both regressions and also 
contiguous county paired fixed effects in model (2). The analyses are conducted using yearly data covering the 
period from January 1994 to December 2010. Robust standard errors are clustered at state level. t-statistics are 
shown in parentheses. *, **, and *** denote an estimate that is statistically significantly different from zero at the 
10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
 
Panel A. Placebo Relaxation of Non-compete Enforcement Assumed to Have Taken Place Two Years Earlier 
  (1)   (2) 
Dep. Var.:  
Ratio of bank entries through branching 
 All counties in the U.S.   Contiguous counties on the border of the 
law-change states and neighboring states 
      
Fictitious changes in labor law      
Placebo relaxation of non-compete 
enforcement t-1 
 
-0.025 
 
 
-0.049 
  (-0.36)  (-0.54) 
      
State controls      
Local market size t-1  -0.000   -0.000 
  (-1.51)   (-0.59) 
Local bank competition t-1  0.664*   0.615 
  (1.75)   (0.9) 
Local per capita income t-1  -0.000   -0.000 
  (-1.47)   (-0.85) 
Average size of local firms t-1  0.102**   -0.099 
  (2.22)   (-0.99) 
Political Balance t-1  0.092   0.276 
  (1.08)   (1.68) 
      
County controls      
Personal income growth rate t-1  -0.000   0.002 
  (-0.02)   (0.27) 
Total population t-1  0.000   0.000 
  (0.12)   (0.71) 
County fixed effects  yes   Yes 
Neighboring county paired fixed effects  no   Yes 
Year fixed effects  yes   Yes 
Within-sample R2  0.086   0.300 
Number of counties  2309   129 
Number of obs.  9553   1407 
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Panel B. Placebo Relaxation of Non-compete Enforcement Assumed to Have Taken Place Three Years Earlier 
  (1)   (2) 
Dep. Var.:  
Ratio of bank entries through branching 
 All counties in the U.S.   Counties on the border of the law-
change states and neighboring states 
      
Fictitious Changes in labor law      
Placebo relaxation of non-compete 
enforcement t-1 
 
-0.025 
 
 
-0.146* 
  (-0.42)  (-1.75) 
      
State controls      
Local market size t-1  -0.000   -0.000 
  (-1.5)   (-0.42) 
Local bank competition t-1  0.662*   0.667 
  (1.76)   (0.95) 
Local per capita income t-1  -0.000   -0.000 
  (-1.47)   (-0.65) 
Average size of local firms t-1  0.102**   -0.129 
  (2.23)   (-1.24) 
Political Balance t-1  0.092   0.288* 
  (1.08)   (1.77) 
      
County controls      
Personal income growth rate t-1  -0.000   0.001 
  (-0.02)   (0.23) 
Total population t-1  0.000   0.000 
  (0.12)   (0.88) 
County fixed effects  yes   yes 
Neighboring county paired fixed effects  no   yes 
Year fixed effects  yes   yes 
Within-sample R2  0.086   0.308 
Number of counties  2309   129 
Number of obs.  9553   1407 
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Appendix Table A4.6. Longer-Period Economic Implications of Bank Entries Modes 
 
This table presents estimated coefficients from panel data regressions of the impact of different modes of interstate 
bank entries on the local bank credit market and the economy. I measure the dependent variables using the average 
percentage change in the small business credit market and local economy in a two-year and three-year period of time 
following bank entries. The results are reported in Panel A and Panel B, respectively. Dependent variables in model 
(1) capture the changes in the bank competition of the local market, dependents in models (2)-(3) capture the 
changes in the local small business lending, and dependents in models (4)-(6) capture the changes on the local 
economic activity. The analyses are conducted using yearly data covering the period from January 1994 to 
December 2010. I control for lagged state and county characteristics, as well as county fixed effects and year fixed 
effects. Robust standard errors are clustered at the state level. t-statistics are shown in parentheses. *, **, and *** 
denote an estimate that is statistically significantly different from zero at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
 
Panel A. Changes in Economic Situation Two Years after Bank Entries 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Dep. Var.:  %Δ Herfindahl 
index of bank 
competitiont,t+2 
%Δ volume 
of small 
business 
loanst,t+2 
%Δ number 
of small 
business 
loanst,t+2 
%Δ per 
capita 
personal 
incomet,t+2  
%Δ nr of 
establish-
ment t,t+2 
%Δ local 
unemploy-
ment 
ratet,t+2 
Bank entries       
Nr of bank entries via branchingt-1 -0.002 0.380*** 0.387*** 0.027 0.052*** -0.137 
 (-1.41) (4.34) (4.26) (1.61) (3.8) (-1.5) 
       
Nr of bank entries via M&At-1 0.000 -0.001 -0.003 -0.001 -0.004 0.014 
 (0.44) (-0.03) (-0.12) (-0.15) (-1.22) (0.64) 
       
State controls       
Local market size t-1 -0.000 -0.000** -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 0.000*** 
 (-1.45) (-2.32) (-1.5) (-0.48) (-1.29) (2.58) 
Herfindahl Index of banks t-1 -0.035 17.021 14.943 -0.463 1.169 -19.148** 
 (-1.05) (1.53) (1.62) (-0.37) (0.74) (-2.11) 
Local per capita income t-1 -0.000 0.000 -0.000 -0.000*** -0.000 0.001*** 
 (-1.27) (0.19) (-0.52) (-3.98) (-0.85) (2.91) 
Average size of local firms t-1 0.000 -2.17 -4.074*** 0.472 1.022*** -2.182 
 (0.05) (-1.59) (-2.81) (1.61) (3.94) (-1.09) 
Political Balance t-1 -0.008 -8.546* -4.412 0.005 0.062 2.321 
 (-0.68) (-1.74) (-1.14) (0.01) (0.16) (0.7) 
       
County controls       
Personal income growth rate t-1 0.000 -0.011 -0.049*  0.016*** 0.067*** 
 (1.02) (-0.26) (-1.93)  (5.6) (2.55) 
Total population t-1 0.000 0.000*** 0.000* -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000 
 (0.49) (2.86) (1.83) (-3.98) (-4.07) (-1.11) 
       
County fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year fixed effects  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Within-sample R2 0.002 0.263 0.754 0.318 0.163 0.664 
Number of obs. 33102 36170 36170 36174 36164 36145 
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Panel B. Changes in Economic Situation Three Years after Bank Entries 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Dep. Var.:  %Δ Herfindahl 
index of bank 
competitiont,t+3 
%Δ volume 
of small 
business 
loanst,t+3 
%Δ number 
of small 
business 
loanst,t+3 
%Δ per 
capita 
personal 
incomet,t+3  
%Δ nr of 
establish- 
mentt,t+3 
%Δ local 
unemploy-
ment 
ratet,t+3 
Bank entries       
Nr of bank entries via branchingt-1 -0.003* 0.26*** 0.306*** 0.012 0.052*** -0.062 
 (-1.95) (4.12) (4.53) (0.73) (3.32) (-0.81) 
       
Nr of bank entries via M&At-1 0.000 -0.009 -0.036** 0.001 -0.002 0.005 
 (0.51) (-0.48) (-2.44) (0.28) (-0.52) (0.23) 
       
State controls       
Local market size t-1 -0.000 -0.000** -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 0.000*** 
 (-1.26) (-2.17) (-1.57) (-1.08) (-1.41) (3.13) 
Herfindahl Index of banks t-1 -0.045 21.555** 18.096** 2.571 1.146 -16.956** 
 (-1.18) (2.1) (2.26) (1.29) (0.91) (-2.11) 
Local per capita income t-1 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000*** -0.000 0.001*** 
 (-1) (-0.18) (-1.4) (-4.27) (-1.52) (3.07) 
Average size of local firms t-1 0.004 -1.06 -2.336** 0.582* 0.979*** -1.428 
 (0.69) (-0.95) (-2.18) (1.83) (3.65) (-0.87) 
Political Balance t-1 -0.013 -7.148 -3.147 -0.257 0.131 2.098 
 (-0.69) (-1.62) (-0.87) (-0.35) (0.34) (0.82) 
       
County controls       
Personal income growth rate t-1 0.000** 0.054 0.001  0.005 0.077*** 
 (2.01) (1.15) (0.03)  (1.1) (3.21) 
Total population t-1 0.000 0.000** 0.000 -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000** 
 (0.39) (2.33) (0.97) (-3.61) (-3.76) (-2.01) 
       
County fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Within-sample R2 0.002 0.341 0.815 0.195 0.206 0.689 
Number of obs. 30042 36170 36170 33118 33108 36145 
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Chapter 5 
Summary and Conclusion   
 
This dissertation bundles three empirical studies in the area of corporate finance and banking. 
These studies investigate corporates’ financing activity with a special focus on the interaction 
between the banking industry and corporate borrowers. By showing how changes in the banking 
industry affect firms’ financing decision and performance, this dissertation highlights the 
important role of the banking industry in shaping the real economy in a world of market friction 
in place.  
Chapter 2 asks the question whether and how government interventions in the U.S. 
banking sector have benefited the U.S. corporate borrowers during the financial crisis of 2007-
2009. We focus on firms’ stock performance and find that government capital infusions in banks 
have a significantly positive impact on borrowing firms’ stock returns. The effect is more 
pronounced for riskier and bank-dependent firms and those that borrow from banks that are less 
capitalized and smaller. Our study highlights positive effects from government interventions 
during the crisis, documenting that an alleviation of financial shocks to banks has led to 
significantly positive valuation effects in the corporate sector. Our evidence suggests that in an 
economic recession, policy makers could restart the economic engine by carefully implementing 
a policy with the specific goal of reactivating the bank lending channel. If a government 
implements this policy carefully, capital injections into banks could be one effective way to 
restart bank lending to the real economy. As observed in our paper, such a policy would 
especially benefit businesses which are smaller and subject to tighter financial constraints, those 
firms are the keys to boost economic recovery and to provide new and continuing employment 
opportunities.  
Chapter 3 looks into firm’s bond maturity dispersion activity and the impact on firms’ 
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funding liquidity. We find that larger, more leveraged, less profitable, growth-oriented, and non-
bank dependent firms exhibit the largest maturity dispersion of outstanding bonds. Such 
dispersion is maintained by frequently issuing sets of bonds with different maturities. We further 
find that more bond maturity dispersion results in higher funding availability and lower funding 
costs. The effects are stronger for firms that face more funding liquidity risk. The evidence 
suggests that spreading out bond maturities is an effective corporate policy to manage funding 
liquidity risk. And the finding is consistent with recent evidence that shows firms successfully 
avoided severe funding liquidity risk during crisis were the ones that have been careful managing 
their debt maturity schedule prior to the crisis time. 
 Chapter 4 studies the role of local information accessibility in the process of bank 
expansions. I investigate whether labor market frictions in the target market influence the mode 
in which out-of-state banks enter the new market following the U.S. interstate banking 
deregulation and consequently affect local economic activity. I argue that the mobility of local 
incumbent bank employees is one key channel through which an out-of-state bank could gain 
access to local information. And the labor market flexibility is an exogenous factor that affects 
banks’ entry mode decision. The result shows that banks enter new markets by establishing new 
branches after the relaxation of non-compete enforcement in the target market, while they enter 
by acquiring incumbent banks’ branches after the enforcement becomes restrictive in the target 
market. Interestingly, only bank entries via new branches significantly increase bank 
competition, improve the availability of credit to small businesses, and facilitate economic 
growth. The main contributions are two-folds: first, the paper highlights the importance of 
human capital for the banking industry and empirically shows that getting access to local 
knowledge is an important consideration for banks that enter a new market. Second, the results 
indicate that policymakers should take into account that local labor legislation (and its 
enforcement) if they want to unleash the positive impact of financial development on the real 
economy.  
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Nederlandse samenvatting  
(Summary in Dutch) 
 
Dit proefschrift bundelt drie empirische studies op het gebied van bankieren en 
ondernemingsfinanciering. Door te laten zien hoe veranderingen in de bancaire sector de 
financieringsbesluiten en prestaties van bedrijven beïnvloeden, benadrukt dit proefschrift de 
belangrijke rol van de banksector in het vormgeven van de reële economie. 
Hoofdstuk 2 stelt de vraag of en hoe Amerikaanse kredietnemers hebben kunnen 
profiteren van de overheidsinterventies in de banksector tijdens de financiële crisis van 2007-
2009. Wij richten ons op de aandelenkoersen van bedrijven en vinden dat kapitaalinjecties door 
de overheid in de bankensector een significant positief effect hebben gehad op de 
aandelenrendementen van zakelijke kredietnemers. Het effect is sterker aanwezig voor 
risicovollere en bank-afhankelijke bedrijven, en voor bedrijven die lenen van banken die minder 
gekapitaliseerd en kleiner zijn. Onze studie wijst op de positieve effecten van 
overheidsinterventies tijdens de crisis en laat zien dat een verzachting van de financiële schokken 
voor banken heeft geleid tot aanzienlijke positieve waarderingseffecten in de zakelijke sector. 
Onze resultaten duiden erop dat beleidsmakers door een zorgvuldig beleid de kredietverlening 
door banken aan de reële economie opnieuw kunnen opstarten. Zoals uit het onderzoek blijkt, is 
een dergelijk beleid vooral bevordelijk voor kleinere bedrijven die onderhevig zijn aan meer 
financiële beperkingen.  
Hoofdstuk 3 kijkt naar de opbouw van de looptijd van obligatieleningen die een 
onderneming heeft uitstaan en de impact hiervan op de financieringsliquiditeit van deze 
bedrijven. Wij vinden dat grotere, meer met schulden gefinancierde, minder rendabele, groei-
georiënteerde, en niet-bancair afhankelijke bedrijven de grootste uiteenlopende looptijden van de 
uitstaande obligaties hebben. Een dergelijke dispersie wordt onderhouden door een regelmatige 
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uitgifte van obligaties met verschillende looptijden. Wij vinden verder dat een grotere dispersie 
in looptijden resulteert in een hogere beschikbaarheid van financiële middelen en lagere 
financieringskosten. Deze resultaten tonen dat het uitspreiden van de looptijden van obligaties 
een effectief beleid is om het risico van financieringsliquiditeit te beheersen. 
 Hoofdstuk 4 bestudeert de rol van de toegankelijkheid van lokale informatie in het 
proces van bankexpansie. Er wordt onderzocht of fricties in de arbeidsmarkt invloed hebben op 
de wijze waarop Amerikaanse banken afkomstig uit een bepaalde staat hun activiteiten uitbreiden 
naar andere Amerikaanse staten nadat deregulering dit heeft mogelijk heeft gemaakt. Ook wordt 
het effect op de lokale economische activiteit in kaart gebracht. De mobiliteit van de lokale 
gevestigde medewerkers van een bank is een belangrijk kanaal waarlangs nieuw toetredende 
banken toegang tot lokale informatie zouden kunnen krijgen. Het resultaat toont dat banken 
nieuwe markten betreden door het oprichten van nieuwe vestigingen in geval van een soepeler 
concurrentiebeding. In markten waarin het de arbeidsmobiliteit door een niet-concurrentiebeding 
beperkt is wordt vaker gekozen voor overnames van gevestigde banken. Indien banken nieuwe 
vestigingen openen verhoogt dit de concurrentie tussen banken, verbetert het de beschikbaarheid 
van krediet voor kleine bedrijven en wordt de economische groei bevorderd. Deze resultaten 
tonen het belang van menselijk kapitaal voor de banksector en dat het krijgen van toegang tot 
lokale kennis een belangrijke overweging is voor banken die een nieuwe markt betreden. De 
resultaten geven tevens aan dat beleidsmakers rekening moeten houden met de lokale 
arbeidswetgeving (en handhaving) als ze de positieve impact van de financiële sector op de reële 
economie willen realiseren. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
117_Erim Wang Stand.job
105 
 
 
 
 
Bibliography  
Acharya, V., Gale, D., Yorulmazer, T., (2011). Rollover risk and market freezes. Journal of 
Finance, 66(4), 1177-1209. 
Adams, R., (2012). Governance and the financial crisis. International Review of Finance, 12, 7-
38. 
Allen, F., Qian, J., and Qian, M. (2005). Law, finance, and economic growth in China. Journal of 
Financial Economics, 77(1), 57-116. 
Almeida, H., Campello, M., Laranjeira, B., Weisbenner, S., (2012). Corporate debt maturity and 
the real effects of the 2007 credit crisis. Critical Finance Review, 1, 3-58 
Altman, E. (1968). Financial ratios, discriminant analysis and the prediction of corporate 
bankruptcy. Journal of Finance, 23, 589-609. 
Amore, M., Schneider, C., and Žaldokas, A. (2013). Credit supply and corporate innovation. 
Journal of Financial Economics, 109(3), 835-855. 
Bae, K.; J. Kang; and C. Lim. (2002). The value of durable bank relationships: Evidence from 
Korean banking shocks. Journal of Financial Economics, 64, 181-214.  
Barclay, M., & Smith, C. W., (1995). The maturity structure of corporate debt. Journal of 
Finance, 50(2), 609-631. 
Bayazitova, D., and A. Shivdasani. (2012). Assessing TARP. Review of Financial Studies, 25, 
377-407.  
Beck, T., Demirgüç‐Kunt, A., and Maksimovic, V. (2004). Bank competition and access to 
finance: International evidence. Journal of Money, Credit, and Banking, 36(3), 627-648. 
Berger, A., and Dick, A. (2007). Entry into banking markets and the early‐mover advantage. 
Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, 39(4), 775-807. 
Berger, A., and G. Udell. (1995). Relationship lending and lines of credit in small firm finance. 
Journal of Business, 68, 351-381.  
Berger, A., Demsetz, R., and Strahan, P. (1999). The consolidation of the financial services 
industry: Causes, consequences, and implications for the future. Journal of Banking & 
118_Erim Wang Stand.job
106 
 
Finance, 23(2), 135-194. 
Berger, A., Saunders, A., Scalise, J., and Udell, G. (1998). The effects of bank mergers and 
acquisitions on small business lending. Journal of Financial Economics, 50(2), 187-229. 
Bertrand, M., Schoar, A., and Thesmar, D. (2007). Banking deregulation and industry structure: 
Evidence from the French banking reforms of 1985. Journal of Finance, 62(2), 597-628. 
Bharath, S.; S. Dahiya; A. Saunders; and A. Srinivasan. (2011) Lending relationships and loan 
contract terms. Review of Financial Studies, 24, 1141-1203 
Bharath, S.; S. Dahiya; A. Saunders; and A. Srinivasan. (2007) So what do I get? The bank’s 
view of lending relationships. Journal of Financial Economics, 85, 368-419.  
Bird, R. C., & Knopf, J. D. (2014). The impact of local knowledge on banking. Journal of 
Financial Services Research, 1-20. 
Black, S. (1999). Do better schools matter? Parental valuation of elementary education. 
Quarterly Journal of Economics, 114(2), 577-599. 
Black, S., and Strahan, P. (2002). Entrepreneurship and bank credit availability. Journal of 
Finance, 57(6), 2807-2833. 
Bofondi, M., and Gobbi, G. (2006). Informational barriers to entry into credit markets. Review 
of Finance, 10(1), 39-67. 
Bolton, P., and D. Scharfstein. (1996). Optimal debt structure and the number of creditors. 
Journal of Political Economy, 104, 1-25. 
Boot, A. (2000) Relationship banking: what do we know? Journal of Financial Intermediation, 9, 
7-25. 
Broecker, T. (1990). Credit-worthiness tests and interbank competition. Econometrica: Journal 
of the Econometric Society, 58(2), 429-452. 
Brunnermeier, M. K., (2009). Deciphering the liquidity and credit crunch 2007–08. Journal of 
Economic Perspectives 23:77–100. 
Brunnermeier, M. K., Yogo, M., (2009). A note on liquidity risk management. Working paper 
No. w14727. National Bureau of Economic Research 
Buchheit, L. C., Gulati, G. M., (2002). Sovereign bonds and the collective will. Emory LJ, 51, 
1317. 
Campello, M., J. Graham, and C. Harvey. (2010). The real effects of financial constraints: 
evidence from a financial crisis. Journal of Financial Economics, 97, 470-487. 
119_Erim Wang Stand.job
107 
 
 
Carvalho, D., Santikian, L., (2012). Liquidity management and industry interactions: evidence 
from debt maturity choices. Working paper. 
Carvalho, D.; M. Ferreira; and P. Matos. (2011) Lending Relationships and the Effect of Bank 
Distress: Evidence from the 2007-2008 Financial Crisis. Journal of Financial and 
Quantitative Analysis, Forthcoming. 
Cecchetti, S. (2009) “Crisis and Responses: The Federal Reserve in the Early Stages of the 
Financial Crisis.” Journal of Economic Perspectives, 23, 51-76. 
Chava, S., and A. Purnanandam. (2011) “The Effect of Banking Crisis on Bank-Dependent 
Borrowers.” Journal of Financial Economics, 99, 116-135.  
Chava, S., and M. Roberts. (2008) How Does Financing Impact Investment? The Role of Debt 
Covenants. Journal of Finance, 63, 2085-2121. 
Chava, S., Oettl, A., Subramanian, A., and Subramanian, K. (2013). Banking deregulation and 
innovation. Journal of Financial Economics, 109(3), 759-774. 
Cheng, H., Milbradt, K., (2012). The hazards of debt: Rollover freezes, incentives, and bailouts. 
Review of Financial Studies, 25(4), 1070-1110. 
Chodorow-Reich, G. (2014). The employment effects of credit market disruptions: firm-level 
evidence from the 2008–9 financial crisis. Quarterly Journal of Economics, 129(1), 1-59. 
Choi, J., Hackbarth, D., Zechner, J., (2013). Granularity of corporate debt. Working paper. 
Ciccarelli, M.; A. Maddaloni; and J. Peydro. (2010) “Trusting the Bankers: A New Look at the 
Credit Channel of Monetary Policy.” Working Paper, European Central Bank. 
Cleary, S., (1999) The Relationship between Firm Investment and Financial Status. Journal of 
Finance, 54, 673-692. 
Cole, R. (1998) The Importance of Relationships to the Availability of Credit. Journal of 
Banking and Finance, 22 , 959-977.  
Coval, J. and Moskowitz, T. (1999). Home bias at home: Local equity preference in domestic 
portfolios. Journal of Finance, 54(6), 2045-2073. 
Coval, J., and Moskowitz, T. (2001). The geography of investment: Informed trading and asset 
prices. Journal of Political Economy, 109(4), 811-841. 
Dell’Ariccia, G.; E. Detragiache; and R. Rajan.(2008) The Real Effect of Banking Crises. 
Journal of Financial Intermediation, 17, 89-112. 
Dell'Ariccia, G., and Marquez, R. (2004). Information and bank credit allocation. Journal of 
120_Erim Wang Stand.job
108 
 
Financial Economics, 72(1), 185-214. 
Dell'Ariccia, G., Friedman, E., and Marquez, R. (1999). Adverse selection as a barrier to entry in 
the banking industry. RAND Journal of Economics, 30(3), 515-534. 
Demirgüç‐Kunt, A., and Maksimovic, V. (1998). Law, finance, and firm growth. Journal of 
Finance, 53(6), 2107-2137. 
Denis, D. J., Mihov, V. T., (2003). The choice among bank debt, non-bank private debt, and 
public debt: evidence from new corporate borrowings. Journal of Financial Economics, 
70(1), 3-28. 
Dennis, S.; D. Nandy; and I. Sharpe. (2000) The Determinants of Contract Terms in Bank 
Revolving Credit Agreements. Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, 35, 87-110. 
Detragiache, E.; P. Garella; and L. Guiso. (2000) Multiple versus Single Banking Relationships: 
Theory and Evidence. Journal of Finance, 55, 1133–1161.  
Diamond, D. W., (1991). Debt maturity structure and liquidity risk. The Quarterly Journal of 
Economics, 106(3), 709-737. 
Dick, A. (2006). Nationwide branching and its impact on market structure, quality, and cank 
performance. Journal of Business, 79(2), 567-592. 
Drucker, S., and M. Puri. (2005) On the Benefits of Concurrent Lending and Underwriting. 
Journal of Finance, 60, 2763-2799. 
Duchin, R., Ozbas, O., Sensoy, B. A., (2010). Costly external finance, corporate investment, and 
the subprime mortgage credit crisis. Journal of Financial Economics, 97(3), 418-435. 
Elsas, R., and J. Krahnen. (1998) Is Relationship Lending Special? Evidence from Credit-File 
Data in Germany. Journal of Banking and Finance, 22, 1283-1316. 
Elyasiani, E.; L. Mester; and M. Pagano. (2011) Large Capital Infusions, Investor Reactions, and 
the Return and Risk Performance of Financial Institutions over the Business Cycle and 
Recent Financial Crisis. Working Paper, Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia. 
Fahlenbrach, R., and R. Stulz. (2011) Bank CEO Incentives and the Credit Crisis. Journal of 
Financial Economics, 99, 11-26. 
Fallick, B., Fleischman, C., and Rebitzer, J. (2006). Job-hopping in Silicon Valley: some 
evidence concerning the microfoundations of a high-technology cluster. Review of 
Economics and Statistics, 88(3), 472-481. 
Fama, E., and K. French. (1993) Common Risk Factors in the Returns on Stocks and Bonds. 
121_Erim Wang Stand.job
109 
 
 
Journal of Financial Economics, 33, 3-56 
Franco, A., and Mitchell, M. (2008). Covenants not to compete, labor mobility, and industry 
dynamics. Journal of Economics and Management Strategy, 17(3), 581-606. 
Froot, K. A., Scharfstein, D., Stein, J. C., (1993). Risk managements coordinating corporate 
investment and financing policies. Journal of Finance, 48(5), 1629-1658. 
Gambacorta, L., and P. Mistrulli. Does Bank Capital Affect Lending Behavior? Journal of 
Financial Intermediation, 13 (2004), 436-457. 
Garmaise, M. (2011). Ties that truly bind: Noncompetition agreements, executive compensation, 
and firm investment. Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, 27(2), 376-425. 
Giannetti, M., and A. Simonov. (2013) On the real effects of bank bailouts: Micro evidence from 
Japan. American Economic Journal: Macroeconomics, 5.1, 135-167. 
Gokcen, U. (2010) Market Value of Banking Relationships: New Evidence from the Financial 
Crisis of 2008. Working Paper, Koc University. 
Gopalan, R., Song, F., Yerramilli, V., 2013. Debt maturity structure and credit quality. Journal of 
Financial and Quantitative Analysis. Forthcoming. 
Gopalan, R.; G. Udell; and V. Yerramilli. (2011) Why Do Firms Form New Banking 
Relationships? Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, 46, 1335-1365. 
Graham, J. R., Harvey, C. R., (2001). The theory and practice of corporate finance: Evidence 
from the field. Journal of financial economics, 60(2), 187-243. 
Guedes, J., Opler, T., (1996). The determinants of the maturity of corporate debt issues. Journal 
of Finance, 51(5), 1809-1833. 
Guiso, L., Sapienza, P., and Zingales, L. (2004). Does local financial development matter?. 
Quarterly Journal of Economics, 119(3), 929-969. 
Hadlock, C., and J. Pierce. (2010) New Evidence on Measuring Financial Constraints: Moving 
Beyond the KZ Index. Review of Financial Studies, 23, 1909-1940. 
He, Z., & Xiong, W., (2012a). Rollover risk and credit risk. Journal of Finance, 67(2), 391-430. 
He, Z., Xiong, W., (2012b). Dynamic debt runs. Review of Financial Studies, 25(6), 1799-1843. 
Holmes, T. (1998). The effect of state policies on the location of manufacturing: evidence from 
state borders. Journal of Political Economy, 106(4), 667–705. 
Hsiao, C. (2003) Analysis of Panel Data, 2nd ed. Cambridge MA: Cambridge University Press. 
Huang, R. (2008). Evaluating the real effect of bank branching deregulation: Comparing 
122_Erim Wang Stand.job
110 
 
contiguous counties across U.S. state borders. Journal of Financial Economics, 87(3), 678-
705. 
Ivashina, V., and D. Scharfstein. (2010) Bank Lending During the Financial Crisis of 
2008.”Journal of Financial Economics, 97, 319-338.  
James, C. (1987) Some Evidence on the Uniqueness of Bank Loans. Journal of Financial 
Economics, 19, 217-36.  
Jayaratne, J., and Strahan, P. (1996). The finance-growth nexus: evidence from bank branch 
deregulation. Quarterly Journal of Economics, 111(3), 639–670. 
Kang, J., and R. Stulz (2000) Do Banking Shocks Affect Borrowing Firm Performance? An 
Analysis of the Japanese Experience. Journal of Business, 73, 1-23.  
Kaplan, S., and L. Zingales (1997) Do Investment-Cash Flow Sensitivities Provide Useful 
Measures of Financing Constraints? Quarterly Journal of Economics, 112, 169-215. 
Kaplan, S., and Stromberg, P. (2003). Financial contracting theory meets the real world: An 
empirical analysis of venture capital contracts. Review of Economic Studies, 70(2):281-315 
Kashyap, A.; O. Lamont; and J. Stein. (1994) Credit Conditions and the Cyclical Behavior of 
Inventories. Quarterly Journal of Economics, 109, 565-92.  
Kim, W. (2010) Market Reaction to Limiting Executive Compensation: Evidence from TARP 
Firms. Working Paper, Dickinson College.  
King, R., and Levine, R. (1993). Finance and growth: Schumpeter might be right. Quarterly 
Journal of Economics, 108(3), 717–738. 
Kishan, R., and T. Opiela. (2000) Bank Size, Bank Capital and the Bank Lending Channel. 
Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, 32, 121-141. 
Kramer, R. (1999). “Mega-mergers” in the banking industry, Antitrust Division, U.S. 
Department of Justice, Washington D.C.  
Kwan, S. H., Carleton, W. T., (2010). Financial contracting and the choice between private 
placement and publicly offered bonds. Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, 42(5), 907-
929. 
La Porta, R., Lopez-de-Silanes, F., Shleifer, A., and Vishny, R. (2001). Law and Finance. 26-68. 
Springer Berlin Heidelberg. 
Lemmon, M., and M. Roberts. (2010)The Response of Corporate Financing and Investment to 
Changes in the Supply of Credit. Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, 45, 555-
123_Erim Wang Stand.job
111 
 
 
587. 
Leonard, B. (2001). Recruiting from the competition. HR Magazine 46(2), 78-83. 
Levine, R., and Zervos, S. (1998). Stock markets, banks, and economic growth. American 
Economic Review, 88(3), 537-558. 
Li, L. (2013) TARP Funds Distribution and Bank Loan Growth. Working Paper, University of 
Kansas. 
Malsberger, B. M. (2004, 2009). Covenants not to compete: a state-by-state survey. Bloomberg 
BNA, 4th edition, 9th edition 
Marx, M., and Fleming, L. (2011). Non-compete agreements: barriers to entry… and exit? In 
Innovation Policy and the Economy, 12, 39-64. University of Chicago Press. 
Marx, M., Strumsky, D., and Fleming, L. (2009). Mobility, skills, and the Michigan non-
compete experiment. Management Science, 55(6), 875-889. 
McKinnon, R. (1973). Money and capital in economic development. Brookings Institution 
Press. 
Mester, L., Nakamura, L., and Renault, M. (2007). Transactions accounts and loan monitoring. 
Review of Financial Studies, 20(3), 529-556. 
Morris, S., Shin, H. S., (2009). Illiquidity component of credit risk. Working paper. Princeton 
University. 
Myers, S. C., (1977). Determinants of corporate borrowing. Journal of Financial Economics, 
5(2), 147-175. 
Myers, S. C., (1984). The capital structure puzzle. Journal of Finance, 39(3), 574-592. 
Norden, L., and Weber, M. (2010). Credit line usage, checking account activity, and default risk 
of bank borrowers. Review of Financial Studies, 23(10), 3665-3699. 
Norden, L., Roosenboom, R., and Wang, T. (2013) The Impact of Government Intervention in 
Banks on Corporate Borrowers’ Stock Returns. Journal of Financial and Quantitative 
Analysis (2013) 48(5), 1635-1662 
Norden, L., Roosenboom, R., and Wang, T. (2015) Do Firms Spread Out Bond Maturity to 
Manage Funding Liquidity Risk? Working Paper 
Ogura, Y. (2006). Learning from a rival bank and lending boom. Journal of Financial 
Intermediation, 15(4), 535-555. 
Ongena, S.; D. Smith; and D. Michalsen. (2003) Firms and their Distressed Banks: Lessons from 
124_Erim Wang Stand.job
112 
 
the Norwegian Banking Crisis, Journal of Financial Economics, 67, 81-112.  
Ongena, S.; G. Jiménez; J. Peydro; and J. Saurina. (2010) Credit Supply: Identifying Balance-
Sheet Channels with Loan Applications and Granted Loans. Working Paper, European 
Central Bank. 
Panetta, F.; T. Faeh; G. Grande; C. Ho; M. King; A. Levy; F. Signoretti; M. Taboga; and A. 
Zaghini. (2010) “An Assessment of Financial Sector Rescue Programmes.” Working Paper, 
Bank of Italy. 
Petersen, M. (2009) Estimating Standard Errors in Finance Panel Datasets: Comparing 
Approaches. Review of Financial Studies, 22, 435–480. 
Petersen, M., and Rajan, R. (1994). The benefits of lending relationships: Evidence from small 
business data. Journal of Finance, 49(1), 3-37. 
Petersen, M., and Rajan, R. (2002). Does distance still matter? The information revolution in 
small business lending. Journal of Finance, 57(6), 2533-2570. 
Rajan, R. (1992). Insiders and outsiders: The choice between informed and arm's‐length debt. 
Journal of Finance, 47(4), 1367-1400. 
Rajan, R. (1992) “Insiders and Outsiders: The Choice Between Informed and Arms Length 
Debt.” Journal of Finance, 47, 1367- 1400. 
Rajan, R., 1992. Insiders and Outsiders: The choice between informed and arm's-length debt. 
Journal of Finance 47, 1367-1400. 
Reinhart, C., and K. Rogoff. (2009) The Aftermath of Financial Crises. American Economic 
Review, 99, 466-72. 
Rice, T., and Strahan, P. (2010). Does credit competition affect small‐firm finance? Journal of 
Finance, 65(3), 861-889. 
Santos, J. “Bank Corporate Loan Pricing Following the Subprime Crisis.” Review of Financial 
Studies, 24 (2011), 1916-1943. 
Schenone, C. “The Effect of Banking Relationships on the Firm's IPO Underpricing.” Journal of 
Finance, 59 (2004), 2903-2958. 
Schipper, K., and R. Thompson. Evidence on the Capitalized Value of Merger Activity for 
Acquiring Firms. Journal of Financial Economics, 11 (1983), 85-119. 
Schumpeter, J. (1912). Theorie der wirtschaftlichen Entwicklung. Duncker and Humblot. 
Schumpeter, J.(1961). The theory of economic development: An inquiry into profits, capital, 
125_Erim Wang Stand.job
113 
 
 
credit, interest, and the business cycle. Translated by Redvers Opie. Oxford University 
Press. 
Servaes, H., Tufano, P., (2006). The theory and practice of corporate debt structure. Deutsche 
Bank, New York, NY. 
Shaffer, S. (1998). The winner's curse in banking. Journal of Financial Intermediation, 7(4), 359-
392. 
Shin, B.; S. Park; and G. Udell. Lending Relationships, Credit Availability, Firm Value and 
Banking Crises. Working Paper, Korea Securities Research Institute, Indiana University 
Bloomington and Yonsei University (2008). 
SIGTARP. Quarterly Report to Congress (January 30, 2010). 
Slovin, M.; M. Sushka; and J. Polonchek. (1993) The Value of Bank Durability: Borrowers as 
Bank Stakeholders. Journal of Finance, 68, 247-266.  
Smith, W., Warner, J., (1979). On financial contracting: An analysis of bond covenants. Journal 
of Financial Economics 7.2: 117-161. 
Taliaferro, R. (2009) Where Did the Money Go? Commitments, Troubled Assets, New Lending, 
and the Capital Purchase Program.  Working Paper, Harvard Business School  
U.S. Congress. (October 3, 2008) Emergency Economic Stabilization Act. H. R. 1424, Second 
Session.  
Veronesi, P., and L. Zingales. (2010) Paulson's Gift. Journal of Financial Economics, 97, 339-
368. 
Wang, T. (2015) Bank Entry Mode, Labor Market Flexibility and Economic Activity, Working 
paper 
Whited, T., and G. Wu. (2006) Financial Constraints Risk. Review of Financial Studies, 19, 531-
559.   
Zarutskie, R. (2006). Evidence on the effects of bank competition on firm borrowing and 
investment. Journal of Financial Economics, 81(3), 503-537. 
 
 
 
126_Erim Wang Stand.job
114 
 
 
 
Biography 
 
Teng Wang was born on December 7, 1984 in China. He 
obtained his Bachelor’s Degree in Economics and Business 
from the University of Amsterdam, majoring in Finance and 
International Economics. During his undergraduate studies, 
Teng did internships at the market research department at Royal 
Philips Electronics. Between 2008 and 2010, Teng did the Mphil 
studies in Finance at Erasmus University, and he graduated with 
distinction (cum laude). During this period, he held several research assistant positions in various research 
units within the Erasmus Research Institute of Management (ERIM), such as China Business Center and the 
Department of Finance.  
 With his doctoral research proposal entitled “The Impact of Government Intervention in the Banking 
Industry on Corporate Sector”, Teng was awarded the Mosaic grant from National Science Foundation of the 
Netherlands (NWO) and the Dutch Ministry of Education, Culture, and Science. With generous financial 
support of this prestigious grant, Teng started his four-year doctoral research at the Department of Finance at 
RSM Erasmus University in 2011. His main research interests are in the areas of financial intermediation and 
corporate finance, but they also extend to financial economics and law and finance.  
 During his PhD trajectory, Teng visited several leading academic institutions and has followed courses 
taught by many leading scholars in the field of financial economics, such as Franklin Allen, Jarrad Harford, 
Greg Udell, David Yermack, Barry Eichengreen, Edward Miguel, and Steven Ogena. His work has been 
presented at several international conferences, such as the EFA, the IFABS Conference, the Australasian 
Finance and Banking Conferences, the Corporate Finance Day, the MoFiR workshop in Banking and the CICF 
conference. One of his research papers has been published in the Journal of Financial and Quantitative 
Analysis, and another paper was recently offered revise-and-resubmit from a prominent academic journal.  
 Teng has been involved in teaching courses at both the undergraduate and graduate level in the areas of 
corporate finance, banking, and valuation. Starting from September 2015, Teng will be working as an 
economist at the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System.  
 
 
 
127_Erim Wang Stand.job
115 
 
 
 
 
 
  
ERASMUS RESEARCH INSTITUTE OF MANAGEMENT (ERIM) 
 
ERIM PH.D. SERIES RESEARCH IN MANAGEMENT 
The ERIM PhD Series contains PhD dissertations in the field of Research in Management defended at Erasmus 
University Rotterdam and supervised by senior researchers affiliated to the Erasmus Research Institute of 
Management (ERIM). All dissertations in the ERIM PhD Series are available in full text through the ERIM 
Electronic Series Portal: http://repub.eur.nl/pub. ERIM is the joint research institute of the Rotterdam School of 
Management (RSM) and the Erasmus School of Economics at the Erasmus University Rotterdam (EUR). 
 
 
DISSERTATIONS LAST FIVE YEARS 
 
Abbink, E., Crew Management in Passenger Rail Transport, Promotor(s): Prof.dr. L.G. Kroon & Prof.dr. 
A.P.M. Wagelmans, EPS-2014-325-LIS, http://repub.eur.nl/pub/76927 
 
Acar, O.A., Crowdsourcing for Innovation: Unpacking Motivational, Knowledge and Relational 
Mechanisms of Innovative Behavior in Crowdsourcing Platforms, Promotor: Prof.dr. J.C.M. van den Ende, 
EPS-2014-321-LIS, http://repub.eur.nl/pub/76076 
 
Acciaro, M., Bundling Strategies in Global Supply Chains, Promotor(s): Prof.dr. H.E. Haralambides, EPS-
2010-197-LIS, http://repub.eur.nl/pub/19742 
Akpinar, E., Consumer Information Sharing; Understanding Psychological Drivers of Social Transmission, 
Promotor(s): Prof.dr.ir. A. Smidts, EPS-2013-297-MKT, http://repub.eur.nl/pub /50140 
Alexiev, A., Exploratory Innovation: The Role of Organizational and Top Management Team Social Capital, 
Promotor(s): Prof.dr. F.A.J. van den Bosch & Prof.dr. H.W. Volberda, EPS-2010-208-STR, 
http://repub.eur.nl/pub/20632 
Akin Ates, M., Purchasing and Supply Management at the Purchase Category Level: Strategy, Structure, 
and Performance, Promotor: Prof.dr. J.Y.F. Wynstra, EPS-2014-300-LIS, http://repub.eur.nl/pub/50283  
 
Almeida, R.J.de, Conditional Density Models Integrating Fuzzy and Probabilistic Representations of 
Uncertainty, Promotor Prof.dr.ir. Uzay Kaymak, EPS-2014-310-LIS, http://repub.eur.nl/pub/51560 
Bannouh, K., Measuring and Forecasting Financial Market Volatility using High-Frequency Data, 
Promotor: Prof.dr.D.J.C. van Dijk, EPS-2013-273-F&A,  http://repub.eur.nl/pub /38240 
Benning, T.M., A Consumer Perspective on Flexibility in Health Care: Priority Access Pricing and 
Customized Care, Promotor: Prof.dr.ir. B.G.C. Dellaert, EPS-2011-241-MKT, http://repub.eur.nl/pub/23670 
Ben-Menahem, S.M., Strategic Timing and Proactiveness of Organizations, Promotor(s):  
Prof.dr. H.W. Volberda & Prof.dr.ing. F.A.J. van den Bosch, EPS-2013-278-S&E, 
http://repub.eur.nl/pub/39128 
 
Berg, W.E. van den, Understanding Salesforce Behavior Using Genetic Association Studies, Promotor: 
Prof.dr. W.J.M.I. Verbeke, EPS-2014-311-MKT, http://repub.eur.nl/pub/51440 
128_Erim Wang Stand.job
116 
 
Betancourt, N.E., Typical Atypicality: Formal and Informal Institutional Conformity, Deviance, and 
Dynamics, Promotor: Prof.dr. B. Krug, EPS-2012-262-ORG, http://repub.eur.nl/pub/32345 
Binken, J.L.G., System Markets: Indirect Network Effects in Action, or Inaction, Promotor: Prof.dr. S. 
Stremersch, EPS-2010-213-MKT, http://repub.eur.nl/pub/21186 
Blitz, D.C., Benchmarking Benchmarks, Promotor(s): Prof.dr. A.G.Z. Kemna & Prof.dr. W.F.C. Verschoor, 
EPS-2011-225-F&A, http://repub.eur.nl/pub/226244 
 
Boons, M., Working Together Alone in the Online Crowd: The Effects of Social Motivations and Individual 
Knowledge Backgrounds on the Participation and Performance of Members of Online Crowdsourcing 
Platforms, Promotor: Prof.dr. H.G. Barkema, EPS-2014-306-S&E, http://repub.eur.nl/pub/50711 
Borst, W.A.M., Understanding Crowdsourcing: Effects of Motivation and Rewards on Participation and 
Performance in Voluntary Online Activities, Promotor(s): Prof.dr.ir. J.C.M. van den Ende & Prof.dr.ir. 
H.W.G.M. van Heck, EPS-2010-221-LIS, http://repub.eur.nl/pub/21914 
Budiono, D.P., The Analysis of Mutual Fund Performance: Evidence from U.S. Equity Mutual Funds, 
Promotor: Prof.dr. M.J.C.M. Verbeek, EPS-2010-185-F&A, http://repub.eur.nl/pub/18126 
Burger, M.J., Structure and Cooptition in Urban Networks, Promotor(s): Prof.dr. G.A. van der Knaap & 
Prof.dr. H.R. Commandeur, EPS-2011-243-ORG, http://repub.eur.nl/pub/26178 
Byington, E., Exploring Coworker Relationships: Antecedents and Dimensions of Interpersonal Fit, 
Coworker Satisfaction, and Relational Models, Promotor: Prof.dr. D.L. van Knippenberg, EPS-2013-292-
ORG, http://repub.eur.nl/pub/41508 
Camacho, N.M., Health and Marketing; Essays on Physician and Patient Decision-making, Promotor: 
Prof.dr. S. Stremersch, EPS-2011-237-MKT, http://repub.eur.nl/pub/23604 
 
Cankurtaran, P. Essays On Accelerated Product Development, Promotor: Prof.dr.ir. G.H. van Bruggen, EPS-
2014-317-MKT, http://repub.eur.nl/pub/76074 
Caron, E.A.M., Explanation of Exceptional Values in Multi-dimensional Business Databases, Promotor(s): 
Prof.dr.ir. H.A.M. Daniels & Prof.dr. G.W.J. Hendrikse, EPS-2013-296-LIS,  http://repub.eur.nl/pub/50005 
Carvalho, L., Knowledge Locations in Cities; Emergence and Development Dynamics, Promotor: Prof.dr. L. 
van den Berg, EPS-2013-274-S&E, http://repub.eur.nl/pub/38449 
Carvalho de Mesquita Ferreira, L., Attention Mosaics: Studies of Organizational Attention, Promotor(s): 
Prof.dr. P.M.A.R. Heugens & Prof.dr. J. van Oosterhout, EPS-2010-205-ORG, http://repub.eur.nl/pub/19882  
Cox, R.H.G.M., To Own, To Finance, and to Insure; Residential Real Estate Revealed, Promotor: Prof.dr. D. 
Brounen, EPS-2013-290-F&A, http://repub.eur.nl/pub/40964 
Defilippi Angeldonis, E.F., Access Regulation for Naturally Monopolistic Port Terminals: Lessons from 
Regulated Network Industries, Promotor: Prof.dr. H.E. Haralambides, EPS-2010-204-LIS, 
http://repub.eur.nl/pub/19881 
Deichmann, D., Idea Management: Perspectives from Leadership, Learning, and Network Theory, 
Promotor: Prof.dr.ir. J.C.M. van den Ende, EPS-2012-255-ORG, http://repub.eur.nl/pub/31174 
129_Erim Wang Stand.job
117 
 
 
Desmet, P.T.M., In Money we Trust? Trust Repair and the Psychology of Financial Compensations, 
Promotor: Prof.dr. D. De Cremer & Prof.dr. E. van Dijk, EPS-2011-232-ORG, http://repub.eur.nl/pub/23268 
Dietvorst, R.C., Neural Mechanisms Underlying Social Intelligence and Their Relationship with the 
Performance of Sales Managers, Promotor: Prof.dr. W.J.M.I. Verbeke, EPS-2010-215-MKT, 
http://repub.eur.nl/pub/21188 
Dollevoet, T.A.B., Delay Management and Dispatching in Railways, Promotor: Prof.dr. A.P.M. Wagelmans, 
EPS-2013-272-LIS, http://repub.eur.nl/pub/38241 
Doorn, S. van, Managing Entrepreneurial Orientation, Promotor(s): Prof.dr. J.J.P. Jansen, Prof.dr.ing. F.A.J. 
van den Bosch & Prof.dr. H.W. Volberda, EPS-2012-258-STR, http://repub.eur.nl/pub/32166 
Douwens-Zonneveld, M.G., Animal Spirits and Extreme Confidence: No Guts, No Glory, Promotor: Prof.dr. 
W.F.C. Verschoor, EPS-2012-257-F&A, http://repub.eur.nl/pub/31914 
Duca, E., The Impact of Investor Demand on Security Offerings, Promotor: Prof.dr. A. de Jong, EPS-2011-
240-F&A, http://repub.eur.nl/pub/26041 
Duursema, H., Strategic Leadership; Moving Beyond the Leader-follower Dyad, Promotor: Prof.dr. R.J.M. 
van Tulder, EPS-2013-279-ORG, http://repub.eur.nl/pub/39129 
Eck, N.J. van, Methodological Advances in Bibliometric Mapping of Science, Promotor: Prof.dr.ir. R. 
Dekker, EPS-2011-247-LIS, http://repub.eur.nl/pub/26509 
Essen, M. van, An Institution-Based View of Ownership, Promotor(s): Prof.dr. J. van Oosterhout & Prof.dr. 
G.M.H. Mertens, EPS-2011-226-ORG, http://repub.eur.nl/pub/22643 
Feng, L., Motivation, Coordination and Cognition in Cooperatives, Promotor: Prof.dr. G.W.J. Hendrikse, 
EPS-2010-220-ORG, http://repub.eur.nl/pub/21680 
 
Fourné, S. P. L., Managing Organizational Tensions: A Multi-level Perspective on Exploration, 
Exploitation, and Ambidexterity, Promotor(s): Prof.dr. J.J.P. Jansen, Prof.dr. S.J. Magala & dr. T.J.M.Mom, 
EPS-2014-318-S&E, http://repub.eur.nl/pub/21680 
Gharehgozli, A.H., Developing New Methods for Efficient Container Stacking Operations, Promotor: 
Prof.dr.ir. M.B.M. de Koster, EPS-2012-269-LIS, http://repub.eur.nl/pub/37779 
Gils, S. van, Morality in Interactions: On the Display of Moral Behavior by Leaders and Employees, 
Promotor: Prof.dr. D.L. van Knippenberg, EPS-2012-270-ORG, http://repub.eur.nl/pub/38028 
Ginkel-Bieshaar, M.N.G. van, The Impact of Abstract versus Concrete Product Communications on 
Consumer Decision-making Processes, Promotor: Prof.dr.ir. B.G.C. Dellaert, EPS-2012-256-MKT,  
http://repub.eur.nl/pub/31913 
Gkougkousi, X., Empirical Studies in Financial Accounting, Promotor(s): Prof.dr. G.M.H. Mertens & 
Prof.dr. E. Peek, EPS-2012-264-F&A, http://repub.eur.nl/pub/37170 
 
Glorie, K.M., Clearing Barter Exchange Markets: Kidney Exchange and Beyond, Promotor(s): Prof.dr. 
A.P.M. Wagelmans & Prof.dr. J.J. van de Klundert, EPS-2014-329-LIS, http://repub.eur.nl/pub/77183 
 
130_Erim Wang Stand.job
118 
 
Hakimi, N.A., Leader Empowering Behaviour: The Leader’s Perspective: Understanding the Motivation 
behind Leader Empowering Behaviour, Promotor: Prof.dr. D.L. van Knippenberg, EPS-2010-184-ORG, 
http://repub.eur.nl/pub/17701 
Hensmans, M., A Republican Settlement Theory of the Firm: Applied to Retail Banks in England and the 
Netherlands (1830-2007), Promotor(s): Prof.dr. A. Jolink & Prof.dr. S.J. Magala, EPS-2010-193-ORG, 
http://repub.eur.nl/pub/19494 
Hernandez Mireles, C., Marketing Modeling for New Products, Promotor: Prof.dr. P.H. Franses, EPS-2010-
202-MKT, http://repub.eur.nl/pub/19878 
Heyde Fernandes, D. von der, The Functions and Dysfunctions of Reminders, Promotor: Prof.dr. S.M.J. van 
Osselaer, EPS-2013-295-MKT, http://repub.eur.nl/pub/41514 
Heyden, M.L.M., Essays on Upper Echelons & Strategic Renewal: A Multilevel Contingency Approach, 
Promotor(s): Prof.dr. F.A.J. van den Bosch & Prof.dr. H.W. Volberda, EPS-2012-259-STR,  
http://repub.eur.nl/pub/32167 
Hoever, I.J., Diversity and Creativity: In Search of Synergy, Promotor(s): Prof.dr. D.L. van Knippenberg, 
EPS-2012-267-ORG, http://repub.eur.nl/pub/37392 
Hoogendoorn, B., Social Entrepreneurship in the Modern Economy: Warm Glow, Cold Feet, Promotor(s): 
Prof.dr. H.P.G. Pennings & Prof.dr. A.R. Thurik, EPS-2011-246-STR, http://repub.eur.nl/pub/26447 
Hoogervorst, N., On The Psychology of Displaying Ethical Leadership: A Behavioral Ethics Approach, 
Promotor(s): Prof.dr. D. De Cremer & Dr. M. van Dijke, EPS-2011-244-ORG, http://repub.eur.nl/pub/26228 
Houwelingen, G., Something to Rely On: The Influence of Stable and Fleeting Drivers on Moral Behaviour, 
Promotor(s): Prof.dr. D. de Cremer, Prof.dr. M.H. van Dijke, EPS-2014-335-ORG, 
http://repub.eur.nl/pub/77320 
 
Huang, X., An Analysis of Occupational Pension Provision: From Evaluation to Redesign, Promotor(s): 
Prof.dr. M.J.C.M. Verbeek & Prof.dr. R.J. Mahieu, EPS-2010-196-F&A, http://repub.eur.nl/pub/19674 
Hytönen, K.A., Context Effects in Valuation, Judgment and Choice, Promotor(s): Prof.dr.ir. A. Smidts, EPS-
2011-252-MKT, http://repub.eur.nl/pub/30668 
 
Iseger, P. den, Fourier and Laplace Transform Inversion with Application in Finance, Promotor: Prof.dr.ir.  
R.Dekker, EPS-2014-322-LIS, http://repub.eur.nl/pub/76954 
Jaarsveld, W.L. van, Maintenance Centered Service Parts Inventory Control, Promotor(s): Prof.dr.ir. R. 
Dekker, EPS-2013-288-LIS, http://repub.eur.nl/pub/39933 
Jalil, M.N., Customer Information Driven After Sales Service Management: Lessons from Spare Parts 
Logistics, Promotor(s): Prof.dr. L.G. Kroon, EPS-2011-222-LIS, http://repub.eur.nl/pub/22156 
Kagie, M., Advances in Online Shopping Interfaces: Product Catalog Maps and Recommender Systems, 
Promotor(s): Prof.dr. P.J.F. Groenen, EPS-2010-195-MKT, http://repub.eur.nl/pub/19532 
Kappe, E.R., The Effectiveness of Pharmaceutical Marketing, Promotor(s): Prof.dr. S. Stremersch,  
EPS-2011-239-MKT, http://repub.eur.nl/pub/23610 
131_Erim Wang Stand.job
119 
 
 
Karreman, B., Financial Services and Emerging Markets, Promotor(s): Prof.dr. G.A. van der Knaap & 
Prof.dr. H.P.G. Pennings, EPS-2011-223-ORG, http://repub.eur.nl/pub/22280 
 
Khanagha, S., Dynamic Capabilities for Managing Emerging Technologies, Promotor: Prof.dr. H. Volberda, 
EPS-2014-339-S&E, http://repub.eur.nl/pub/77319 
Kil, J.C.M., Acquisitions Through a Behavioral and Real Options Lens, Promotor(s): Prof.dr. H.T.J. Smit, 
EPS-2013-298-F&A, http://repub.eur.nl/pub/50142 
 
Klooster, E. van’t, Travel to Learn: The Influence of Cultural Distance on Competence Development in 
Educational Travel, Promotors: Prof.dr. F.M. Go & Prof.dr. P.J. van Baalen, EPS-2014-312-MKT,  
http://repub.eur.nl/pub/151460 
 
Koendjbiharie, S.R., The Information-Based View on Business Network Performance Revealing the 
Performance of Interorganizational Networks, Promotors: Prof.dr.ir. H.W.G.M. van Heck & Prof.mr.dr. 
P.H.M. Vervest, EPS-2014-315-LIS, http://repub.eur.nl/pub/51751 
 
Koning, M., The Financial Reporting Environment: Taking into Account the Media, International Relations 
and Auditors, Promotor(s): Prof.dr. P.G.J.Roosenboom & Prof.dr. G.M.H. Mertens, EPS-2014-330-F&A, 
http://repub.eur.nl/pub/77154 
 
Konter, D.J., Crossing Borders with HRM: An Inquiry of the Influence of Contextual Differences in the 
Adaption and Effectiveness of HRM, Promotor: Prof.dr. J. Paauwe, EPS-2014-305-ORG, 
http://repub.eur.nl/pub/50388 
 
Korkmaz, E., Understanding Heterogeneity in Hidden Drivers of Customer Purchase Behavior, Promotors: 
Prof.dr. S.L. van de Velde & dr. R.Kuik, EPS-2014-316-LIS, http://repub.eur.nl/pub/76008 
 
Kroezen, J.J., The Renewal of Mature Industries: An Examination of the Revival of the Dutch Beer Brewing 
Industry, Promotor: Prof. P.P.M.A.R. Heugens, EPS-2014-333-S&E, http://repub.eur.nl/pub/77042 
Lam, K.Y., Reliability and Rankings, Promotor(s): Prof.dr. P.H.B.F. Franses, EPS-2011-230-MKT,  
http://repub.eur.nl/pub/22977 
Lander, M.W., Profits or Professionalism? On Designing Professional Service Firms, Promotor(s): Prof.dr. 
J. van Oosterhout & Prof.dr. P.P.M.A.R. Heugens, EPS-2012-253-ORG, http://repub.eur.nl/pub/30682 
Langhe, B. de, Contingencies: Learning Numerical and Emotional Associations in an Uncertain World, 
Promotor(s): Prof.dr.ir. B. Wierenga & Prof.dr. S.M.J. van Osselaer, EPS-2011-236-MKT,  
http://repub.eur.nl/pub/23504 
Larco Martinelli, J.A., Incorporating Worker-Specific Factors in Operations Management Models, 
Promotor(s): Prof.dr.ir. J. Dul & Prof.dr. M.B.M. de Koster, EPS-2010-217-LIS, 
http://repub.eur.nl/pub/21527 
Leunissen, J.M., All Apologies: On the Willingness of Perpetrators to Apologize, Promotor: Prof.dr. D. De 
Cremer, EPS-2014-301-ORG, http://repub.eur.nl/pub/50318 
Liang, Q., Governance, CEO Indentity, and Quality Provision of Farmer Cooperatives, Promotor: Prof.dr. 
G.W.J. Hendrikse, EPS-2013-281-ORG, http://repub.eur.nl/pub/39253 
132_Erim Wang Stand.job
120 
 
Liket, K.C., Why ‘Doing Good’ is not Good Enough: Essays on Social Impact Measurement, Promotor: 
Prof.dr. H.R. Commandeur, EPS-2014-307-S&E, http://repub.eur.nl/pub/51130 
 
Loos, M.J.H.M. van der, Molecular Genetics and Hormones; New Frontiers in Entrepreneurship Research, 
Promotor(s): Prof.dr. A.R. Thurik, Prof.dr. P.J.F. Groenen & Prof.dr. A. Hofman, EPS-2013-287-S&E, 
http://repub.eur.nl/pub/40081 
Lovric, M., Behavioral Finance and Agent-Based Artificial Markets, Promotor(s): Prof.dr. J. Spronk & 
Prof.dr.ir. U. Kaymak, EPS-2011-229-F&A, http://repub.eur.nl/pub/22814 
 
Lu, Y., Data-Driven Decision Making in Auction Markets, Promotor(s): Prof.dr.ir.H.W.G.M. van Heck & 
Prof.dr.W.Ketter, EPS-2014-314-LIS, http://repub.eur.nl/pub/51543 
 
Manders, B., Implementation and Impact of ISO 9001, Promotor: Prof.dr. K. Blind, EPS-2014-337-LIS, 
http://repub.eur.nl/pub/77412 
Markwat, T.D., Extreme Dependence in Asset Markets Around the Globe, Promotor: Prof.dr. D.J.C. van 
Dijk, EPS-2011-227-F&A, http://repub.eur.nl/pub/22744 
Mees, H., Changing Fortunes: How China’s Boom Caused the Financial Crisis, Promotor: Prof.dr. 
Ph.H.B.F. Franses, EPS-2012-266-MKT, http://repub.eur.nl/pub/34930 
 
Meuer, J., Configurations of Inter-Firm Relations in Management Innovation: A Study in China’s 
Biopharmaceutical Industry, Promotor: Prof.dr. B. Krug, EPS-2011-228-ORG, 
http://repub.eur.nl/pub/22745 
Mihalache, O.R., Stimulating Firm Innovativeness: Probing the Interrelations between Managerial and 
Organizational Determinants, Promotor(s): Prof.dr. J.J.P. Jansen, Prof.dr.ing. F.A.J. van den Bosch & 
Prof.dr. H.W. Volberda, EPS-2012-260-S&E, http://repub.eur.nl/pub/32343 
Milea, V., New Analytics for Financial Decision Support, Promotor: Prof.dr.ir. U. Kaymak, EPS-2013-275-
LIS, http://repub.eur.nl/pub/38673 
 
Naumovska, I. Socially Situated Financial Markets: A Neo-Behavioral Perspective on Firms, Investors, and 
Practices, Promoter(s) Prof.dr. P.P.M.A.R. Heugens & Prof.dr. A.de Jong, EPS-2014-319-S&E, 
http://repub.eur.nl/pub/76084 
Nielsen, L.K., Rolling Stock Rescheduling in Passenger Railways: Applications in Short-term Planning and 
in Disruption Management, Promotor: Prof.dr. L.G. Kroon, EPS-2011-224-LIS, 
http://repub.eur.nl/pub/22444 
Nijdam, M.H., Leader Firms: The Value of Companies for the Competitiveness of the Rotterdam Seaport 
Cluster, Promotor(s): Prof.dr. R.J.M. van Tulder, EPS-2010-216-ORG, http://repub.eur.nl/pub/21405 
Noordegraaf-Eelens, L.H.J., Contested Communication: A Critical Analysis of Central Bank Speech, 
Promotor: Prof.dr. Ph.H.B.F. Franses, EPS-2010-209-MKT, http://repub.eur.nl/pub/21061 
Nuijten, A.L.P., Deaf Effect for Risk Warnings: A Causal Examination Applied to Information Systems 
Projects, Promotor: Prof.dr. G. van der Pijl & Prof.dr. H. Commandeur & Prof.dr. M. Keil, EPS-2012-263-
S&E, http://repub.eur.nl/pub/34928 
Oosterhout, M., van, Business Agility and Information Technology in Service Organizations, Promotor: 
Prof.dr.ir. H.W.G.M. van Heck, EPS-2010-198-LIS, http://repub.eur.nl/pub/19805 
133_Erim Wang Stand.job
121 
 
 
Osadchiy, S.E., The Dynamics of Formal Organization: Essays on Bureaucracy and Formal Rules, 
Promotor: Prof.dr. P.P.M.A.R. Heugens, EPS-2011-231-ORG, http://repub.eur.nl/pub/23250 
Otgaar, A.H.J., Industrial Tourism: Where the Public Meets the Private, Promotor: Prof.dr. L. van den Berg, 
EPS-2010-219-ORG, http://repub.eur.nl/pub/21585 
Ozdemir, M.N., Project-level Governance, Monetary Incentives and Performance in Strategic R&D 
Alliances, Promotor: Prof.dr.ir. J.C.M. van den Ende, EPS-2011-235-LIS, http://repub.eur.nl/pub/23550 
Peers, Y., Econometric Advances in Diffusion Models, Promotor: Prof.dr. Ph.H.B.F. Franses, EPS-2011-251-
MKT, http://repub.eur.nl/pub/30586 
Pince, C., Advances in Inventory Management: Dynamic Models, Promotor: Prof.dr.ir. R. Dekker, EPS-
2010-199-LIS, http://repub.eur.nl/pub/19867  
 
Peters, M., Machine Learning Algorithms for Smart Electricity Markets, Promotor: Prof.dr. W. Ketter, EPS-
2014-332-LIS, http://repub.eur.nl/pub/77413 
Porck, J.P., No Team is an Island, Promotor: Prof.dr. P.J.F. Groenen & Prof.dr. D.L. van Knippenberg, EPS-
2013-299-ORG, http://repub.eur.nl/pub/50141 
Porras Prado, M., The Long and Short Side of Real Estate, Real Estate Stocks, and Equity, Promotor: 
Prof.dr. M.J.C.M. Verbeek, EPS-2012-254-F&A, http://repub.eur.nl/pub/30848 
Potthoff, D., Railway Crew Rescheduling: Novel Approaches and Extensions, Promotor(s): Prof.dr. A.P.M. 
Wagelmans & Prof.dr. L.G. Kroon, EPS-2010-210-LIS, http://repub.eur.nl/pub/21084 
Poruthiyil, P.V., Steering Through: How Organizations Negotiate Permanent Uncertainty and Unresolvable 
Choices, Promotor(s): Prof.dr. P.P.M.A.R. Heugens & Prof.dr. S. Magala, EPS-2011-245-ORG, 
http://repub.eur.nl/pub/26392 
Pourakbar, M., End-of-Life Inventory Decisions of Service Parts, Promotor: Prof.dr.ir. R. Dekker, EPS-2011-
249-LIS, http://repub.eur.nl/pub/30584 
Pronker, E.S., Innovation Paradox in Vaccine Target Selection, Promotor(s): Prof.dr. H.R. Commandeur & 
Prof.dr. H.J.H.M. Claassen, EPS-2013-282-S&E, http://repub.eur.nl/pub/39654 
Retel Helmrich, M.J., Green Lot-Sizing, Promotor: Prof.dr. A.P.M. Wagelmans, EPS-2013-291-LIS, 
http://repub.eur.nl/pub/41330 
 
Rietveld, C.A., Essays on the Intersection of Economics and Biology, Promotor(s): Prof.dr. P.J.F. Groenen, 
Prof.dr. A. Hofman, Prof.dr. A.R. Thurik, Prof.dr. P.D. Koellinger, EPS-2014-320-S&E, 
http://repub.eur.nl/pub/76907 
Rijsenbilt, J.A., CEO Narcissism; Measurement and Impact, Promotor: Prof.dr. A.G.Z. Kemna & Prof.dr. 
H.R. Commandeur, EPS-2011-238-STR, http://repub.eur.nl/pub/23554 
Roelofsen, E.M., The Role of Analyst Conference Calls in Capital Markets, Promotor(s): Prof.dr. G.M.H. 
Mertens & Prof.dr. L.G. van der Tas RA, EPS-2010-190-F&A, http://repub.eur.nl/pub/18013 
Roza, M.W., The Relationship between Offshoring Strategies and Firm Performance: Impact of Innovation, 
Absorptive Capacity and Firm Size, Promotor(s): Prof.dr. H.W. Volberda & Prof.dr.ing. F.A.J. van den 
Bosch, EPS-2011-214-STR, http://repub.eur.nl/pub/22155 
134_Erim Wang Stand.job
122 
 
Rubbaniy, G., Investment Behavior of Institutional Investors, Promotor: Prof.dr. W.F.C. Verschoor, EPS-
2013-284-F&A, http://repub.eur.nl/pub/40068 
Schellekens, G.A.C., Language Abstraction in Word of Mouth, Promotor: Prof.dr.ir. A. Smidts, EPS-2010-
218-MKT, http://repub.eur.nl/pub/21580 
Shahzad, K., Credit Rating Agencies, Financial Regulations and the Capital Markets, Promotor: Prof.dr. 
G.M.H. Mertens, EPS-2013-283-F&A, http://repub.eur.nl/pub/39655 
Sotgiu, F., Not All Promotions are Made Equal: From the Effects of a Price War to Cross-chain 
Cannibalization, Promotor(s): Prof.dr. M.G. Dekimpe & Prof.dr.ir. B. Wierenga, EPS-2010-203-MKT, 
http://repub.eur.nl/pub/19714 
 
Sousa, M., Servant Leadership to the Test: New Perspectives and Insight, Promotors: Prof.dr. D. van 
Knippenberg & Dr. D. van Dierendonck, EPS-2014-313-ORG, http://repub.eur.nl/pub/51537 
Spliet, R., Vehicle Routing with Uncertain Demand, Promotor: Prof.dr.ir. R. Dekker, EPS-2013-293-LIS, 
http://repub.eur.nl/pub/41513 
Srour, F.J., Dissecting Drayage: An Examination of Structure, Information, and Control in Drayage 
Operations, Promotor: Prof.dr. S.L. van de Velde, EPS-2010-186-LIS, http://repub.eur.nl/pub/18231 
 
Staadt, J.L., Leading Public Housing Organisation in a Problematic Situation: A Critical Soft Systems 
Methodology Approach, Promotor: Prof.dr. S.J. Magala, EPS-2014-308-ORG, http://repub.eur.nl/pub/50712 
Stallen, M., Social Context Effects on Decision-Making; A Neurobiological Approach, Promotor: Prof.dr.ir. 
A. Smidts, EPS-2013-285-MKT, http://repub.eur.nl/pub/39931 
Tarakci, M., Behavioral Strategy; Strategic Consensus, Power and Networks, Promotor(s): Prof.dr. P.J.F. 
Groenen & Prof.dr. D.L. van Knippenberg, EPS-2013-280-ORG, http://repub.eur.nl/pub/39130 
Teixeira de Vasconcelos, M., Agency Costs, Firm Value, and Corporate Investment, Promotor: Prof.dr. P.G.J. 
Roosenboom, EPS-2012-265-F&A, http://repub.eur.nl/pub/37265 
 
Tempelaar, M.P., Organizing for Ambidexterity: Studies on the Pursuit of Exploration and Exploitation 
through Differentiation, Integration, Contextual and Individual Attributes, Promotor(s): Prof.dr.ing. F.A.J. 
van den Bosch & Prof.dr. H.W. Volberda, EPS-2010-191-STR, http://repub.eur.nl/pub/18457 
135_Erim Wang Stand.job
123 
 
 
Tiwari, V., Transition Process and Performance in IT Outsourcing: Evidence from a Field Study and 
Laboratory Experiments, Promotor(s): Prof.dr.ir. H.W.G.M. van Heck & Prof.dr. P.H.M. Vervest, 
EPS-2010-201-LIS, http://repub.eur.nl/pub/19868 
Tröster, C., Nationality Heterogeneity and Interpersonal Relationships at Work, Promotor: Prof.dr. 
D.L. van Knippenberg, EPS-2011-233-ORG, http://repub.eur.nl/pub/23298 
Tsekouras, D., No Pain No Gain: The Beneficial Role of Consumer Effort in Decision Making, 
Promotor: Prof.dr.ir. B.G.C. Dellaert, EPS-2012-268-MKT, http://repub.eur.nl/pub/37542  
 
Tunçdoğan, I.A., Decision Making and Behavioral Strategy: The Role of Regulatory Focus in Corporate 
Innovation Processes, Promotor(s) Prof. F.A.J. van den Bosch, Prof. H.W. Volberda, Prof. T.J.M. Mom, 
EPS-2014-334-S&E, http://repub.eur.nl/pub/76978 
Tzioti, S., Let Me Give You a Piece of Advice: Empirical Papers about Advice Taking in Marketing, 
Promotor(s): Prof.dr. S.M.J. van Osselaer & Prof.dr.ir. B. Wierenga, EPS-2010-211-MKT, 
http://repub.eur.nl/pub/21149 
Uijl, den, S., The Emergence of De-facto Standards, Promotor: Prof.dr. K. Blind, EPS-2014-328-LIS, 
http://repub.eur.nl/pub/77382 
 
Vaccaro, I.G., Management Innovation: Studies on the Role of Internal Change Agents, Promotor(s): 
Prof.dr. F.A.J. van den Bosch & Prof.dr. H.W. Volberda, EPS-2010-212-STR, http://repub.eur.nl/pub/21150 
Vagias, D., Liquidity, Investors and International Capital Markets, Promotor: Prof.dr. M.A. van Dijk, EPS-
2013-294-F&A, http://repub.eur.nl/pub/41511 
 
Veelenturf, L.P., Disruption Management in Passenger Railways: Models for Timetable, Rolling Stock and 
Crew Rescheduling, Promotor: Prof.dr. L.G. Kroon, EPS-2014-327-LIS, http://repub.eur.nl/pub/77155 
Verheijen, H.J.J., Vendor-Buyer Coordination in Supply Chains, Promotor: Prof.dr.ir. J.A.E.E. van Nunen, 
EPS-2010-194-LIS, http://repub.eur.nl/pub/19594 
Venus, M., Demystifying Visionary Leadership; In Search of the Essence of Effective Vision Communication, 
Promotor: Prof.dr. D.L. van Knippenberg, EPS-2013-289-ORG, http://repub.eur.nl/pub/40079 
Visser, V., Leader Affect and Leader Effectiveness; How Leader Affective Displays Influence Follower 
Outcomes, Promotor: Prof.dr. D. van Knippenberg, EPS-2013-286-ORG, http://repub.eur.nl/pub/40076 
Vlam, A.J., Customer First? The Relationship between Advisors and Consumers of Financial Products, 
Promotor: Prof.dr. Ph.H.B.F. Franses, EPS-2011-250-MKT, http://repub.eur.nl/pub/30585 
Waard, E.J. de, Engaging Environmental Turbulence: Organizational Determinants for Repetitive Quick and 
Adequate Responses, Promotor(s): Prof.dr. H.W. Volberda & Prof.dr. J. Soeters, EPS-2010-189-STR, 
http://repub.eur.nl/pub/18012 
Waltman, L., Computational and Game-Theoretic Approaches for Modeling Bounded Rationality, 
Promotor(s): Prof.dr.ir. R. Dekker & Prof.dr.ir. U. Kaymak, EPS-2011-248-LIS, 
http://repub.eur.nl/pub/26564 
Wang, Y., Information Content of Mutual Fund Portfolio Disclosure, Promotor: Prof.dr. M.J.C.M. Verbeek, 
EPS-2011-242-F&A, http://repub.eur.nl/pub/26066 
136_Erim Wang Stand.job
124 
 
Wang, Y., Corporate Reputation Management; Reaching Out to Find Stakeholders, Promotor: Prof.dr. 
C.B.M. van Riel, EPS-2013-271-ORG, http://repub.eur.nl/pub/38675 
 
Weenen, T.C., On the Origin and Development of the Medical Nutrition Industry, Promotors: Prof.dr. H.R. 
Commandeur & Prof.dr. H.J.H.M. Claassen, EPS-2014-309-S&E, http://repub.eur.nl/pub/51134 
Wolfswinkel, M., Corporate Governance, Firm Risk and Shareholder Value of Dutch Firms, Promotor: 
Prof.dr. A. de Jong, EPS-2013-277-F&A, http://repub.eur.nl/pub/39127 
Xu, Y., Empirical Essays on the Stock Returns, Risk Management, and Liquidity Creation of Banks, 
Promotor: Prof.dr. M.J.C.M. Verbeek, EPS-2010-188-F&A, http://repub.eur.nl/pub/18125 
 
Yang, S.Y., Information Aggregation Efficiency of Prediction Market, Promotor: Prof.dr.ir. H.W.G.M. 
van Heck, EPS-2014-323-LIS, http://repub.eur.nl/pub/77184 
Zaerpour, N., Efficient Management of Compact Storage Systems, Promotor: Prof.dr. M.B.M. de Koster, 
EPS-2013-276-LIS, http://repub.eur.nl/pub/38766 
Zhang, D., Essays in Executive Compensation, Promotor: Prof.dr. I. Dittmann, EPS-2012-261-F&A, 
http://repub.eur.nl/pub/32344 
Zhang, X., Scheduling with Time Lags, Promotor: Prof.dr. S.L. van de Velde, EPS-2010-206-LIS, 
http://repub.eur.nl/pub /19928 
Zhou, H., Knowledge, Entrepreneurship and Performance: Evidence from Country-level and Firm-level 
Studies, Promotor(s): Prof.dr. A.R. Thurik & Prof.dr. L.M. Uhlaner, EPS-2010-207-ORG, 
http://repub.eur.nl/pub/20634 
Zwan, P.W. van der, The Entrepreneurial Process: An International Analysis of Entry and Exit, Promotor(s): 
Prof.dr. A.R. Thurik & Prof.dr. P.J.F. Groenen, EPS-2011-234-ORG, http://repub.eur.nl/pub/23422 
 
 
 
 
T
E
N
G
 W
A
N
G
  -  E
ssa
y
s in
 B
a
n
k
in
g
 a
n
d
 C
o
rp
o
ra
te
 Fin
a
n
ce
ERIM PhD Series
Research in Management
E
ra
sm
u
s 
R
e
se
a
rc
h
 I
n
st
it
u
te
 o
f 
M
a
n
a
g
e
m
e
n
t
-
352
E
R
IM
D
e
si
g
n
 &
 l
a
yo
u
t:
 B
&
T
 O
n
tw
e
rp
 e
n
 a
d
vi
e
s 
 (
w
w
w
.b
-e
n
-t
.n
l)
  
  
P
ri
n
t:
 H
a
ve
k
a
  
 (
w
w
w
.h
a
ve
k
a
.n
l)ESSAYS IN BANKING AND CORPORATE FINANCE
This dissertation bundles three empirical studies in the area of corporate finance and
banking. These studies investigate corporates’ financing activity with a special focus on the
interaction between the banking industry and corporate borrowers. Chapter 2 asks the
question whether and how government interventions in the U.S. banking sector have
benefited the U.S. corporate borrowers during the financial crisis of 2007-2009. This chapter
focuses on firms’ stock performance and find that government capital infusions in banks
have a significantly positive impact on borrowing firms’ stock returns. Findings from this
chapter suggest that in an economic recession, policy makers could restart the economic
engine by carefully implementing a policy with the specific goal of reactivating the bank
lending channel. Chapter 3 looks into firm’s bond maturity dispersion activity and the
impact on firms’ funding liquidity. The results suggest that spreading out bond maturities is
an effective corporate policy used by certain types of firms to manage funding liquidity
risk. Chapter 4 investigates whether labor market frictions in the target market influence
the mode in which out-of-state banks enter the new market following the U.S. interstate
banking deregulation. The result shows that banks enter new markets by establishing new
branches after the relaxation of non-compete enforcement in the target market, while they
enter by acquiring incumbent banks’ branches after the enforcement becomes restrictive in
the target market. Interestingly, only bank entries via new branches significantly increase
bank competition, improve the availability of credit to small businesses, and facilitate
economic growth. 
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